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Foreword
Heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, cannabis, prescription and over-the-counter 
medicines, alcohol, tobacco, coffee, tea - we are all people who use drugs. 
Our refusal to acknowledge this comes from a deep-seated fear that ‘we’ 
might become, or be seen as, one of ‘them’. What we really need to focus 
on is the difference between drug use and drug addiction or dependency. 
Global prohibitionist drug policy continues to focus efforts primarily 
on the substances alone. This is wrong.
Of course, the harms associated with some drugs are worse than others. 
Sometimes these are due to the degree of addictiveness of a particular 
drug. But most of the harms are due to the way that a particular drug is 
acquired (for example, in a dark alley versus from a pharmacy), the way 
in which it is used (as a pill, for example, versus smoking, snorting or 
injecting), and, even more importantly, the way in which society treats 
people who use drugs. The vast majority of the horrific harms asso-
ciated with drug use—crime, HIV and other blood-borne infections, 
violence, incarceration, death—are clearly fuelled by the prohibitionist 
drug policies our governments pursue. 
xii
The use of non-medical drugs, and more importantly the ‘War on Drugs’ 
itself, have had a profound influence on the global HIV epidemic over 
the past 25 years. Today, injecting drug use accounts for 30% of HIV 
infections worldwide outside of sub-Saharan Africa. In the Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia region as a whole over 60% of HIV infections are 
due to injecting drug use. 
Global normative guidance on HIV prevention, treatment, care and 
support for people who inject drugs emphasises the use of a compre-
hensive set of evidence-based interventions aimed at reducing the 
harms associated with drug use. This normative guidance, as endorsed 
by the World Health Organization, the United Nations Joint Programme 
on HIV/AIDS, the International AIDS Society and other organisations, 
is in direct contrast to global drug control policy, as set out in the three 
major UN drug conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. These call for a strict 
prohibitionist stance on the production, distribution and use of non-
medical drugs.
It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to show that criminalising drugs and 
drug use has directly and indirectly led to a dramatic increase in drug-
related harms, and that controlling and regulating the production 
and distribution of all drugs would go a long way towards reducing 
those harms. So long as we continue to define the drug user as ‘other’ 
and define the drug itself as the problem, we will be trapped in our 
misguided and harm-inducing programmes and policies.
‘After the War on Drugs: Blueprint for Regulation’ lays out, for the first time, 
a set of practical and pragmatic options for a global regulatory system 
for non-medical drugs. It comes at a critical time. A number of Latin 
American governments, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Mexico have moved, or are moving, towards decriminalisation of 
drug possession and are shifting to a public health model to prevent and 
treat misuse of drugs. They are no longer able to tolerate the damage 
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done to their societies by the War on Drugs. Portugal decriminalised 
possession of all drugs in 2001. There are signs that the US government, 
under the new US ‘Drug Czar’ Gil Kerlikowske, is ready to review its 
position on the War on Drugs. Given that prohibitionist policy has been 
dominated by the US, and to some extent Russia, Japan and Sweden, any 
shifts in US policy could have dramatic effects at the global level.
This is not a radical book, nor does it posit radical approaches to 
global drug policy. In fact, as it points out, the prohibitionist model is 
the radical approach, in that it is based exclusively on a moral judg-
ment against drug use and drug users and not on an evidence based 
approach to reducing drug-related harms. Underscoring a century 
of prohibitionist policy is a deep-seated fear that moving from prohi-
bition to a regulatory approach will lead to a ‘free-for-all’ situation 
vis-à-vis drug availability and use. ‘Blueprint’ outlines clearly that this 
fear is irrational and that reform of any kind will be vastly superior to 
the status quo. 
Reform will not happen overnight. In fact, as ‘Blueprint’ makes clear, 
it will be important that changes are phased in gradually and closely 
monitored through intensive policy research that comprehensively 
documents health and other outcomes. The book proposes a number 
of regulatory options for each class of drug. Various approaches 
currently in use for the regulation and management of alcohol, tobacco, 
cannabis, and pharmaceutical medicines can be adapted for regulating 
non-medical drugs and drug use. 
There often appears to be a vast gulf of irreconcilable differences 
between those of us advocating for harm reduction approaches to drug 
use, and those in the anti-drugs movement. To bridge the gap between 
these movements, harm reduction advocates must not be coy about the 
horrific problems that can be associated with drug use. Individuals in 
the anti-drugs movement are motivated too by their experience of these 
xiv
harms. Discussing these experiences openly and without prejudice 
could lead to a common language we can all share. If we are not able to 
reach out to the anti-drugs movement and find common ground, then 
our evidence will never overcome their fear. We must aim towards a 
unified voice where public health and human rights are two sides of 
the same coin.
‘Blueprint’ envisages a world in which non-medical drug supply 
and use is addressed through the right blend of compassion, prag-
matism, and evidence-based interventions focussed on improving 
public health. These have been missing from the debate for too long. 
The time for change in global drug policy is long overdue. Nothing 
less than the future health of individuals, families, communities 
and societies is at stake.
Craig McClure 
Former Executive Director, International AIDS Society
22 September 2009
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1.1	 Anethicsofeffectiveness
Global drug policy is rooted in a laudable urge to address the very real 
harms that non-medical psychoactive drugs can create. Such concerns 
have driven a prohibitionist global agenda: an agenda that gives clear 
and direct moral authority to those who support it, while casting those 
who are against it as ethically and politically irresponsible. However, 
such binary thinking can be problematic. By defining the most stringent 
prohibition as the most moral position, it makes nuanced consideration 
of the impacts of prohibition difficult.
In particular, it makes it very difficult to look at and learn from the 
impacts and achievements of prohibition. Historic attempts to do so have 
foundered on a sense that analysing prohibition means questioning 
prohibition, and that questioning prohibition is in itself an immoral 
act—one that allies the questioner with the well known infamies of the 
world’s illegal drug trade. Ironically, supporting the status quo perpetu-
ates that trade, and the harms that it creates. 
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prevents policy makers and legislators from learning from experience. 
In fact, a century of experience with prohibition teaches that it can often 
be counter-productive; failing to reduce the harms it sets out to address 
as well as creating a raft of catastrophic unintended consequences. The 
extent of this failure has been chronicled in detail by many hundreds of 
sober, independent and objective assessments undertaken by govern-
ment committees, academics, and Non Government Organisations across 
the world, over many decades. 
It is not the purpose of this report to revisit these various findings; they 
are freely and easily available elsewhere.1 Rather, we seek to reconsider 
the management of illicit drugs in the light of the experience that they 
represent and embody. Using that experience, we will set out a blueprint 
for non-medical drug management policies that will minimise the harms 
that such drug use creates, both on a personal and on a societal level. 
In short, our goal is to define a set of practical and effective risk and 
harm management and reduction policies. Such policies will represent 
a clear and positive step towards the positive outcomes that prohibition 
has tried, and failed, to achieve. A strictly prohibitionist stance would 
understand them to be immoral, because they call for the legally regu-
lated production and availability of many currently proscribed drugs. 
Transform’s position is, in fact, driven by an ethics of effectiveness, and 
as such represent an attempt to re-frame the global harm management 
debate in exclusively practical terms. 
Examples of inadequate regulation of currently legal drugs should not 
distract us from seeking more just and effective models for the regulation 
of currently illegal drugs. An ethics of effectiveness should be applied 
to all drugs. Indeed, historic failings in regulation of the tobacco and 
alcohol industries have more in common with the abrogation of control 
that prohibition exemplifies, than with best practice in regulation. 
1 See Transform’s collection of key reports www.tdpf.org.uk/Policy_KeyReports.htm, 
and the Drug Policy Alliance online library www.drugpolicy.org/library/.
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1.2	 No-onewantsanarchy
Prohibition’s emergence has been predicated on the concept of drugs 
as an existential ‘threat’, rather than a more conventionally conceived 
health or social policy issue. Prohibitionist rhetoric frames drugs as 
menacing not just health, but also our children, national security (‘our 
borders’), or more broadly the moral fabric of society itself. 
The prohibition paradigm is very much framed as a response to such 
threats, which has cast prohibitionist discourse as a moral crusade 
against an ‘evil’ that threatens mankind itself. The preamble to the 1961 
UN Single Convention on drugs, for example, establishes the context of 
the legal framework it has enshrined in these terms: 
* Concerned with the health and welfare of mankind
* Recognizing that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil 
for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to 
mankind
* Conscious of their duty to prevent and combat this evil 
Given this rhetorical context, it is easy to see how supporters of prohi-
bition understand any kind of moves towards legal regulation of drug 
production and supply as being immoral, a form of surrender, or descent 
into anarchy. Criticism of more liberal drug policies is, in fact, often 
framed in these terms. Critics define one or more worst case scenarios, 
often extrapolated from ‘what if ?’ thinking built on an immediate and 
total absence of all drug control legislation, and then argue from the 
basis that such scenarios will be the norm. 
It is important to note that, here, we agree with the prohibitionists. 
Full and immediate absence of all drug control infrastructure, disre-
garding all hard won harm and risk management experience, would 
lead to serious personal and social harms, outweighing any potential 
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and mistaken. Nobody wants anarchy, least of all us. This remains 
true whether it is criminal anarchy or entirely 
unfettered free markets. The need for the effec-
tive regulation of non-medical drug production 
and availability and use has always been, and 
remains, paramount. 
Where we differ is on our sense of the function of 
regulation. Instead of understanding drugs to be 
virulently, existentially threatening, we see them 
as creating issues that can be most helpfully defined in medical/health 
and social terms. Drug using motivations and behaviours are many and 
varied, as are the outcomes of this use; they exist on a continuum from 
beneficial use, through non-problematic use, to problematic and chronic 
dependent use. Whilst this book emphasises the application of legal 
regulation where drug related harms are most evident, we also need to 
recognise that the majority of drug use is not significantly harmful, is an 
informed adult choice, and is rationally motivated—primarily by plea-
sure. So, rather than seeking to use statutory instruments to punish and 
eradicate moral evil, we look to help develop a clearly defined set of laws 
that will help local, national and global legislatures effectively manage 
the reality of the health and social issues we face, to the clearly definable, 
and measurable, benefit of all. 
1.3	 Beingradical?
Supporters of prohibition present any steps towards legal regulation 
of drug markets as ‘radical’, and therefore innately confrontational and 
dangerous. However, the historical evidence demonstrates that, in fact, it 
is prohibition that is the radical policy. Legal regulation of drug produc-
tion, supply and use is far more in line with currently accepted ways of 
managing health and social risks in almost all other spheres of life. 
Instead of understanding 
drugs to be virulently, 
existentially threatening, 
we see them as creating 
issues that can be most 
helpfully defined in 
medical/health and 
social terms
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By contrast, the presentation of drugs as an existential ‘threat’ has gener-
ated a policy response within which unevidenced and radical measures 
are justified. Drug policy has evolved within a context of ‘securitization’, 
characterised by increasing powers and resources for enforcement and 
state security apparatus. The outcomes of this strategy, framed as a 
drug ‘war’, include the legitimisation of propaganda, and the suspen-
sion of many of the working principles that define more conventional 
social policy, health or legal interventions. Given that the War on Drugs 
is predicated on ‘eradication’ of the ‘evil’ drug threat as a way of achieving 
a ‘drug free world’, it has effectively established a permanent state of war. 
This has led to a high level policy environment that ignores critical scien-
tific thinking, and health and social policy norms. Fighting the threat 
becomes an end in itself and as such, it creates a largely self-referential 
and self-justifying rhetoric that makes meaningful evaluation, review 
and debate difficult, if not impossible. 
Prohibition has become so entrenched and institutionalised that many 
in the drugs field, even those from the more critical progressive end of 
the spectrum, view it as immutable, an assumed reality of the legal and 
policy landscape to be worked within or around, rather than a policy 
choice. It is in this context that we seek to highlight how the basics of 
normative health and social policy can be applied to developing effec-
tive responses to drugs. Put bluntly, it is prohibition, not legal regulation 
that is the radical policy. 
1.4	 Ourproposals
‘Legalisation’ is a process of legal reform only, regulation being the end 
point. So, when proponents of such moves are asked ‘how would legali-
sation work?’, or ‘what would it look like?’ they can find it hard to give 
concrete responses. In the absence of more fully realised answers to 
these questions, myths and misunderstandings fill the void. Without a 
firm sense of what a post-legalisation world would look like, and how 
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forward. This book aims to provide that foundation. 
Thus, we are putting forward a set of proposals for how drug regula-
tion might operate when the War on Drugs finally ends. In doing so, 
we have tried to create a very specific and practical set of suggestions 
for managing a variety of different drugs in ways appropriate to the 
individual effects that they have, and harms that they can cause. In 
particular, we have considered how such drugs could be produced and 
supplied, with the aim of taking back control of the drugs market from 
those least likely to manage it in a constructive way. We have based our 
thinking on currently existing models of controlled substance produc-
tion, supply and management. 
We begin this task by defining five models for regulating drug 
supply. We propose that drugs could be made available on prescrip-
tion, through pharmacy sales, through sale from licensed outlets or 
venues, or even (in some admittedly rare cases) through sale from 
unlicensed suppliers. It should be noted that, under our proposals, 
this last is the exception, not the rule; and that, conversely, under 
prohibition, every single drug supplier is by definition unli-
censed, and therefore beyond any form of constructive state or civil  
authority control or management. 
Then, we look at the practical detail of regulation. We consider what 
kind of production and product controls could be put in place, to 
ensure that, for example, product strength and purity is safeguarded 
and consistent, and that appropriate product information is easily 
available to those using them. We define a range of supplier and outlet 
controls, and we balance that with some suggestions for purchaser and 
end user controls. Taken as a body, these will support and encourage 
drug users to use more moderately and responsibly, where appropriate 
in safer, more controlled environments. They are intended to minimise 
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the personal and societal harms currently associated with drug taking. 
Again, under prohibition, harm minimisation of this type is rarely 
possible, nor generally even seen as desirable. 
Of course, we accept that such changes will not come about overnight; 
nor should they. Legal regulation of production, supply and use repre-
sents a substantial realignment in drug management policy; like any 
such shift, it is not without risks, and so should be brought in slowly 
and carefully, with the impact of each incremental change carefully 
assessed before the next one is introduced. So, we propose a cautious, 
phased introduction. We look at ways of better assessing and ranking 
drug risks and harms to inform such decisions, and of managing 
appropriate legislation globally, nationally and locally. Effective policy 
needs effective research; we briefly lay out the terms of such research, 
and the goals it would need to achieve. Finally, moves towards legally 
regulated drug production and supply would have a wide range of 
broader social, political and economic impacts. We try to understand 
these, and look at ways of mitigating negative impacts whilst building 
on the positive. 
By way of conclusion, we look at how regulated drug markets might 
work in practice. We begin with alcohol and tobacco. Despite their 
socially accepted status, they are capable of causing proven harms, and 
so their availability is carefully managed in most modern societies. We 
look at the most constructive ways of so doing, learning from historic 
mistakes. Then, we consider how regulated supply of cannabis, stimu-
lants, psychedelics and depressants might work, based on the methods 
and processes defined in the preceding chapters. 
The report is supplemented with two appendices. These give a broader 
context to the report, by describing the development and action of the 
current UN drug control system, and laying out current legal produc-
tion frameworks for opium, coca, cannabis and pharmaceuticals. 
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1.5	 Knowingthelimits
It is crucial to recognise that legal regulation of drugs will not elimi-
nate problematic drug use or dependence. Prohibition cannot produce 
a drug free world; regulatory models cannot produce a harm free world. 
Some individuals will continue to be harmed by their drug use, or as 
a result of the drug use of others. High-profile drug related tragedies 
will continue to make headlines. Legal regulation is no silver bullet or 
panacea for ‘the drug problem’, however it is conceived. 
Legal regulation and control of drug markets can only seek to 
reduce or eliminate the harms that are created or exacerbated 
specifically by prohibition and illicit markets. It is also important to 
acknowledge that regulation of drug production is only one aspect 
of the broader drug policy debate. This wider field includes a range 
of intersecting arenas of policy thinking, including public health 
education and prevention, treatment and recovery, and the role of 
broader social policy concerns (including poverty, social exclusion, 
inequality, and human rights), and how they impact on drug use and 
drug markets. 
Whilst these issues are not covered in any detail, a strong argument is 
made in these pages that prohibition creates both conceptual and practical 
obstacles to addressing the very real health concerns around problematic 
drug use. Its replacement with a regulatory system would enable, in terms 
of redirected resources, and empower, by reshaping the discourse and 
removing political and ideological obstacles, a public health and wellbeing 
based approach that would produce long term benefits. It would create 
a context that could facilitate tackling the social conditions that underlie 
problematic use, and better deal with wider drug related harms. 
Regulation as envisaged here would also not entirely eliminate illicit 
drug markets and their associated problems, and it is important to note 
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that any regulatory system is only as good as its enforcement. Clearly 
illicit activity continues to some extent with almost all commodities 
including drugs that are currently legal (alcohol, tobacco, and prescrip-
tion drugs). Even a partial reduction in illicit markets and prohibition 
related harms still represents a huge net gain for society as a whole. 
1.6	 Astartingpoint,notaconclusion
In publishing this book, we are not seeking to provide an exhaustive 
response to the practical issues surrounding legal regulation of drug 
production, supply and use. We have tried to demonstrate that legalisation 
and regulation do not mean anarchy; rather, plentiful drug management 
models already exist, and can be usefully and constructively applied to 
create a post-prohibition world, that learns from the mistakes of earlier 
drug management policies, and builds on their achievements. 
However, we are very aware that this book is a starting point, not a 
conclusion. We do not seek to provide an unarguable answer to the 
problems of moving beyond prohibition; rather, we are looking to 
trigger debate and discussion about the most practical and construc-
tive ways of achieving such a change. To facilitate this process we 
are launching various online discussion venues to accompany a 
series of discussion events, seminars and dialogues with key stake-
holders. Message boards will allow readers to share their own 
opinions, while a ‘wiki’ version of the report will allow reader expertise 
to be fed directly into an evolving future iteration of the book itself (visit  
www.tdpf.org.uk for more information). 
We are also very aware that this book has been written from a specifically 
Western, and in particular European, point of view. We are in particular 
looking forward to input that will help broaden the book’s perspective, 
and move it towards achieving a fully global awareness of the problems 
and solutions involved in moving towards a post-prohibition world. 
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Furtherreading
* ‘After the War on Drugs: Options for Control’,	Transform	Drug	
Policy	Foundation,	2004
* ‘After the War on Drugs: Tools for the Debate’,	Transform	Drug	
Policy	Foundation,	2006
* S.	Rolles,	‘Principles for rational drug policy making’,  
(chapter	in	‘The Politics of Narcotic Drugs’,	Routledge,	edited	by	
J.	Buxton,	2009)	
* K.	Grayson,	‘Chasing Dragons—Security, Identity and Illicit Drugs in 
Canada’,	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2008
* R.	MacCoun,	P.	Reuter,	‘Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other 
Vices, Times, & Places’,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001	
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2.1	 Regulation,prohibitionandfreemarkets
A spectrum of different approaches exists for controlling and regulating 
the production, supply and possession/use of different drugs. These 
can be broadly seen as existing on a continuum between the poles of 
completely unregulated free markets, and harshly enforced punitive 
prohibition. Ironically both of these extremes entail little or no market 
regulation. Between them sit the various options for legal regulation. 
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2 Either through policing practice (tolerance, ‘turning a blind eye’, de-prioritisation, 
non-enforcement, warnings/cautions etc.), or by changing responses to possession  
from criminal to civil or administrative sanctions. Access to drugs remains through  
illicit channels.
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Prohibition/Criminalisation 
Prohibiting/criminalising non-medical production, supply, possession and use, 
with punitive sanctions. Intensity of enforcement and severity of penalties can vary. 
Decriminalisation of personal possession and use can operate within a prohibitionist 
framework.2
example: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, ecstasy, etc.
market controller: criminal entrepreneurs, corrupt police and officials. 
Regulated markets 
A range of regulatory controls are deployed covering drug production and trade, 
product, gatekeepers of supply, and user. Some drugs, preparations, and activities 
remain prohibited. 
example: prescription drugs, over the counter drugs, alcohol, tobacco.
market controller: moderate to intense regulation by government agencies.
Free market legalisation, or ‘supermarket model’
Drugs are legal and available for essentially unrestricted sale in the ‘free market’, like 
other consumer goods. 
example: caffeinated drinks.
market controller: corporate/private enterprise, with minimal regulation by 
government agencies, voluntary codes for retailers. 
2.1.1	 Prohibition/criminalisation
Drug prohibition is a legal system under which the production, supply 
and use (or possession) of a list of specified drugs is proscribed by law 
and subject to punitive sanction. The overarching legal framework 
for global prohibition is defined by the three UN drug conventions 
 17
(see: Appendix 1, page 165) which frame domestic law across the globe. 
While these prohibitions are absolute in nature for all non-medical 
use, the detail of penalties and enforcement regimes are not specified 
and vary widely between states. The only legal production and supply 
models for drugs covered by the conventions are those permitted 
for medical and scientific purposes, such as opiates for maintenance 
prescribing for dependent users.3 Some exemptions also operate in a 
legal grey area for traditional and religious uses (see: 5.5 Psychedelics, 
page 146). Such models are consequently limited to a tiny proportion of 
the total using population. 
Within the overarching global prohibition framework, individual 
states have considerable flexibility to determine enforcement regimes 
and punitive responses for prohibited activities. Indeed, responses to 
identical offences in different countries vary from de facto decriminali-
sation through to long prison sentences or, at the extremes, the death 
penalty. Trends in policy have diverged and polarised in recent years. 
While many countries’ drug policies have become increasingly draco-
nian and punitive,4 there has been, throughout much of the developed 
world and in the newly industrialising countries of South America, a 
clear trend towards grudging tolerance and decriminalisation of drug 
possession and use.5 
It is also important to note that, while exploration of these less puni-
tive approaches to personal possession and use is allowed within the 
international legal framework, no form of legal production and supply 
of any drug prohibited under the conventions, or domestic law, can 
be explored for non-medical use in any way. The medical prescrip-
tion model is the only real quasi-exception to this rigid rule; as such, 
it exists as an island of regulated production and supply, albeit within 
very narrow parameters. Beyond this there is zero flexibility for any 
3 The conventions also control the medical uses of listed drugs, such as opiates for  
pain control. 
4  ‘At What Cost? HIV and Human Rights Consequences of the Global War on Drugs’, 
International Harm Reduction Development Program, Open Society Institute, 2009.
5  ‘Illicit drug use in the EU: legislative approaches’, EMCDDA, 2005, and: T. Blickman, 
M. Jelsma, ‘Drug Policy Reform in Practice’,  Transnational Institute, 2009. 
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regulated production and supply models to be piloted, tested, researched 
or explored. Furthermore, this absolute legal barrier creates genuine 
political obstacles to even discussing or proffering such policy alterna-
tives. Defenders of the status quo often adopt dogmatic and entrenched 
moral positions, portraying regulatory legal alternatives as immoral, 
extreme, ‘pro-drug’,6 radical, or even heretical. The clear implication is 
that debating such alternatives is a political ‘no-go’ zone. Until relatively 
recently, the climate of fear thus created had pushed the law reform 
position to the margins of mainstream political discourse. 
To the rational public health or social policy pragmatist, exploring and 
seeking out policy options that will deliver the best policy outcomes—an 
optimum point along this drug policy continuum—the idea that such an 
arbitrary barrier to policy research and development exists is difficult 
to justify. 
This is especially true given that the vast majority of markets for 
goods and services, particularly ones that involve risk or poten-
tial harm (including many hundreds of medical and non-medical 
psychoactive drugs), are both legally available 
and regulated by governments. 
A wide range of evidence based regulatory mecha-
nisms and related enforcement/oversight agencies 
are deployed to control and manage producers, 
suppliers, environments, products and consumers. 
Legal regulation of potentially risky goods and 
activities is demonstrably not only the norm; it is 
one of the primary functions of government. For even the exploration 
of any such regulatory options to be forbidden in one, relatively narrow, 
field of human behaviour does not sit well with the wider commitment 
of the United Nations to ‘promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom’.7
6  UNODC executive director Antonio Costa has frequently used the term to describe 
advocates of legalisation/regulation.
7 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble.
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2.1.2	 Regulatedmarkets
This book defines ‘regulation’ as a set of legal rules and enforcement 
infrastructure designed to control or govern certain types of products 
and conduct—the various options being explored in detail in this and 
the following chapters. Activities that take place beyond the parame-
ters of a given regulatory framework remain prohibited and subject to 
legal sanctions. 
2.1.3	 Freemarketlegalisation
The free market model is often wrongly associated with the word 
‘legalisation’, even deliberately so as the ‘nightmare scenario’ promoted 
by opponents of reform, but is in reality only espoused by a very small 
group of hard core libertarian thinkers. With the possible exception of 
some very low risk products such as coffee or coca tea, such models 
are not appropriate for drugs, because they forgo the potential for 
most forms of responsible state intervention in market regulation and 
control. In this, they are handing control of drug markets to exploit-
ative profiteers just as surely as prohibition. 
Arguably such an approach8 is, from a public health perspective at 
least, potentially an even worse scenario than unregulated criminal 
control of drug markets. Legal commercial actors—whose primary 
concern is profit maximisation—would be free to aggressively promote 
consumption through marketing and advertising. 
The potential for such an approach to create unacceptable public 
health costs has been all too clearly demonstrated with the example 
of the free markets for tobacco in much of the developed world during 
the first 60 years of the 20th century, and to a greater extent in large 
parts of the developing world today (see: 5.1 Alcohol, page 100, and 
5.2 Tobacco, page 105). 
8  Nadelmann describes it as the ‘supermarket model’ in a more detailed critique;  
see: E. Nadelmann ‘Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition’,  
Daedalus, 1992, 121: pages 87–132.
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2.2		 Definingthefivebasicregulationmodels
There are five basic models for regulating drug supply. We describe 
them below, starting with the most restrictive and moving to the most 
open. Variants on these models already exist and function across the 
world, supporting the entirely legal distribution of a range of medical, 
quasi-medical and non-medical psychoactive drugs. 
Of course, the precise nature of the respective regulatory frameworks 
and enforcement infrastructure varies from country to country.  
There is also some degree of boundary blurring between these models. 
This leads to a certain amount of generalisation, but also helps 
emphasise that such models will inevitably operate differently in 
different locations. 
We have also made some basic suggestions as to how to adapt these 
basic models to cater for the challenges of non-medical drug supply in 
the future. 
2.3	 Prescription
* The prescription model is the most tightly controlled and 
enforced drug supply model currently in operation. Under this 
model, drugs are prescribed to a named user by a qualified and 
licensed medical practitioner. They are dispensed by a licensed 
practitioner or pharmacist from a licensed pharmacy or other 
designated outlet.
* The process is controlled by a range of legislation, regulatory struc-
tures and enforcement bodies. These guide, oversee and police the 
prescribing doctors and dispensing pharmacists. They also help 
determine which drugs are available, in what form, where, and 
under what criteria. 
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* As the most tightly controlled and enforced supply model, the 
prescription model is the most expensive to administer. It is 
limited to medical necessity, which restricts its actual or poten-
tial use to the problematic/chronic dependent end of the drug use 
spectrum.9 Most commonly, it supports maintenance prescribing 
as part of a treatment regimen or harm reduction programme. 
As such it will only ever involve a small fraction of the total drug 
using population, although it should be noted that this user group 
is disproportionately associated with the greatest personal and 
societal harms (especially under prohibition10).
* Substitute opiates such as methadone are the most commonly 
prescribed under such scenarios. Prescribed injectable heroin 
(diamorphine) also has a long history, and established evidence 
base.11 Less common, although not unknown, is the prescription of 
stimulants, including amphetamines and cocaine. 
* These long established models serve as an island of regulation for 
the very same drugs that are prohibited in all other scenarios. They 
provide a useful, if limited, demonstration of how legal regulation 
of drugs can help people become prescribed, rather than street, 
users; a clear example of the benefits of decriminalisation of drug 
use and regularisation of their supply route. 
* This is particularly important given that such legal models have 
only evolved within generally hostile prohibition environments. As 
a rule, they have been minimally funded and politically unpopular. 
It is hard to know how such services would develop if managed with 
the latitude afforded to other, less controversial areas of patient care 
such as, for example, diabetes or mental health. 
9 As well as, occasionally, for psycho-therapeutic uses of, for example, MDMA or certain 
hallucinogens. Cannabis prescribing is also somewhat different in practice. 
10 See: discussion on disaggregating drug harms in ‘A Comparison of the Cost-effectiveness  
of the Prohibition and Regulation of Drugs’, Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2009,  
(and 4.2 Assessing and ranking drug harms, page 70).
11 G. Stimson, N. Metrebian, ‘Prescribing heroin: what is the evidence?’, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2003, and M. Ashton, J. Witton, ‘Thematic review—heroin prescribing’, Drug 
and Alcohol Findings, 2003, issue 9, page 16. 
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* Additional tiers of regulation have often been introduced within 
the basic prescribing model. These include requirements for 
consumption to be supervised in a specific venue, for very specific 
qualifying criteria to be met, or for the prescribing doctor to obtain 
a special licence. Prescribing is often time limited, administered in 
progressively reduced dosage, or made conditional on the patient 
meeting specific rehabilitation milestones. 
* Some prescribing occurs in a grey area, where medical necessity 
has evolved into what is effectively maintained dependence. This 
is far more widespread, and includes dependence on various pain-
killers (e.g. Vicodin, OxyContin) and tranquillisers (e.g. Valium). 
* Maintenance prescribing for dependent users continues to create 
controversy within the field of medical ethics and practice. It raises 
some difficult questions for practitioners, as it exposes the grey areas 
between medical, quasi-medical and non-medical use. There are 
ongoing controversies and conflicts between the clear need to reduce 
harms associated with problematic illicit drug use and a reluctance 
to dispense drugs that are being used in any way non-medically. 
* There are clear benefits of providing a safe and affordable supply 
of both drug and related paraphernalia. From a medical point of 
view, these are particularly helpful to those injecting, who are at 
high risk of contracting blood borne diseases. These benefits are 
sometimes undermined if practitioners are accused of supporting 
drug use for pleasure or recreation, while simultaneously ‘failing 
to treat’—or even ‘endorsing’—dependence. 
* There appears to be a need for this field of care to evolve pragmati-
cally to deal with modern challenges. Specialist training, a specific 
qualification/licence, or a new specialist prescribing-practitioner 
professional niche could be put in place. These would be supported 
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by a strictly ethical code of conduct, and clearly defined general 
guidance. They would potentially be overseen by a new regulatory 
agency, or equivalent sub-group. 
* Beyond this admittedly European perspective is an extensive, 
although poorly documented, history of opium registration 
systems in many Eastern and Middle Eastern countries. Users 
were registered and managed in Iran until 1953, and then again 
in the early 1970s (similar programmes are now being cautiously 
re-introduced); comparable systems also existed in Pakistan 
and India—where remnants still function—and in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Thailand and elsewhere. 
2.4	 	Pharmacymodel
* The pharmacy model, whilst still working within a clearly defined 
medical framework, is less restrictive and controlling than the 
prescription model. Pharmacists are trained and licensed to 
dispense prescriptions, although they cannot write them. They can 
also sell certain generally lower risk medical drugs from behind 
the counter. Such dispensing generally takes place from licensed 
pharmacy venues. 
* Pharmacists are overseen by regulatory legislation, managed by 
various agencies and a clearly defined enforcement infrastructure. 
They either fulfil prescriptions, or sell over the counter products. 
Access to the latter is only possible if firm, non-negotiable criteria 
are met. These include restrictions according to buyer age, level of 
intoxication, quantity requested, or case-specific concerns relating 
to potential misuse. In addition, pharmacists are trained to offer 
basic medical advice, support and information. 
* In some places, pharmacists are already involved in drug 
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management regimes. For example, in the UK, they are required 
to supervise the on-site consumption of some maintenance 
methadone prescriptions—a precaution against diversion to the 
illicit market. 
* The existing pharmacy model is not directly involved in dispensing 
or vending drugs for non-medical use. However, it could easily be 
adapted and developed into an effective way of managing the avail-
ability of currently illicit drugs for such purposes. Licensed and 
trained professionals could serve as gatekeepers for a range of such 
drugs. They would be legally required to restrict sales according 
to the kind of strict criteria defined above, and would also act as a 
source of realistic, well informed and practical advice and support. 
* A specialist, non-medical drug pharmacist would occupy a distinct 
professional niche, one that would need careful development, defi-
nition and management. This new role would be subject to a similar 
code of practice to that of more conventional pharmacists, but with 
additional access control criteria. These specialist pharmacists 
would also be required to offer advice about harm reduction, safer 
use, and treatment services and referrals to help users quit, where 
appropriate. Such advice would be supported by necessary addi-
tional training or experience in drug counselling. They could either 
operate alongside existing pharmacies (subject to appropriate 
licensing conditions) or from separate licensed outlets.
2.5	 	Licensedsales
* Current best practice in licensed sales of alcohol and tobacco offers 
a less restrictive, more flexible infrastructure for the licensed sales 
of certain lower risk non-medical drugs (see: 5.1 Alcohol, page 100, 
and 5.2 Tobacco, page 105). Such a system would put various combi-
nations of regulatory controls in place to manage the vendor, the 
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supply outlet, the product and the purchaser, as appropriate. 
* Much like current best practice in alcohol and tobacco management 
programmes, a raft of centrally determined framework policy and 
regulatory legislation would be put in place. This would be over-
seen and enforced by municipal, regional or national authorities, 
according to local legal and cultural norms. These authorities 
would act as the licensing body, and would be able to tailor the 
regulatory framework to local needs and policy priorities. They 
would be supported by police, customs, trading standards, and 
health and safety infrastructure, as appropriate. 
* As noted in the pharmacy model above, licence holders could be 
required to offer advice about harm reduction, safer use, and treat-
ment services, where appropriate. They might also be required to 
undergo necessary additional training in drug counselling, or to 
have pre-existing drug counselling experience. 
2.6	 	Licensedpremises
* Public houses and bars serving alcohol offer the most common 
example of premises licensed for sale and consumption. Under this 
long established system, various controls exist over the venue and 
(in particular) the licensee. He or she is responsible for restricting 
sales on the basis of age, intoxication and hours of opening. 
* The licensing authority is usually a tier of local government, which 
manages and enforces a series of centrally determined regulations. 
A clearly defined hierarchy of sanctions for licence infringements 
includes a sliding scale of fines, loss of licence, and even criminal 
penalties. Licensees can also be held partially or wholly liable for 
how their customers behave—punishable examples include anti-
social behaviour, noise, littering and drink driving. 
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* The cannabis ‘coffee shop’ system in the Netherlands offers another 
useful example of premises licensed to sell more contentious prod-
ucts (see: 5.3 Cannabis, page 110). Through these coffee shops, the 
Dutch authorities have gone some way towards legally licensing 
the sale and consumption of cannabis. However, it should be noted 
that, even here, the cannabis trade is not subject to full legal regu-
lation; supply to the coffee shops remains illicit, even though low 
level supply and consumption within them is tolerated. The coffee 
shops themselves operate under a range of strict—and strictly 
policed—conditions. 
* Supervised venues for the dispensing and consumption of 
prescribed diamorphine (heroin) are another form of licensed 
venue. They are subject to strict licensing, regular external scru-
tiny and firm enforcement, although they only provide drugs on a 
prescription basis. 
* Lessons can also be learned from licensing and regulating regimes 
put in place to manage other restricted (and potentially harmful) 
activities including gambling, certain kinds of entertainment, and 
sex work.12 
* The examples given above suggest that a functioning licensed 
premises for drugs would remain relatively restricted in terms 
of how it offered drugs, and who it offered them to. Given this, it 
could combine elements of existing licensed premises, licensed 
sales, and specialist pharmacy models, to ensure that moderate 
drug use took place in a safer, more supportive environment. 
2.7	 	Unlicensedsales
* Certain psychoactive substances deemed sufficiently low risk, 
such as coffee, traditional use of coca tea and some low strength 
12 R. MacCoun, P. Reuter, ‘Drug War Heresies: Learning from Other Vices, Times, & Places’, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
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painkillers, are subject to little or no licensing. Here, regulation 
focuses on standard product descriptions and labelling. Where 
appropriate, food and beverage legislation (dealing with packaging, 
sell by dates, ingredients etc.) comes into play. These substances 
are effectively freely available, although they may in some cases be 
subject to certain localised restrictions or voluntary codes. 
Regulated Market Model 
There has been much recent discussion responding to the historic public health failings 
of tobacco policy (see: 5.2 Tobacco, page 105). This has generated proposals for a new 
regulatory model that could also be applied to other drugs. Professor Ron Borland has 
proposed the Regulated Market Model (RMM), which is built on the assumption that 
smoked tobacco is not an ordinary consumer product. 
Even when used as directed, tobacco is both highly addictive and significantly harmful 
to personal health. It follows that any commercial marketing, which aims to increase 
tobacco consumption and thus profitability, will inevitability lead to unacceptable 
increases in health harms. 
Responding to this, the proposed model would maintain legal access to adults but 
remove incentives for profit motivated efforts to increase consumption by creating even 
more addictive products, by increasing usage of existing products, or by encouraging 
new consumers to begin smoking. It would establish a regulatory agency (a Tobacco 
Products Agency, or TPA) to act as the bridge between manufacturers and retailers. 
The TPA would take complete control over the product and all related marketing activity, 
managing tobacco product type, production, packaging and marketing. Competitive 
commercial interaction would still occur at point of production, and point of supply. 
Tobacco producers would compete to supply the TPA with raw materials, while retailers 
would profit from selling tobacco products to appropriate customers. 
The TPA would thus be able to pursue public health goals by managing and possibly 
even reducing consumption, instead of profit goals by actively working to maximise 
tobacco usage.13 (See graphic overleaf) 
13 R. Borland, ‘A strategy for controlling the marketing of tobacco products: a regulated market 
model’, Tobacco Control, 2003, Vol. 12, page 377.
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> establishes tobacco as a controlled 
substance
> meets demand
> determines packaging (generic)
> controls promotion
> sets conditions for sale
> controls price
> incentivises harm reduced products 
(to both make and use)
Regulated market model
manufacturers/ 
importers
Tobacco Products Agency
distribution to  
retail agency
users
Adapted from: Borland, ‘Tobacco Control’, 2003
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3.1	 Productioncontrols
Surprisingly, the problems of regulating drug production require far less 
discussion than the problems of drug supply regulation. There are already 
a large number of well established businesses engaged in the produc-
tion of plant-based and synthetic psychoactive drugs. They are doing so 
entirely within existing regional, national, and global legal frameworks. 
Given this, drug production for non-medical use will mostly require 
expansion of existing frameworks, rather than development of new 
ones. We demonstrate this with the following summary of existing 
legal and regulated production of opium/heroin, coca/cocaine, and 
cannabis. For a more detailed discussion of current legal drug produc-
tion summarised below; see: Appendix 2, page 193. 
It should also be noted that establishing a legal regime permitting the 
sale and consumption of drugs for non-medical use would allow these 
legally regulated companies to compete directly with current, illegal 
non-medical drug providers. The relative quality and legality of their 
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products, over and above any price advantage they would have, would 
no doubt allow them to take very substantial market share from their 
criminal competitors as their market presence grows. 
There are economic and social issues to be addressed in any transi-
tion from criminal to legally regulated system; for example, it would 
raise important development issues in previous illicit drug producing 
areas (see: 4.5 Broader social, political and economic impacts, page 84). In 
the long run, however, stripping a wide range of international criminal 
organisations of one of their central profit streams can only be regarded 
as a positive outcome. 
3.1.1	 Currentlegalproduction:opiates,cocaine,cannabis,
pharmaceuticals
i	 Legal opium/opiate production 
Almost half 14 of global opium is legally produced for processing into 
various opiate based medicines. Any country can formally apply to the 
UN’s Commission on Narcotic Drugs to cultivate, produce and trade 
in licit opium, under the auspices of the UN Single Convention on 
Narcotics Drugs 1961 and under the supervision and guidance of the 
International Narcotic Control Board (INCB). As of 2001 there were 
eighteen countries that do, including Australia, Turkey, India, China 
and the UK. 
The international licensing control system seeks to permit and regulate 
legitimate production and use, and at the same time prevent diversion to 
the illicit market for non-medical use. National governments deal with 
the licensing and inspection of cultivation, production, manufacture 
and trade in the controlled substances whilst being monitored by the 
INCB, which is the UN body responsible for ensuring a balance between 
legitimate production and legitimate requirements. 
14 Licit opium production accounted for more than half of global opium production until 
around 2005–6, and the subsequent bumper harvests of illicit opium in Afghanistan.
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Expanded production of opium and derived products under existing 
frameworks is clearly both feasible and non-problematic. Even with 
the economic pressures from illicit demand as they currently exist, the 
legal production and transit of both raw opium and processed opiate 
pharmaceutical products currently takes place on a large scale without 
significant security or diversion issues. 
It is likely that the expansion of legally regulated opiate use would 
initially take place within existing medical prescription models; indeed, 
this process is already underway, albeit slowly. More significant shifts 
from illicit to licit production (be it via more substantial expansion of 
prescribing models, or some other appropriate form of licensed sales), 
would take place incrementally over a number of years. 
This would allow for a manageable transition period during which the 
relevant regulatory and enforcement infrastructure could be developed 
or expanded. Any emerging challenges could be responded to as and 
when they came up. As this phased process continues, demand for illicit 
product will correspondingly diminish, and with it the economic incen-
tives for diversion or illicit production to occur. 
As noted above, such a change is a mixed blessing for some. In this case, 
it raises potentially significant development issues for Afghanistan, 
which currently produces an estimated 93% of the world’s illicit opium, 
contributing over half of its GDP.15 Any shift away from opium produc-
tion as a key source of income would have to be carefully managed, 
especially in such a sensitive area (see: 4.5 Broader social, political and 
economic impacts, page 84) .
ii	 Legal coca/cocaine production 
Both the coca leaf and its active drug content cocaine, are subject to 
strict controls under the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
15 ‘In Afghanistan, the total export value of opium and heroin being trafficked to neighbouring 
countries in 2007 is $US 4 billion, an increase of 29% over 2006. That means that opium now 
accounts for more than half (53%) of the country’s licit GDP.’  
‘Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007’, UNODC, 2007, page iii.
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in a similar fashion to opium and opium-based pharmaceuticals. Legal 
production of both does take place, but on a much smaller scale than 
permitted opium production. 
Legal production of coca in the Andean region continues for use as a 
beverage flavouring (mostly for Coca-Cola), the leaf being exported to 
the US where it is ‘de-cocainised’ by a pharmaceutical company licensed 
by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency. The extracted cocaine is used 
as an anaesthetic medicine around the world. 
Various low potency coca products, including the coca leaf itself, coca 
tea, and coca based foods and traditional medicines, are also common 
in this part of the world. They exist in a legal grey area, and remain 
the subject of ongoing wrangling between the UN drug agencies and 
Bolivia and Peru. 
Given all this, legal coca production for use in its raw leaf form, in lightly 
processed products, or as pharmaceutical cocaine, demonstrably does 
not present any significant problems in and of itself. When assessed 
from the point of view of potential health harms caused, low potency 
coca products (leaf and tea) do not require any more controls than 
equivalent products such as coffee. The processing of coca into phar-
maceutical cocaine would take place at an industrial level for which any 
security and product regulation issues would 
operate within well established models. 
The key problems in any such system are the 
ones already seen in coca producing regions: 
the destabilising economic tensions and social 
harms created by any parallel illicit markets. 
Regulating legal production of coca leaf in line 
with the established fair trade guidelines—price 
guarantees along with a range of other social and 
Medical cocaine in a UK hospital, July 2009
st
e
p
h
e
n
 r
o
l
l
e
s
1
Introduction
2
Five models for regulating drug supply
3
The practical detail of regulation
 35
environmental protections (for growers of coffee, cocoa, sugar, etc.)—
would go some way to ameliorating these problems. Furthermore, in a 
similar fashion to opium and cannabis, such problems would progres-
sively diminish with the shrinking demand for illicit supply, as the 
global market shifted towards legal regulation. 
Specific trade and development issues might arise during this transi-
tion period, including the potential for the UN drug agencies to license 
production of coca to a limited number of countries (for example 
limiting it to Andean nations), or for individual states to begin to culti-
vate coca for their domestic markets (see: 4.5 Broader social, political and 
economic impacts, page 84). 
iii	 Legal cannabis production 
Cannabis has been produced in a number of different countries, notably 
the US and Canada, over a number of decades, primarily for various 
medical uses and preparations. Some has been grown under licence or 
by the state, some by quasi-legal or tolerated patient co-ops. 
This has created a significant body of experience concerning legal regu-
lation of cannabis production. It also demonstrates how production 
can take place in a way that addresses security concerns and quality 
control issues. Taken together, these will provide clear guidance for 
the development of a functioning model for commercial non-medical 
production in the future. 
Legitimate concerns about diversion to illegal markets could be 
addressed through appropriate licensing of growers and suppliers 
combined with effective enforcement where violations of licensing 
conditions were identified. Economic incentives to divert to illegal 
markets would progressively diminish as legal production expanded 
and undermined the profits currently on offer to illegal suppliers. 
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As with opium and coca products, the expansion 
of legal production would be incremental over a 
number of years. This would allow for a manage-
able transition, and in particular the evolution of 
an effective regulatory infrastructure in response 
to any emerging issues and challenges. 
Making a reliable retail supply of cannabis avail-
able would also impact substantially on home 
growing for personal use. It would become an increasingly minority 
pursuit, the preserve of a small group of hobbyists or connoisseurs—
rather like home brewing of wine or beer. Basic guidelines could be 
issued and limits placed on how much production was allowed for any 
individual, but experience with such schemes in Europe suggests they 
are hard to enforce and often ignored by police and growers alike. 
A licensing model might become appropriate for small to medium sized 
cannabis clubs or societies of growers who share/supply/exchange on a 
non-profit basis, so that age and quality controls could be put in place, 
and some degree of accountability could be established. Of course, it 
could be that there would be little to no interest in home growing; home 
tobacco growing in the UK—theoretically subject to customs duty—is 
virtually non-existent. 
For a more detailed discussion of current legal drug production 
summarised above, see: Appendix 2, page 193. 
iv	 Legal pharmaceutical production 
Existing models for production of many thousands of pharmaceutical 
drugs already exist. They are built round very strict regulation, partic-
ularly of quality control, security, and transit issues. Given that (as 
highlighted with cocaine and opiates) many legal pharmaceuticals are 
Economic incentives to 
divert to illegal markets 
would progressively 
diminish as legal 
production expanded 
and undermined the 
profits currently on offer 
to illegal suppliers
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the same drugs as those used non-medically, little or no change would 
be required here. 
Established models would be more than adequate to support licensed 
expansion of production for non-medical use. Indeed, once again, secu-
rity and diversion issues would become less pressing over time. 
3.2	 Availabilitycontrols
Minimising the harm that a given drug creates, both to users and the 
broader society that he or she is a part of, is a key motivation of any drug 
control regime. It seems logical, therefore, that the best way to minimise 
such harms is by limiting the availability of the drug that causes them, 
and thus minimising use—the key goal of supply side drug prohibition 
and enforcement. 
However, accurate measurements of illicit drug availability are difficult 
to come by, and so the relative success or failure of such regimes is hard 
to judge. Moreover, limiting legal availability of a given drug can—coun-
ter-intuitively—increase rather than decrease the harms that it creates, 
by gifting its distribution and sale into the hands of criminal profiteers 
and cultures that have no interest in serving the broader social good. 
Reducing availability is often stated as a primary policy goal16 but, 
remarkably, the concept of availability has been very poorly explored 
and expressed. Almost no data is systematically collected on drug 
availability anywhere, beyond inference from price and purity data, 
occasionally through user surveys, or more commonly via meaningless 
proxy measures, such as levels of drug seizures. Even if such data were 
to be gathered, the mostly covert and informal nature of the illicit drug 
trade would make it very difficult to achieve a reliable overview of drug 
availability. From the limited data we do have the clear inference is that 
illicit drug availability has more than kept pace with demand—indeed 
16 See example (UK) in ‘After the War on Drugs: Options for Control’, Transform Drug Policy 
Foundation, 2005, page 24.
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availability is generally acknowledged to have been increasing despite 
the growing resources directed into supply side enforcement. 
Unlike illicit availability, legal product availability, in its various forms, 
can be very precisely measured and controlled. This can be managed 
through the nature and intensity of regulatory controls deployed and 
the strictness of, and resources directed towards, their enforcement. 
Policy can thus be adapted to different or changing policy priorities, or 
changes in public mood. At a practical level, policy can evolve according 
to the needs of different environments, and respond swiftly to changing 
circumstances and emerging challenges. 
Some readers may baulk at the restrictive and intrusive nature of some 
of the regulations outlined below. It is the aim of this book to show that 
a range of options is available to control production, supply and use in 
a legally regulated regime. It is the more or less democratic will of the 
people affected that will determine the fine tuning of restrictions as 
applied in any given scenario. However, it is to be assumed that more 
restrictive regimes would be applied in the initial phase of legal regula-
tion, with a view to lightening the regulatory touch further down the line, 
guided by evidence of its effectiveness, and as more positive social norms 
and controls evolved (see: 4.1 A cautious, phased introduction, page 67). 
One of the many harms created by a blanket prohibition is the reduction 
in the range of choice of drugs available to consumers. The consequence 
of an illicit market governed almost exclusively by the need to maximise 
profits, is that it becomes increasingly dominated by the more concen-
trated, potent and risky drug products and preparations that offer the 
greatest profits—injected heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine 
for example. When control by criminal profiteers is replaced with a 
legal regime controlled by public health and state authorities, we would 
expect that much lower strength versions of drugs would be more widely 
available. There is plenty of evidence, especially from the alcohol field, to 
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demonstrate that most users rationally tend to choose milder versions. 
Emerging regulatory approaches have the flexibility and options for 
control to take account of the wider range of drugs available. 
A crucial point to emphasise is, therefore, that public management 
of drug availability ensures that regulatory models and additional 
controls can be deployed differentially, at different levels of intensity, 
depending on the risks of a given product or activity. It is not just that the 
greater risks associated with a given drug and/or population of users (or 
potential users) justifies greater regulation on practical risk reduction 
grounds, but that the differential application of regulatory controls can 
create an availability gradient that corresponds to the risk gradient of 
different drugs/preparations, behaviours and environments in which 
they are consumed. 
This availability/risk gradient can support broader public health and 
harm reduction goals by progressively discouraging higher risk prod-
ucts, preparations and behaviours, and ‘nudging’ patterns of use towards 
less risky products, preparations and behaviours, and in the longer 
term fostering social norms around more responsible and less harmful 
use. As already touched upon, illicit drug culture is not neutral in this 
regard; in many instances it actively pushes use in the opposite direc-
tion, towards increasingly harmful products, preparations, behaviours 
and environments (see, for example, discussion of coca and cocaine 
products in 5.4 Stimulants, page 117). 
Prohibition—and the illicit drug markets and cultures it has fostered—
undermines social norms and controls that can encourage more 
responsible drug using decisions and discourage more harmful or risky 
ones. This process is a counterintuitive one. Punitive prohibitions are 
clearly intended to achieve precisely the opposite. What is now evident 
from the experience of the past half century or more is that prohibi-
tion, when used as a tool for public health education and improvement, 
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fails in this goal. This failure occurs because prohibition cedes control 
of drug availability to those least qualified or incentivised to manage it 
responsibly, motivated solely by profit maximisation. 
The key point to emphasise is that regulated availability affords the 
opportunity for control which is absent under prohibition. Controlled 
availability does not automatically translate into increased availability. 
Rather than the one size fits all approach of prohibition, legal regulation 
creates opportunities for nuance and flexibility through differential 
application along a range of policy vectors. That flexibility will help 
policy makers balance the need to regulate current, prohibition-driven 
patterns of use in the short term, with longer term policies that will 
encourage new lower-risk patterns of use. 
With legal regulation and management of currently illicit drugs, the 
opportunity exists not only to arrest this general trend towards harm 
maximisation created by prohibition, but to begin to reverse it and in 
the medium to long term, move decisively in the opposite direction. 
3.3		 Productcontrols
3.3.1	 Dosage,preparationcontrols
As discussed elsewhere (see: 4.2 Assessing and ranking drug harms, 
page 70.), risks associated with a given drug are significantly deter-
mined by the nature of the drug preparation, the dosage, and the 
consumption method. 
Drugs that come in pill or powder form should be made available in 
standardised units. Such standardisation ensures that the amount 
being consumed is clearly understood. It also allows information 
associated with the product to be related clearly and directly to those 
units. The dosage for a standardised unit should be determined by the  
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toxic/dose risk profile of the drug in question. 
The availability of particular preparations of each drug, and the levels 
of control exercised over each preparation, will need to be determined 
on a case by case basis. In general, weaker, slower release oral prepa-
rations should be more easily available. Stronger, more rapid release 
versions should be more difficult to come by. The highest risk prepara-
tions, particularly if for use via injecting, should only be accessible on 
the most restrictive terms—usually either on prescription, or for super-
vised use. 
The risk of diversion into secondary, illicit markets could be mitigated 
through the use of microtaggants. These are microscopic tracers that 
function like a chemical barcode, and can be added to pharmaceutical 
drug preparations. They would help the licensing authorities identify 
and take action against the source—perhaps the drug’s named user or 
original supplier—of any illicit secondary sales. 
3.3.2		 Pricecontrols
Legal regulation allows the government 
to influence drug prices, either through 
taxation added (or subsidy provided) to a 
market determined price, or though more 
direct price fixing interventions. Taxation 
could be set either on a fixed tax per unit 
basis, or as a percentage of goods/services supplied (as, for example, 
VAT is currently set). Depending on how they are set, price controls 
could either lead to tax revenue generation, or demand state subsidy of 
drug products. 
Optimum drug pricing can be summarised as creating a balance 
between two conflicting needs. Prices should at once be sufficiently 
Price controls are highly 
flexible and can potentially be 
targeted at specific products, 
populations of users, types 
of outlets or geographical 
regions associated with 
particular concerns
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high to discourage misuse, and sufficiently low to ensure that under-
cutting them is not profitable for illicit drug suppliers. 
Of course, this is a very simple presentation of the problem. Caution 
needs to be exercised when making generalisations about the impacts 
that price management can have. It should be noted that price 
adjustments potentially have very different impacts on different sub-
populations of users, and on different markets for different drugs. Wide 
variations in price elasticity of demand—that is, the degree to which 
demand responds to changes in price—have been observed in different 
groups of drug users, drugs, and patterns of use. 
For example, increasing price does not always reduce levels of consump-
tion (or vice versa). Despite the fact that such a price-driven reduction is 
both a fundamental tenet of micro economics, and demonstrable with 
some drugs and related user populations (e.g. alcohol and tobacco), 
patterns of use demonstrably often rise and fall independently of price. 
In the US, to take one example, the price of cocaine has dropped by 80% 
over the last 25 years, but consumption has fallen. 
The price levels for legally supplied drugs (inclusive of any government 
interventions) will naturally have an impact on the size of any parallel 
illicit market, the key factor being the relative price difference. It is the 
huge profit margins offered by the current illegal market—with supply 
side enforcement somewhat counter-intuitively acting as an informal 
price support system—that exert the powerful attraction to the criminal 
organisations and individuals. 
Assuming market prices for some key drugs would fall (most obvi-
ously for heroin and cocaine), and as consumption progressively shifts 
to licit supply, so we can expect an associated fall in the size of illicit 
profit opportunity on offer, the incentive for criminal involvement on 
a per unit basis, and a corresponding fall in the level and intensity of 
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violence associated with the illicit market. The ability and incentive 
of illicit traders to undercut the licit market will diminish as price 
approaches the licit market production cost price and potential profit 
margins shrink. 
This all points to a need for careful, realistic, case by case management 
of drug pricing levels. If so managed, changes in drug price point can 
be managed to have maximum impact on levels of use, levels of illicit 
supply activity, levels of crime committed by users fundraising to buy 
drugs, and levels of taxation revenue generated. Setting an optimum 
price for a given product, in a particular environment, will require 
careful balancing of these various impacts, which are often in conflict 
with each other. This is a challenge familiar to policy makers who have 
managed pricing controls for alcohol and tobacco; there are many useful 
lessons to be learned from their experience in this field. 
General drug pricing considerations include: 
* The economic burden of drug expenditure relative to total dispos-
able income of the user is a key factor. If initial prices are sufficiently 
low and/or if use is moderate/occasional, total spend is likely to be 
low and even a dramatic change in price is unlikely to have much 
impact on demand. Conversely, where use is frequent and total 
spend relative to disposable income is high, price changes can have 
significant impacts on levels of use (e.g. alcohol and tobacco). 
* Those with lower disposable incomes—significantly including 
young people—will generally be more susceptible to price controls 
intended to moderate levels of consumption. It should however be 
borne in mind that, although such increases can have a positive 
impact on young people (alcohol research for example shows price 
increases are linked to reduced use), the broader socio-economic/
class impact of price control policies can raise contentious issues.
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* A general assumption is that a dependent user’s need to main-
tain their habit makes their demand less price elastic than other 
consumers. Increased price may have unintended consequences 
amongst those with low disposable incomes, such as fundraising-
related offending (often observed with illicit cocaine and heroin 
users), or reduced spending on, for example, healthy diet (also 
observed with dependent alcohol and tobacco users).
* Availability and costs of substitute drugs, or substitute recre-
ational activities, is also a factor in determining the impact of 
pricing changes on drug use. Increasing the price of one drug may 
divert users to cheaper alternatives. The impacts of such displace-
ment are potentially either positive or negative, depending on 
exactly what the replacement drug or activity is. Displacement can 
also take place towards riskier but more cost-effective methods of 
administration, such as injecting. Of course, it should also be noted 
that policy-making can attempt to encourage positive displace-
ment (see below). 
User choice of licit or illicit supply will be determined by a complex 
interplay of variables, not just relative prices, making generalisa-
tions difficult. Future pricing policy decisions will have to be based 
on the cautious testing of different pricing regimes and their impacts 
on various indicators amongst different populations—an ongoing 
system for outcome evaluation necessarily built into any regulatory 
infrastructure. 
Interventions on price are a particularly useful policy tool, as once a 
price control infrastructure is established it allows for relatively rapid 
responses to changing circumstances and emerging problems. Price 
controls are highly flexible and can potentially be targeted at specific 
products, populations of users, types of outlets or geographical regions 
associated with particular concerns. Differential application of such 
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price controls can also contribute to an incentive-disincentive gradient 
that can help encourage more responsible using behaviours and the use 
of lower risk products. 
Whilst there is a need to be cautious in generalising between drugs, 
the range of experiences with alcohol and tobacco policy provides 
a useful starting point to inform drug pricing policy more generally. 
As well as demonstrating where policy may be effective it needs to be 
acknowledged that political issues continue to cloud government price 
interventions on both of these drugs; the potential to generate substan-
tial tax revenue may negatively impact on government public health 
priorities (which would generally aim to moderate use and thus reduce 
revenue), whilst the public unpopularity of increasing taxes, the 
lobbying power of the production and supply industries, and employ-
ment of potential voters within the respective production and supply 
industries are also important political considerations. 
The occasionally mooted idea that tax revenue from drugs could be 
redirected into drug services (prevention, education and treatment/
recovery) is one that has a certain populist appeal, but is not useful 
beyond the broadest of cost benefit considerations. Service provision 
should be determined by need and evidence of efficacy, not by the whims 
of tax revenue generation. 
3.3.3	 Packagingcontrols
i		 Tamper proofing 
Established product packaging types used for pharmaceutical drugs 
and some food products can reduce the possibilities for tampering with 
drugs, and allow the purchaser/user to know if tampering has occurred. 
Examples include blister packs, sealed ampoules, and other forms of 
sealed containers, such as ‘pop top’ lids on foods. 
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ii		 Child proofing 
Established childproof containers (as used for medicines) should be used 
as a default for all licensed psychoactive substances. Where appropriate 
an additional requirement could be made for commercial or domestic 
storage in sealed/locked cabinets. 
iii	 Information on packaging 
Information on packaging should be based on established norms for 
pharmaceutical drugs—with additional information and messages as 
appropriate. Contents and prominence of packaging information should 
be determined by the appropriate public health authority and be legally 
enforced. Information should include: 
* Contents: clearly stated—both technical names and terms in 
popular usage. 
* Dosage: total contents and contents per unit (e.g. pill) where 
appropriate.
* Effects and side effects—positive and negative: at different 
dosages (including likely different effects on different users; 
e.g. body-mass). 
* General risks: acute and chronic toxicity, dependence—and 
danger signs.
* Specific risks: re; pregnancy, certain medical conditions (e.g. heart 
problems, diabetes, mental health).
* Secondary risks: impaired driving/operating machinery/work-
place competence. 
* Harm reduction: how to minimise risk. 
* Contraindications: risks of poly-drug use: both with regards to 
other non-medical use or use with prescribed/non-prescribed 
medications.
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* Where to find more information/support services: help lines, 
websites etc. 
* Legal disclaimer: producer/vendor liability: ‘Consumption is at 
the risk of user’, ‘Not for medical use', ‘Consumption for Over 18s only’, 
‘Consumption only for named purchaser’, etc. 
* Anti-counterfeiting measures (if required): holograms etc., as 
seen with tax stamps on some alcohol products. 
* Use-by dates. 
These guidelines apply for offsite sale or supply, and will need some level 
of flexibility. For example, following the model of some prescription or 
over the counter drugs, certain product and packaging formats might 
demand a summary of key information, or a single prominent warning, 
on one packaging component (e.g. the pill blister-pack). This would be 
supported by a paper insert giving more detailed product information. 
Where drugs are supplied for on-site use, supervised use, or use by 
licensed individuals, different regulations may apply, including on-site, 
clearly visible provision of the relevant information. This would not 
necessarily be available on the product itself, which may be provided 
without packaging in some scenarios. 
iv		 No on-pack branding or marketing communications 
In line with the wider controls on all forms of advertising, marketing 
and promotion, no branded or more general marketing communica-
tions should be permitted on any psychoactive drug packaging. The 
resultant packs would be modelled on current medical drug packaging, 
or plain packaging models proposed for tobacco.17 Clear guidelines for 
such controls should be mandated by the appropriate public health 
authority and enforced by the relevant authorities as part of licensing 
conditions. These authorities should also define and manage any on- or 
in-pack health and safety messaging. 
17 R. Cunningham, ‘Smoke and Mirrors: The Canadian Tobacco War’, IDRC, 1996, chapter 12: 
‘Plain Packaging’.
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v		 Named user purchaser identification 
In some scenarios, such as under a licensed purchaser model (see 
below) it may be appropriate to record a named user on the packaging. 
This could be managed through print, digital tagging or bar-codes, 
or through some combination of all three. It would emphasise that 
the product is for use by the named individual only, and that they are 
directly responsible for it and its use. Product tagging could be linked 
to sanctions, such as loss of purchaser licence, if the product ends up in 
the hands of a third party. 
3.4	 Supplierandoutletcontrols
The licensing of an individual or corporate vendor/supplier can be 
linked to some or all of the conditions listed here. Licensed individuals 
or companies could be subject to a hierarchy of penalties for violations, 
including fines, loss of licence, or other appropriate civil or criminal 
sanctions. As described above, in chapter 2, Five models for regulating drug 
supply, requirements for individual vendors to have specialist training, 
and/or experience, and abide by a legally mandated code of conduct, can 
be threaded through all licensed sales models. 
3.4.1	 Advertising/marketingcontrols
Links between the advertising and promotion of alcohol 
and tobacco products, and increased levels of usage of 
those products, are well established. Such advertising 
and promotion could easily drive a similar expansion in 
psychoactive drug usage. 
Therefore, the default position of any licensing regime 
should be a complete ban on all advertising, promotion 
or marketing of all drugs, with any exceptions made only 
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on a cautious case by case basis by the relevant authorities. This ban 
should include any alcohol and tobacco marketing activities. A default 
ban should also exist on political donations from any commercial opera-
tors in the drugs market. 
The distinct nature of drug risks relative to most other commodities, and 
the particular need to protect vulnerable groups from exposure to these 
risks, (see discussion of Regulated Market Model, page 27) justifies this 
stringent restriction of standard commercial freedoms. These controls 
should extend to point of sale advertising, and the external appearance 
and signage for outlets. 
Such controls should be as strict as possible, within the context of local 
legal regimes. For example, in the US, a free speech argument can be made 
against such a ban. However, even though the Supreme Court has extended 
a degree of ‘free speech’ protection to commercial speech, such speech is still 
subject to various controls and limitations. 
	3.4.2	 Location/densityofoutlets
Location and density of bars and off-licences has been shown to have an 
impact on patterns of alcohol use and misuse.18 Controlling the location 
and density of legal drug outlets—whether licensed sales sites or venues 
combining sale and consumption—could help limit and control usage in 
potential problem areas. It should be noted that this would aim to help 
prevent over-availability, rather than reduce it to zero (which might, in 
any case, create illicit sales opportunities). Similarly, restrictions could 
be placed around specific sites of public concern. These could include 
schools or other places where young people gather. 
3.4.3	 Sharedresponsibilitybetweensupplierandconsumer
As a way to ensure responsible vendor conduct, licensing agreements 
18 ‘Current Research on Alcohol Policy and State Alcohol and Other Drug (AOD) Systems’, 
State Issue Brief by National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors 
(NASADAD), 2006, page 5.
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could include elements of shared responsibility between provider and 
consumer. The provider would be held partially responsible/liable for 
consumer behaviour. This would encourage vendors—and, in partic-
ular, consumption venue proprietors—to monitor the environment 
where the drug is used, and restrict sales based on the behaviour of the 
consumers (see also: 3.5.2 Degree of intoxication of purchaser, page 55). 
Proprietors could be held part-responsible for socially destructive inci-
dents (such as automobile accidents). This responsibility would extend 
for a specified period of time after the drug is consumed. Sanctions 
could include fines or licence revocations. Of course, the consumer 
would not be absolved of responsibility for such incidents; a clearly 
defined balance based on joint liability would be established. This 
is admittedly a potentially tricky area of regulation to establish and 
police, but precedents relating to alcohol vending do exist in Canada, 
the US and elsewhere. 
3.4.4	 Volumesales/rationingcontrols
Sales to individual purchasers could be restricted to levels deemed 
appropriate for personal consumption. This would: 
* Prevent or minimise unlicensed selling on or gifting of the product 
to a third party 
* Reduce opportunities for excessive use 
Of course, problems would arise when an individual wants to procure 
a larger amount. This creates an incentive for any restrictions to be 
circumvented, through, for example, purchases from multiple sources, 
or product stockpiling. It must be acknowledged that any rationing 
system, whilst being able to limit or contain some behaviours in some 
circumstances (larger scale bulk-buying for example), will be imper-
fect and—with enough will and determination—can be circumvented.
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Secondary tiers of regulation could be put in place if such circumven-
tion becomes especially problematic. The most obvious current example 
of a volume control/rationing system is that used to manage existing 
prescribed drugs. This includes systems designed to help maintain 
dependent users, some of which require frequent repeat prescriptions 
or daily pick ups. These latter examples are extremely strict manage-
ment methods, which are hard to justify in cases other than the highest 
risk drugs/preparations, or in support of maintenance prescribing. 
More generally, purchase tracking linked to a centralised database, in 
conjunction with an ID based licensed purchaser scheme (see below) 
could to some degree prevent multiple purchasing and stockpiling. 
However, such a system would be potentially bureaucratic and expen-
sive, and could also raise privacy concerns; many would view it as being 
overly intrusive. 
Comparable systems do, however, already exist for certain controlled 
prescribed drugs, such as the Pharmanet system in British Colombia, 
Canada, under which all prescriptions for certain drugs are 
centrally tracked and all physicians and pharmacists have access to 
the network database.19
Combining price controls with purchase tracking could create a system 
of progressive price increases to act as a progressive financial disincen-
tive to bulk buying (rather than absolute ban)—the price rising as more 
is purchased. 
Familiar volume rationing systems also exist for duty free purchase 
of alcohol and tobacco, although they are specifically aimed at 
preventing commercial sales to third parties, rather than misuse 
per se. In the Netherlands, an upper limit of five grams of cannabis 
for individual purchasers is a licensing condition for the country’s 
cannabis coffee shops. 
19 For more details about Pharmanet and how it operates see:  http://www.health.gov.
bc.ca/pharmacare/pharmanet/hp.html.
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3.4.5	 Timedelaybetweenorderandpickup
An order/pick up time delay would encourage forward planning of any 
drug taking, and thereby more responsible use and moderation. This 
would also help curtail binge use, by preventing immediate access to 
further drug supplies once existing supplies had run out. In some coun-
tries access to casinos is controlled in this way; membership is required 
for entry, but it is only activated the day after application. 
3.5	 Purchaserandendusercontrols
3.5.1	 Ageofpurchasercontrols
Restricting or preventing access to drugs by non-adults is a key element 
of any existing or future regulatory models. Any rights of access to 
psychoactive drugs and freedom of choice over drug taking decisions 
should only be granted to consenting adults. 
This is partly because of the more general concerns 
regarding child vs. adult rights and responsibilities. 
More importantly, however, the specific short and 
long term health risks associated with drug use are 
significantly higher for children; and, of course, the 
younger they are, the greater the risks. 
This combination of legal principle and public health management 
legitimises a strict age control policy. In practical terms, it should also 
be noted that stringent restrictions on young people’s access to drugs—
whilst inevitably imperfect—are more feasible and easier to police 
than population wide prohibitions. Generally speaking, children are 
subject to a range of social and state controls that adults are not. More 
specifically, drug restrictions for minors command near universal 
adult support. 
Any rights of access 
to psychoactive 
drugs and freedom 
of choice over drug 
taking decision should 
only be granted to 
consenting adults
1
Introduction
2
Five models for regulating drug supply
3
The practical detail of regulation
 53
Combined with this is the fact that—while markets created by any 
prohibition will always attract criminal interest—the non-adult market 
for drugs is a small fraction of the total adult market. Thus, enforcement 
resources could be brought to bear on it with far more efficiency, and 
correspondingly greater chances of success. 
It is also worth pointing out that one ironic and unintended side effect 
of prohibition can often be to make illegal drug markets, that have no 
age thresholds, easier for young people to access than legally regulated 
markets for (say) alcohol or tobacco. 
Of course, there is an important debate around what age constitutes 
adulthood and/or an acceptable age/access threshold. Different coun-
tries have adopted different thresholds for tobacco and alcohol, generally 
ranging from 14 to 21 for purchase or access to licensed premises. Where 
this threshold should lie for a given drug product will depend on a range 
of pragmatic choices. These should be informed by objective risk assess-
ments, evaluated by individual states or local licensing authorities, and 
balanced in accordance with their own priorities. As with all areas of 
regulatory policy there needs to be some flexibility allowed in response 
to changing circumstances or emerging evidence. 
In the UK for example, the age of access for tobacco purchase has recently 
been raised from 16 to 18, whilst in the US there is a growing debate 
over whether the alcohol age threshold of 21 is too high. The Amethyst 
Initiative20 for example (supported by 135 chancellors and presidents of 
US universities and colleges) argues that the 21 limit has created ‘a culture 
of dangerous, clandestine “binge-drinking”—often conducted off-campus’ 
and that ‘by choosing to use fake IDs, students make ethical compromises 
that erode respect for the law.’ Even within a legal regulatory framework, 
inappropriate prohibitions evidently have the potential to create unin-
tended consequences. They can undermine, rather than augment, social 
controls and responsible norms around drugs and drug use. 
20 See: www.amethystinitiative.org.
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It is clear that age limits need to be realistic and, crucially, properly 
enforced for them to be effective. In the UK for example—where ‘binge-
drinking’ amongst young people has been a growing problem—there has 
been a widespread lack of age restriction enforcement, Alcohol Concern 
reporting that: ‘10–15% of licensed premises are found to persistently sell 
alcohol to the under-aged yet only 0.5% licensed premises are called up for 
review’.21 Secondary supply of legitimately obtained drugs to non-adults 
will also require appropriate enforcement and sanction, perhaps with a 
graded severity depending on distance in age from the legal threshold. 
Legal age controls can, of course, only ever be part of the solution to 
reducing drug-related harms amongst young people. Effective regula-
tion and access controls must be supported by concerted prevention 
efforts. These should include evidence based, targeted drug education 
that balances the need to encourage healthy lifestyles (including absti-
nence) while not ignoring the need for risk reduction and, perhaps 
more importantly, investment in social capital. Young people—partic-
ularly those most at risk in marginal/vulnerable populations—should 
be provided with meaningful alternatives to drug use. The SMART 
programme in the US, which works on public housing estates, has 
found that providing youth clubs has a real impact on reducing drug 
use, dealing and overall criminal activity in both young people and 
adults.22 It is also worthy of note that The Netherlands and Sweden 
regularly top the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) child well-
being23 table and have relatively low levels of drug misuse, whilst the 
US and UK invariably sit at or near the bottom and have relatively high 
levels of misuse and a lower age of misusers. 
Whilst steps to restrict access and reduce drug use amongst young 
people are important, it is also essential to recognise that some young 
21 ‘Unequal Partners: A report into the limitations of the alcohol regulatory regime’, Alcohol 
Concern, 2008, page 19.
22 Steven P. Schinke, et al., ‘The Effects of Boys & Girls Clubs on Alcohol and Other Drug Use 
and Related Problems in Public Housing. Final Research Report’, Education Resource 
Information Center, 1991.
23 ‘Child poverty in perspective: An overview of child well-being in rich countries, Innocenti 
Report Card 7’,  UNICEF, 2007, page 4.
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people will still access and take drugs. It is vital that they should be 
able to access appropriate treatment and harm reduction programmes 
without fear. 
3.5.2	 Degreeofintoxicationofpurchaser
This form of control combines shared responsibility between user and 
vendor with an understanding that drug taking choices should be based 
on informed consent and responsible decision making, both of which 
can be compromised by intoxication. 
A number of countries have established a precedent for this kind of 
control by making it illegal to sell alcohol to people who are drunk,24 both 
through off and on-sales. However, such regulation is problematic, as it 
tends to be poorly or unevenly exercised and rarely enforced.25 Some of 
these problems are explored below, along with potential solutions that 
could increase the effectiveness of this kind of regulatory regime. 
issues/problems 
What is the threshold level of intoxication beyond which vending and purchasing 
is restricted? What criteria should be used to establish it? How do you determine if 
someone has passed it? Without the impractical deployment of breathalyser or similar 
technology, or more detailed impairment testing, there is a large degree of subjectivity 
involved in such judgments (particularly difficult if in bar/club environments that are 
crowded, noisy, busy, or poorly lit).
responses/solutions
> To avoid the more subjective marginal cases, only fairly extreme intoxication would 
qualify for restriction of sales where a clear-cut series of guideline criteria would 
have to be met. It would be necessary for these criteria to be well understood by 
both vendors and patrons (see below). Investment would need to be made in public 
education so patrons know what to expect. 
> Provision of methadone in Canada, for example, is contingent on the patient 
24 For example the UK Licensing Act 2003, Part 7/141.
25 A parliamentary answer from the UK Home Office (March 19, 2008) reveals that annual 
prosecutions for serving a drunken patron remain at zero or in single figures in most 
areas of the UK. 
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appearing lucid and not overly sedated. Pharmacists are liable if they give a dosage 
which results in harm or death. 
issues/problems 
Third party purchasing on behalf of an intoxicated individual.  
responses/solutions
> In theory it could be made a civil offence to knowingly buy a drug for someone 
who has been denied service. However, this would add a further complication to 
enforcement efforts and may not be realistic in practice. 
> It has to be acknowledged that the system is imperfect; encouraging licensee and 
premises staff vigilance and responsibility is the best approach. 
issues/problems 
When denied service, irate, aggrieved and highly intoxicated customers present potential 
security, public order and safety problems for vending staff and others. (This is a 
problem more often encountered with alcohol than any other drug intoxication.)
responses/solutions
> Health and safety precautions for staff could include security staff on premises, or 
physical barriers between vendor and purchaser.
> Clear, easy to refer to on-site information about rules of service. 
> Investment in better public understanding of the law. 
> Staff training in dealing with difficult customers.
issues/problems 
Lack of staff skills. Bar staff are frequently low paid, working on a temporary, transitory 
or informal basis, unlicensed, and lack any training in this regard.
responses/solutions
> A low threshold licensing scheme for bar staff could be explored, which would 
include a requirement for relevant basic training. 
> Licensees could be made liable for bar staff misdemeanours, thus ensuring minimum 
levels of staff training.
> In Canada (and in Utah, USA), bar owners and home servers can be held liable if the 
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customer or guest drinks and then has a car accident. Penalties are fines for the owner 
(and possibly the server); licence to serve alcohol can also be removed.
issues/problems 
The profit motivation of commercial vendors, and the need to maximise sales in a highly 
competitive market place (many franchise pub managers work towards very tight 
volume sales targets) will naturally create a tendency against restricting sales. 
Whilst it may not be the norm, many people go to the bars specifically to get intoxicated, 
and the industry profits from and to some extent encourages precisely the sort of 
excessive intoxication that such theoretically industry enforced regulations are 
attempting to restrict. 
responses/solutions
> This is essentially a carrot and stick issue: on the one hand a culture should be 
encouraged whereby vendors understand that it’s in their long term interests to 
follow the regulations, and on the other public resources should be put into educating 
vendors and customers about it and then enforcing it more effectively. 
> Effective implementation of such a regulation would hopefully over time help 
establish social norms defining socially acceptable levels of public intoxication. 
A similar principle operates in pharmacies. Pharmacists are required 
to restrict or refuse sales of certain prescription and over the counter 
products if they suspect intoxication, or potential non-medical 
product use or misuse. However, pharmacies are highly regulated 
environments, and pharmacists are highly trained, and respected, 
professionals. This means that pharmacy staff face few of the prob-
lems associated with bars or clubs, where the drug in question is 
unambiguously being consumed on the premises for the purpose of 
recreational intoxication. 
Given this, it seems reasonable to conclude that premises licensed for 
sales only, rather than for sale and on site consumption, are better posi-
tioned to implement such restrictions, although they are also less likely 
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to need them. However, there may still be a need for them to consider 
some of the issues raised above. For example, in Canada methadone 
prescriptions can order ‘witnessed ingestion’ of methadone. In this case, 
patients have to drink the ‘juice’ in front of the pharmacist, who has to 
note that they were not intoxicated. 
Particular issues arise for pharmacists supplying dependent users 
with prescriptions for either substitute or drug of choice maintenance. 
A considerable body of experience and well established guidelines for 
handling the various scenarios and problems associated with this kind 
of transaction already exists. 
 Licensed premises for the consumption of cannabis are a good example 
of where such regulations might come into force under future, less 
restrictive drug availability regimes. Experience in Holland and else-
where suggests that cannabis use is on the whole, self regulating, and 
unlikely to cause major over-intoxication problems. In this case, the 
main intoxication related restriction of sales would be for people who 
are either drunk, or using other drugs. If they then seek to purchase 
or consume cannabis, guidelines comparable to those that exist for 
alcohol vending premises could come into force. 
3.5.3	 Licencesforpurchasers/users
A system for licensing purchasers/users presents the opportunity to 
introducing a range of different controls. 
Obtaining a licence to purchase or possess a given drug could, for 
example, be like obtaining a driving licence, or pyrotechnics licence to 
buy and use certain fireworks. It could be dependent on passing a test, 
which would establish that the licensee knows and understands the 
risks inherent in drug use, and is thus well placed to make responsible 
consumption choices. 
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This is a potentially flexible system: 
* Drug access licences could to some degree control time, place and 
associations for new users, just as newly licensed drivers are some-
times restricted as to where and when they drive, and who they are 
permitted to drive with. 
* Like a driving licence, violations of licence conditions could be 
associated with hierarchy of penalties. These would depend 
on the seriousness of violation, and could lead to licence and 
access suspension once a points threshold had been passed. 
Such offences might include consuming in public, passing/
selling drugs to non licensed individuals, or driving under the 
influence. Such penalties would need to be balanced with any 
concurrent civil or criminal sanctions.
* The variable licensing system could also function as a graduated 
program, specifying different levels of access to various products 
based on levels of additional training, or periods of good conduct 
or maintenance of a clean licence.
* Purchaser licences could be linked to an ID system, to prove that the 
purchaser is the licensee. Such ID might feature the same sorts of 
electronic identification systems (embedded biometric data, etc.) as 
other established ID card/driving licence models, or licences could 
be embedded or electronically linked to an existing ID system. 
From a public health and harm reduction perspective, licence applicant 
training programmes would offer an invaluable opportunity to augment 
drug and health education for a key target population. Information could 
be directed to drug users about risk, dependency, treatment services and 
other health issues. Care would need to be taken to present an educational 
element without being over-burdensome, condescending or preachy. 
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The programs could, using established prevention education methods, 
harm reduction principles and motivational techniques, furnish gradu-
ates with key drug related knowledge and skills. These would empower 
them to make independent drug use choices, reduce associated harms, 
cultivate social norms supporting responsible, moderate use, promote 
abstinence as the zero risk option, and provide an understanding of the 
rights and responsibilities of drug users. 
As touched on in 3.4.4 Volume sales/rationing controls (page 50), licensed 
users could have their purchase volume and frequency tracked. This 
data could be used to highlight potential problematic usage patterns. 
If a problem comes up, the dispensing pharmacist could instigate a 
‘health intervention’. He or she could register their concerns with the user, 
and offer relevant assistance. The tracking may be a deterrent to use in 
itself. It could also be tied to other deterrent effects; for example, price 
increases could be triggered once the user has passed a certain purchase 
volume threshold. Users could also put a stop purchase order on their 
licence themselves, should they wish to avoid temptation. Such an order 
would deactivate their access to a given drug for a given period. 
3.5.4	 Proofofresidencywithpurchase
Some societies have developed ‘culturally specific social controlling mecha-
nisms’ that—over time—have allowed their members to form relatively 
healthy, unproblematic relationships with certain drugs. There is a 
possibility that ‘drug tourists’, who have not been integrated into this 
culture, may not adhere to the local restraining social practices, poten-
tially leading to problematic or risky behaviours. 
To help avoid such behaviour, purchasers could be restricted to residents 
of a country, state/province, city or even a particular neighbourhood. 
This would however require a residency-linked ID system, which is 
itself not without problems. 
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3.5.5	 Requiredmembershipincluborgrouppriortopurchase
Drug users could join membership clubs or groups26. These would work 
in a similar way to existing professional regulatory bodies. They would 
provide access to specific drugs, along with clearly defined good prac-
tice guidelines for their members. If the user acts outside of the norms 
or rules of the group, membership can be refused or revoked. The norms 
are communicated through education, and enforced through a variety 
of formal and social peer processes. 
Alternatively, licensed venues could use a membership model based 
on those used to restrict access to casinos or late night drinking venues 
in some countries.27 Such a model could potentially be applied to 
venues licensed for the sale and consumption of certain drugs, as a 
core licence condition. The membership based venue or club model 
allows for various other controls to be put in place, as appropriate. 
These can include: 
* Time delay between application for membership and first use of 
venue (in the UK casino model a 48 hour delay was used), or time 
delay between order and delivery
* Conditions of membership including training or interview
* Consumption on premises only—no sales of ‘take outs’ 
* Venue licensing conditions (see above) 
3.5.6	 Controlsoverpermittedlocationsforuse
One of the major, if unspoken, anxieties about drug reform is that drug 
use would be far more visible and socially intrusive. In reality, the new 
regulatory regimes would make it possible for drug use to be far less 
visible than at present. 
Alcohol and tobacco licensing regimes have established clear precedents 
26 D. Gieringer, ‘Drug User’s Clubs: A Modest Proposal’, unpublished conference discussion 
paper, (US) Drug Policy Foundation conference, November 1994.  
27 As used, for example, in the UK until the Gambling Act 2005 came into force.
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for defining and controlling permitted substance 
use locations. A range of flexible controls exist for 
both, including: 
* Licensed premises for consumption of 
alcohol. 
* Designated outdoor smoking areas, 
gardens, or smoking booths (following 
the widespread adoption of indoor public 
space smoking restrictions) .
* Zoning laws restricting alcohol use and 
smoking in specified public and private 
spaces. 
The functions of these restrictions differ. 
Smoking restrictions are usually justified on the 
basis of the environmental/secondary health 
impacts of smoke;28 public alcohol consump-
tion is more often restricted for public order 
reasons, and to lesser extent, litter issues. These 
restrictions are sometimes centrally, some-
times regionally, defined and driven. They are 
enforced to different degrees, usually through 
the deployment of fines. 
Because they enjoy broad popular support, 
these restrictions are generally well observed. 
Experience suggests that when effectively exer-
cised such regulation can foster new social norms, ensuring that less 
onerous enforcement is needed as time passes. 
It is both reasonable and practical to propose that—in the future—
similar restrictions would exist for other drugs. For example, public 
'No injecting' sign in Amsterdam, Netherlands
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Controlled drinking area in the UK
28 Although most public health benefits probably accrue from reduced levels of use.
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smoking bans could naturally extend to cover the 
smoking of any drug, most obviously cannabis. 
Restrictions on public intoxication and public 
disorder that already exist, and that are regu-
larly applied to drunkenness, could be extended 
to include any form of intoxication. In fact, to 
some extent they already have been. 
Drugs that are in oral pill form, and to a lesser 
extent powder drugs that are taken orally or 
snorted, generally present less of a problem in 
terms of public consumption. The act of consump-
tion itself is brief; it is not part of the drug using 
experience or ritual in the same way that drinking, 
smoking, or injecting is. 
The use of injecting paraphernalia, whilst only 
representing a tiny fraction of total drug use, creates 
a disproportionately large regulatory challenge. 
Chaotic injecting drug users require particular 
attention. They are simultaneously most likely to 
cause hazardous drug litter problems, and least 
likely take notice of their civic responsibilities. 
Given this, it would seem reasonable to ban 
public injecting. However, experience demon-
strates that such bans are only likely to succeed 
if broader social and harm reduction responses 
are simultaneously put in place. These include: 
* Accessible needle exchange 
* Provision of safer supervised injecting facilities 
* Housing assistance to deal with homelessness
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* Outreach programs 
* Low threshold treatment and service provision
* Access to social and welfare support 
Without such policies in place the likelihood is that public injecting 
will continue, even if geographically displaced. Enforcing anti-injection 
laws will simply add to the burden of criminality for chaotic users, who 
frequently are unable to even pay the fines that such laws demand. This 
will have the effect of pushing them into more dirty and risky marginal 
environments, without acting as any significant deterrent. 
Furtherreading
* ‘A Public Health Approach to Drug Control’,		
British	Colombia	Health	Officers	Council,	2005
* ‘Effective Drug Control: Toward A New Legal Framework',		
The	King	County	Bar	Association,	2005
* ‘Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition’,	
E.	Nadelmann,	Daedalus,	1992;	121:	pages	87–132	
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4.1		 Acautious,phasedintroduction
Governments and other authorities have significant experience in 
regulating potentially harmful recreational products and activities, 
including a broad range of psychoactive drugs. However, developing 
and implementing new legal regulatory models for currently illegal 
drugs is essentially working from a blank slate. This presents clear 
opportunities to learn from past policy successes and failures, but also 
risks unintended or unanticipated negative consequences. 
For certain elements of the reform agenda—for example incorporation 
of human rights principles and law into international drug control—a 
rapid change is warranted. For other elements of the reform process, 
such as the development of legal supply models and availability controls, 
the responsible approach is to phase in change over a period of months 
or years. This change should take place along various policy increments, 
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so that policy and regulatory models can be developed whilst outcomes 
on key indicators are carefully monitored and evaluated. 
This approach should be, by default, based on a precautionary prin-
ciple, particularly where evidence from existing policy is thin, or 
specific high-risks are identified. New models will thus initially err 
towards stricter, more intrusive regulation, with lower restriction levels 
only subsequently coming into play. A precautionary and incremental 
approach allows for key concerns, such as availability to youth, increase 
in high risk behaviours or other specific public health concerns, to be 
closely monitored. If problems do arise, policy can take a step back, be 
refined and adjusted, and alternative or additional regulatory tools can 
be deployed. 
Additionally, such an approach has democratic benefits, in that it 
allows for greater civil society involvement in policy development. It 
also goes some way to removing the fear that all drugs would somehow 
just become available ‘overnight’. By demonstrating that policy is being 
developed in a responsible and cautious fashion, based on evidence of 
effectiveness and sensitive to legitimate fears and concerns, it offers 
the opportunity to win a greater level of public and political support 
for a programme of reform. Such a cautious, measured approach will 
also help placate critics, who fear that moves towards regulation are a 
‘gamble’, un-evidenced or in some way ‘reckless’. 
A useful precedent for this is provided by some of the more contentious 
harm reduction policy developments of the past two decades, such as 
needle exchanges, supervised injecting venues, or opiate prescribing. 
Due to the highly charged political environment around drugs issues, 
such interventions have been subject to unprecedented regulation 
and scrutiny. Particular attention has been given to their effectiveness 
in reducing health harms, and to high profile concerns that they can 
somehow encourage use. Responses to such scrutiny have demonstrated 
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how effective policy interventions can be developed, public concerns 
can be dealt with sensitively, sensationalist media coverage responded 
to intelligently, and political opposition ameliorated. 
The increments along which phased change can be implemented 
are essentially in line with the range of regulatory tools described in 
chapters two and three. There is the potential to move from greater to 
lesser levels of regulation, controlling the levels of availability either 
through deployment of the different regulatory controls over suppliers, 
purchasers and products, or through their deployment at varying inten-
sities. Where possible the longer term aim would be to encourage and 
move from legal/administrative controls towards social controls. 
Different countries will necessarily take different approaches, and see 
their policy and legal infrastructure develop along different routes. 
There will, for example, be very different challenges faced by primarily 
producer, transit or consumer countries, states with different levels of 
economic resources, political stability and public health and enforce-
ment infrastructure, and states that are geographically isolated, 
compared to those with large borders with highly populated regions. 
Cannabis is likely to be the first drug to have regulatory models more 
seriously explored. This is because: 
* It is by far the most widely used illegal drug.
* Established and effective models already exist for regulating its 
production and supply (see: pages 206 and 110).
* Public opinion is generally both supportive of reform 
(approaching or having reached majority support in many 
countries) and growing.29
At the other end of the spectrum, around problematic dependent use of 
opiates and stimulants, we are likely to see medicalised maintenance 
29 R. Newcombe, ‘Attitudes to drug policy and drug laws; a review of the international evidence’, 
Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2004.
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prescription models developed and expanded. These models will be 
based on already established, functional and effective interventions in 
numerous countries. These two emerging trends are already defining 
an ongoing pragmatic reform process —addressing the areas of most 
pressing practical necessity where prohibition’s effects are the most 
egregious, in population terms (cannabis) and overall harm creation 
(chaotic use/dependence). 
Within broad groupings of similar types of drugs—stimulants, depres-
sants or hallucinogens (see: chapter 5)—we might reasonably expect 
regulated legal availability pilots to begin by focussing on the drugs 
least likely to be associated with personal or social harms and costs (see: 
4.2 Assessing drug harms, page 70). Similarly, less potent preparations of 
drugs, for use through lower risk methods of administration, could be 
made available in the first instance. So, for example, psilocybin (‘magic’) 
mushrooms might be made initially available, rather than LSD, opium 
rather than pharmaceutical opiates, and lower potency orally consumed 
stimulants rather than cocaine powder or methamphetamine. 
4.2		 Assessingandrankingdrugharms
The concept of quantifying and ranking drug harms has two primary 
functions. First, such rankings should inform policy makers, so that 
they can develop effective, targeted and proportionate policy responses 
to a range of different drug harms, which can thereby be managed and 
minimised. This is an essential element of developing effective regula-
tory frameworks and inevitably requires a degree of population based 
generalisation. The second is to facilitate the education of individuals 
about drug risks and harms, so enabling them to make informed and 
responsible decisions about their health and wellbeing. This requires 
information that is more nuanced and person-specific in nature. 
Getting to grips with these questions requires that two important 
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distinctions are made. First of all, primary health harms to individual 
users should be distinguished from the secondary social harms to third 
parties that follow from that use. Second, harms related to drug use per se 
(both primary and secondary) should be distinguished from harms 
created or exacerbated by policy environments. The prevailing analysis 
that informs most current policy makes the first distinction (between 
health and social harms) reasonably well, but largely fails to make the 
second distinction (between drug harms and policy harms). It confuses 
and conflates the two, often misattributing prohibition or illicit market 
harms to drugs, or by default drug users, and feeding the self-justifying 
feedback loop that has helped immunise prohibition from scrutiny.30
Some efforts to untangle drug use harms from drug policy harms have 
been made, although this is an area that warrants more detailed consid-
eration and analysis. Transform’s 2004 publication ‘After the War on 
Drugs: Options for Control’ 31 describes six key harms created by prohi-
bition (each then broken down into sub-categories): ‘creation of crime’; 
‘a crisis in the criminal justice system and prisons’; ‘billions in wasted expen-
diture and lost tax revenue’; ‘undermining public health and maximising 
[health] harms’; ‘destabilising producer countries' and ‘undermining human 
rights’. Correspondingly, the Transform report then makes a distinc-
tion between the aims of the drug policy reform movement—to reduce 
or eliminate the harms specifically created or exacerbated by prohibi-
tion and illicit markets—and the more conventional aims of an effective 
drug policy—to reduce or eliminate the range of direct and indirect 
harms associated with drug use and misuse. 
A more comprehensive ‘taxonomy of drug-related harms’ has been 
constructed by MacCoun and Reuter32 who break down forty six iden-
tified drug-related harms into four general categories: ‘health’, ‘social 
and economic functioning’, ‘safety and public order’, and ‘criminal justice’. 
30 For a more detailed discussion of disaggregating drugs use and drug policy harms see: 
‘A Comparison of the Cost-effectiveness of the Prohibition and Regulation of Drugs’, Transform 
Drug Policy Foundation, 2009.
31 ‘After the War on Drugs: Options for Control’, Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2004, 
page 9. 
32 R. MacCoun, P.  Reuter, ‘Drug War Heresies’, Cambridge University Press, 2001, page 106.
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In tabular form they then identify six population 
group headings (‘users’, ‘dealers’, ‘intimates’, ‘employers’, 
‘neighbourhood’ and ‘society’) and note which of these 
‘bears the harm/risk’ for each of the harms listed. 
Crucially, in a separate column they also identify 
what they term the ‘primary source of harm’ for each of 
the populations, from three options: ‘use’, ‘illegal status’ 
and ‘enforcement’ (illegal status and enforcement being 
identified for thirty six of the list). 
The task of assessing and ranking drug harms is 
clearly complicated by the large number of variables 
involved, the permutations of which make attempting to describe and 
categorise drug harms and risks a complex challenge. Policy the world 
over is currently based on grouping illegal drugs into between three 
and five harm rankings (for example the A-B-C classification system 
in the UK, the I-IV scheduling system in the US). Whilst these systems 
have some functionality, they are frequently both inconsistent and 
oversimplified. On a practical level, they are built on generalisations, 
they (confusingly) fail to include legal drugs, and both conflate and fail 
to fully acknowledge multiple harms; this has substantially reduced 
their utility, both as policy making tools, and as aids to individual users 
seeking to make informed decisions about personal drug use. 
Before discussing these issues and their policy implications in more 
detail it is worth trying to deconstruct the main vectors of harm associ-
ated with drug use specifically (as distinct from harms related to drug 
policy) that policy makers must consider. 
4.2.1	 Breakdownofdrughealthrisks/harms
The personal health risks/harms associated with a particular drug are 
most usefully divided into toxicity and ‘addictiveness’—that is, a drug’s 
The nature of drug 
preparation, how the 
drug is administered, 
and the physical 
and social/peer 
environment in 
which consumption 
takes place are also 
crucially important 
linked variables in 
determining risk
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propensity to cause dependence. The level of risk associated with a given 
drug’s toxicity and propensity to cause dependence is then moderated 
by a series of behavioural variables, and by the predispositions of 
the individual user. These can be described on an individual or on a 
population/sub-population basis. 
i	 Toxicity 
A distinction needs to be made between short term acute toxicity (for 
example, death following respiratory arrest from a heroin overdose) and 
long term chronic toxic effects (for example, death from liver cirrhosis 
after decades of heavy drinking). 
A drug’s acute toxicity relates to the size of the margin between an 
active threshold, the dose at which the drugs effect (or desired effect) is 
achieved by the user, and the dose at which a specified toxic reaction, or 
overdose, occurs. Such a toxic reaction could involve merely unpleasant 
temporary side effects, such as vomiting, dizziness, fainting, distress, 
etc., or a range of more serious acute episodes, tissue damage of some 
variety, or death. 
The comparable terminology for medical drugs is the ‘therapeutic index’, 
which is the ratio of the therapeutic dose to the toxic dose. With non-med-
ical drugs acute toxicity of a given drug is often measured by assessing 
the ratio of lethal dose to the usual or active dose. The smaller this gap 
between active and toxic dosage, the more toxic a drug is deemed to be. 
Other methods for measuring toxicity, such as sub-lethal toxic effects, 
also exist; all are clear and relatively simple. 
When ranking drugs, however, issues of acute drug toxicity are compli-
cated by a number of behavioural variables, most obviously including 
mode of drug administration, and poly-drug use. The development of 
individual tolerances is another complicating factor. 
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By contrast, long-term chronic drug toxicity is intrinsically more diffi-
cult to quantify, especially for new or emerging drugs. It is especially 
hard to establish individual effect causality in the context of a range of 
lifestyle variables, and use of multiple drugs. Even when credible esti-
mates or measurements can be made of long term effects, the problem 
arises that rankings of drugs by acute and chronic toxic effects do not 
necessarily match up. 
So, drugs cannot necessarily be usefully grouped together. For example, 
it is difficult to compare tobacco smoking, which involves low acute risk 
but high chronic risk, with opiate use, which has high acute risk but 
lower chronic risks. 
ii	 	Addiction/Dependence 
Historically, the political discourse on drug harms has been dominated 
by the concept of addiction. The original rankings made in the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Drugs, the model for most subsequent domestic 
ranking systems, were largely predicated on contemporary under-
standings of addiction33 at the time of the treaty’s drafting—that is, in 
the 1940s and 1950s. 
Drug addiction, or drug dependence as it is generally now described, 
is a difficult concept to precisely define, or to achieve consensus on. 
The WHO and American Psychiatric Association DSM criteria prob-
ably come closest to this, but the subject is still the source of endless 
controversy, not least the fact that addiction is commonly defined as 
a mental health problem. However, more agreement does exist on the 
physiological components of drug dependence, described in terms of 
brain chemistry (neurotransmitters, receptors, etc.). These physiolog-
ical components have been well described in the medical literature of 
the last century (for established drugs at least, if not perhaps so well for 
more recently emerging ones), and are now well understood. 
33 The preamble that frames the 1961 convention includes the following: ‘Recognizing that 
addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social 
and economic danger to mankind.’
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It is both possible and useful to quantify and thus rank the degree to 
which a particular drug will tend to be associated with the develop-
ment of tolerance and specific withdrawal symptoms. An additional 
physiological aspect of drug action that impacts on dependence is its 
half life, which measures how long the drug effect lasts. Shorter acting 
drugs lend themselves to more intensive repeated usage. The qualita-
tive nature of the initial onset of the intoxication experience, or ‘rush’, 
and the post-rush experience—the subjective pleasure associated with 
using the drug—are also important variables. They are, however, harder 
to objectively quantify, and also dependent to a significant extent on 
drug preparation, dosage and mode of administration. 
However, while the physiological elements of drug action as it relates to 
dependence can be assessed and potentially ranked, dependency issues 
are dramatically complicated by the individual user, and the range 
of psycho-social factors that interface with physiological processes. 
This interaction produces dependency-related behaviours, which 
may require the attention of policy makers and service providers. The 
psycho-social influences upon, or components of dependency relating 
to, a given drug are far harder to quantify and rank, and far more 
contentious in the literature. For example, psychological dependence—
‘addiction’—is now also associated with sex, shopping, gambling, the 
internet and so on.34
These psycho-social components are, however, arguably no less 
important in terms of determining behaviours. Some drugs that have 
relatively moderate or low physiological dependency effects are none 
the less frequently associated with powerful psychological depen-
dency, cocaine being an obvious example. Whether physiological 
and psychological dependence should be pooled together in rank-
ings remains a moot point—as does the question of whether ‘addiction’ 
remains a useful term, as opposed to dysfunctional, problematic or 
dependent use. 
34 There is a useful discussion of the issues around how addiction is conceptualised in 
B. Alexander, ‘The Globalisation of Addiction: A Study in Poverty of the Spirit’,  
Oxford University Press, 2008.
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iii		 Individual predispositions 
Even if the different vectors of drug harms described above can be 
meaningfully quantified and ranked, in generalised population terms 
at least, complications remain. In particular, risk assessment is made 
more difficult by the wide variation in physiological and psychological 
makeup of individual drug users. Key variables include general phys-
ical and mental health, and age (young and old are more vulnerable). 
Specific physical and mental health conditions can have a major impact 
on individual risk, and pharmacogenetic factors can also cause vulner-
abilities to certain drug harms in certain individuals. 
iv	 Preparation of the drug, method of administration, using behaviours 
For all drugs, there is a clear relationship between risk and dose. 
This is largely unaccounted for by broadly generalised drug harm 
categories and rankings. Clearly, a small amount of a Class A or 
Schedule 1 drug will be less risky than a large dose of a drug from a 
lower schedule. 
The related issue of drug potency is also a risk factor. However, in a regu-
lated market, with standardised products and packaging information, 
the specific risks of unknown potency (and in particular, of unexpectedly 
high potency) will largely be removed. The issue of relative potency-
related risk has probably been overstated as users, if possessed of the 
requisite dosage information, will rationally dose control to regulate 
their own risk exposure—or auto-titrate, to achieve the level of intoxica-
tion they are seeking. 
The nature of the drug preparation, how the drug is administered, and 
the physical and social/peer environment in which consumption takes 
place are also crucially important linked variables in determining risk. 
This is usefully illustrated with the example of coca based drugs—from 
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chewed coca leaf, through coca drinks, snorted cocaine powder, to 
smoked crack cocaine (see: page 120). All involve cocaine use, but at 
widely differing levels of risk. 
Summary of risk vector for mode of drug administration35
injection
The most risky form of administration, not only because the user is immediately exposed 
to the totality of the dose consumed, and thus risks overdose, but also because injecting 
itself involves risk of injury and infection.
smoking/inhalation
Exposes the user to the drug effect only marginally slower than injection but allows a 
greater degree of control over dose and intoxication—so overdose risk is lower. However, 
it presents an additional risk of chronic damage to the lungs. It is worth noting that the 
risk of lung damage can be significantly reduced if the drug can be inhaled in a vaporised 
form,36 rather than as smoke from a burning process.
snorting (insufflation)
Powder form drugs can be snorted and absorbed through the nasal mucus membranes 
over a period of minutes. By contrast to the seconds associated with injection, this is 
lower intensity and gives some degree of control over dosage. There is a moderate risk of 
chronic damage to nasal membranes.
oral consumption
The drug is absorbed over a longer time period (an hour or more) in the gut, which 
is relatively well equipped to deal with foreign substances.37 Slower release orally 
consumed drugs will generally be lower risk than rapid release equivalents, as the level 
of exposure (blood levels) at any given time is reduced—although length of exposure/
intoxication is prolonged. Some drugs, including tobacco and coca leaf are held in the 
mouth and absorbed through the gums. 
35 Other less common modes of administration include transdermal patches (used, for 
example, in medical administration of nicotine replacement therapy, and slow release 
methylphenidate), and suppositories; also used, perhaps unsurprisingly, almost 
exclusively for medical purposes.
36 Prescription drug inhalers are a familiar example of how a drug can be absorbed via 
the lungs without the risk of lung damage associated with smoke. ‘Vaporisers’ are also 
commonly used for cannabis consumption.
37 Including a vomiting defence mechanism.
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4.2.2	 Secondarysocialrisks/harms
Disaggregating drug harms and policy harms 
Considerations of secondary risks/harms are, like assessments of drug use health 
risks/harms, complicated by the influences of the policy environment. The reform 
position is substantially predicated on the observation that both health and 
secondary social drug risks/harms are increased in the context of illicitly controlled 
production and supply, and illicit using environments. Whilst there is a great deal 
of complexity in teasing out these relative risks/harms, the broader point is simply 
illustrated with a real world example. 
Compare two injecting heroin users; the first is committing high volumes of property 
crime and street sex work to fund their illicit habit. They are using ‘street’ heroin (of 
unknown strength and purity) with dirty, often shared needles in unsafe environments. 
Their supplies are purchased from a criminal dealing/trafficking infrastructure that can 
be traced back to illicit production in Afghanistan. They have HIV, Hepatitis C, and a 
long—and growing—criminal record. 
The second uses legally manufactured and prescribed pharmaceutical heroin of known 
strength and purity in a supervised clinical setting, with clean injecting paraphernalia. 
There is no criminality, profiteering or violence involved at any stage of the drug’s 
production supply or use, no blood borne disease transmission risk, a near zero risk of 
overdose death, and no offending to fund use. 
Significantly, with this example no speculative modelling is required; these two 
individuals coexist in a number of countries, where legal heroin maintenance is available 
alongside the parallel illicit trade. A similar, albeit less dramatic, comparison could be 
made for most drugs. 
While efforts to disaggregate drug risks/harms from policy risks/
harms are of vital importance in taking the policy discourse forward, 
there are demonstrable social and secondary risks/harms associated 
with drug use. They flow specifically from the nature of a given drug’s 
effects, and relate to intoxication related behaviours, the propensity for 
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dependency, and harms that can result from dependency related behav-
iour. The UK Academy of Medical Sciences has identified the following 
potential social drug risks/harms:38
* Deprivation and family adversity resulting from unemployment/
loss of income, loss of working days, family/dependent neglect and 
risk of abuse. 
* Criminality associated with use, including public disorder, prob-
lems of having a criminal record, and burden on the criminal 
justice system (including prisons).
* Burden on the drug treatment and social services. 
Risks/harms associated with driving, operating machinery or similar 
whilst competence is impaired by drug use should be included. 
4.2.3	 Finetuningpolicyresponsesandcommunication
Generalising about a given drug product’s population harms is some-
times essential; for example, it can help define broad policy priorities. 
However, it is not always appropriate for fine tuning policy responses 
for specific sub-populations or individuals. 
As they currently stand, drug harm assessments and rankings can 
help with such generalisations. However, they are less effective when 
it comes to more nuanced responses. We have tried to point out some 
of the factors that can support such fine tuning; these are demonstrably 
not present in existing generalised three or four tiered systems. 
Such systems are frequently oversimplified, and both unaware of 
and unresponsive to sub-cultural population behaviours. They also 
conflate a number of harm vectors whose rankings are demonstrably 
different. This leads to policy construction based on an understanding 
that ‘drug A is more risky than drug B’, even though such judgments are 
38 ‘Brain Science, Addiction and Drugs’, UK Academy of Medical Sciences, 2008, page 88. 
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often meaningless when translated into real world behaviour and the 
experience of individual users. 
In terms of public health education, current, former, and potential 
drug users, as well as non-drug users, need tailored information 
about drug risks and the potential harms they face as individuals. 
Such information should be responsive to the very different needs of, 
for example, a healthy 18 year old wondering about ecstasy, a 26 year 
old with a history of psychotic illness using cannabis, a 36 year old 
diabetic concerned about cocaine, or a 66 year old with hypertension 
considering their alcohol use. 
Each and every user needs to be able to understand the risks they person-
ally run using a particular drug, at a particular dose, at a particular 
frequency, administered in a particular way, in a given setting.39 This 
is the substantial—but by no means impossible—challenge for educa-
tors, be they in schools and colleges, providing websites and leaflets, or 
designing billboards and TV slots. 
They need to find ways of making the complexity that has been alluded 
to above understandable and accessible to a broad population. In partic-
ular, they need to address those who are the most vulnerable to drug 
related harm, but often the hardest to reach. 
The detail of how this challenge is best tackled is beyond the scope of this 
publication, but from this discussion it is clear that the key variables, 
or vectors of drug harms, need to be separated, quantified and ranked 
independently. These include: acute and chronic toxicity, propensity 
for dependency (both physiological and psychological), issues relating 
to dosage, potency, frequency of use, preparation of drug and mode of 
administration, individual risk factors including physical and mental 
health, age and pharmacogenetics, and behavioural factors including 
setting of drug use, and poly drug use. 
39 They also need to have information about danger signs that their drug use, or that of 
their peers, has become, or is becoming, problematic, and the appropriate course of 
action, including access to support and treatment services. 
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4.3	 Legislatingglobally,nationallyandlocally
The arguments made above imply a need to make a wide range of new 
drug policy decisions and laws. It is important to understand at what 
political level such choices and legislation should take place. In prin-
ciple, they do not significantly differ from similar issues in other arenas 
of social policy and law dealing with currently legal medical and non-
medical drugs. On this basis, we suggest below how new drug legislation 
and management could be integrated into and managed by a range of 
different kinds of political bodies, running from the international to the 
intensely local. 
* The UN’s various agencies would remain responsible for inter-
national human rights and trade issues. They would provide the 
foundation, ground rules and parameters within which individual 
states can operate, as well as offering guidance and providing a 
central hub for international drug research and data collection. The 
UN role would include oversight and guidance on sovereign state 
rights, as well as responsibilities to neighbours and the wider inter-
national community. An additional expanded role would involve 
overseeing international non-medical drug trade issues, which 
would operate in parallel to its existing medical drug production 
oversight role, alongside the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and other relevant trade bodies/agreements. 
* Individual states would be able to democratically determine their 
own drug policies and legal frameworks. Such determination 
would naturally take place within the international legal param-
eters, rights and responsibilities established by the UN, and by any 
other international entities/regional governments to which indi-
vidual states belong. This would set basic standards of justice and 
human rights that would have—as a baseline—implications for the 
use of punitive sanctions against drug users, although they would 
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neither impose nor preclude issues around legal access/supply, or 
internal domestic drug trade. 
* Local and municipal government could determine the detail 
of lower tier legal issues around regulation, licensing and 
enforcement, along with drug service/health provision. This 
would all sit within the parameters and targets established by 
the national government, and by implication broader interna-
tional law. Similar frameworks are already well established in a 
number of countries with regards to licensing of alcohol sales. 
In the UK, for example, each licensing authority must review 
entertainment licenses every three years and consult with the 
chief of police, fire authority, representatives of the licensees 
and representatives from local businesses and residents. In the 
US, alcohol policy is largely managed by the individual states, 
which control manufacture, distribution and sale within their 
own borders, whilst the federal government regulates importa-
tion and interstate transportation. Similarly, individual states 
in the US and Australia have very different approaches to 
enforcement of personal cannabis use—ranging from de facto 
decriminalisation (or civil penalties) to punitive criminal 
sanctions.40 The federal/state power dynamic generally sees 
responsibility for most serious crimes falling to federal govern-
ment with flexibility over less serious crimes and civil offences 
falling to state authorities. 
4.4	 Effectiveresearchforeffectivepolicy
Over the past five decades, prohibition has been a politically impor-
tant policy for governments worldwide. Its importance has been driven 
more by a desire to deal firmly with a perceived ‘evil’, and be seen to be 
doing so, than by a desire to engage directly with a very challenging 
and complex set of health and social issues. The need to justify such an 
40 Federal and international law, however, currently prevents exploration of options for 
legal regulation of non-medical supply. 
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approach has shaped the drug research agenda. Directly and indirectly, 
it has encouraged research to be skewed towards demonstrating drug 
harms, in order to justify and support punitive responses to the ‘drug 
threat’. This focus on research that justifies firm, punitive action has 
led to an avoidance of policy research that meaningfully evaluates and 
scrutinises the actual outcomes of prohibition. 
There is, therefore, a clear need to shift the research agenda away from 
its historical skew towards medical research of drug toxicity and addic-
tion, and towards meaningful policy research. Of course, it remains 
very important to fully explore and understand drug related health 
harms. But such an understanding needs to be complemented by careful 
evaluation of the policies intended to mitigate such harms. In particular, 
policy outcomes and policy alternatives should be carefully evaluated 
and explored. 
The responsibility for this has historically fallen largely to the non 
government sector. Government entry into and support of this area 
would support both the development of new drug management policies 
and the modification of existing ones. This would ensure most efficient 
limitation of drug related harms at a local, national and international 
level, both in the short and long term. 
Two key research programs need to be commenced: 
* Critics of the prohibitionist approach can and do argue authorita-
tively that there is strong evidence of the policy approach’s overall 
failure and counterproductive nature. For political progress to take 
place, however, this critique and analysis needs to be firmly rooted 
in a comprehensive ongoing body of international (UN) and state 
government research—in which all policy outcomes are openly and 
accurately evaluated on an ongoing basis to agreed standards and 
using an agreed set of policy indicators/measures. We are still some 
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way from achieving anything remotely approaching this.41 The 
paucity of adequate data and analysis regarding current policy is a 
significant obstacle to understanding the impacts of that policy, and 
thus to being able to modify or evolve it to maximise its efficacy. 
 * In parallel to more meaningful evaluation and critical engagement 
with current policy there needs to be substantial investment in 
exploration of alternative policy approaches. Such research can 
utilise established analytical tools of a more speculative nature, 
such as comparative cost benefit analysis and impact assess-
ments.42 These can augment ongoing and expanded pilot research 
on regulated production and supply models. Independent research 
boards that oversee the research agenda and disseminate findings 
to relevant stakeholders can operate at state and UN level. 
4.5		 Broadersocial,politicalandeconomicimpacts
Illicit drug production and trade has had a range of profound conse-
quences for the social, political and economic development of key 
producer and transit countries. The impact for them of any transi-
tion towards regulated production within the global market will be 
correspondingly significant. The development consequences of global 
prohibition—and impacts of any shifts away from it—need to become 
more central to the drug reform discourse, which has tended to focus 
on the domestic concerns of developed world user countries. Such 
consequences should also feature far more prominently in wider devel-
opment discourse. 
Many countries or regions involved in drug production and transit 
have weak or chaotic governance and state infrastructure—prominent 
current examples include Afghanistan, Guinea Bissau, and areas of 
Colombia. Prohibitions on commodities for which there is high demand 
41 For more discussion see: M. Trace, M. Roberts, A. Klein, ‘Assessing Drug Policy; Principles 
and Practice’ , Beckley Foundation, 2004. 
42 For more discussion see: ‘A Comparison of the Cost-effectiveness of the Prohibition and 
Regulation of Drugs’, Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 2009. 
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inevitably create criminal opportunities, pushing production, supply 
and consumption into an illicit parallel economy. Such illicit activity 
is flexible and opportunistic, naturally seeking out locations where it 
can operate with minimum cost and interference—hence the attrac-
tion of geographically marginal regions and fragile, failing or failed 
states. Large-scale illicit activity can feed into a downward develop-
ment spiral. In such a spiral, existing problems are exacerbated and 
governance further undermined through 
endemic corruption and violence, the inevi-
table features of illicit drug markets entirely 
controlled by organised criminal profiteers. 
Most drug producers do not fit the stereo-
type of cartel gangsters who sit at the top 
of the illicit trade pyramid, accruing the 
majority of the wealth that it generates. The 
farmers and labourers who make up most of 
the illicit workforce are frequently living in 
poor, underdeveloped and insecure environ-
ments. Their involvement in the illicit drug trade is in large part because 
of ‘need not greed’, their ‘migration to illegality’ 43 primarily a reflection of 
poverty and limited options. For example, the UNODC has acknowl-
edged that, in Myanmar, ‘opium poppy cultivation is a sign of poverty rather 
than wealth’.44
This discussion requires that we highlight those harms that are specifically 
either the result of, or exacerbated by, the illicit nature of the drug trade. Of 
course, that illicit nature is itself the inevitable and direct consequence of 
opting for an exclusively prohibitionist approach to drug control. 
The 2009 Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy45 
43 M. Jelsma, ‘Vicious Circle: The Chemical and Biological War on Drugs’, Transnational 
Institute, 2001, page 26.
44 ‘Life in the Wa Hills: Towards Sustainable Development’, UNODC Myanmar Country Office, 
2006, page 3.
45 ‘Drugs and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm Shift’, Latin American Commission on Drugs 
& Democracy, 2009,  page 25. 
Most drug producers do 
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pyramid. The farmers and 
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has identified five major problems that are caused by prohibition, its 
enforcement, and the illicit trade that it creates: 
* The development of parallel powers in susceptible areas of national States 
(poor districts within large cities and their periphery; regions far within 
the interior; frontier areas; and Amazonian territories);
* The criminalization of political conflicts;
* The corruption of public life (above all police, justice and penitentiary 
systems);
* The alienation of youth and, especially, poor youth;
* The dislocation of farmers (more than two million are internally displaced, 
thousands more are refugees from drug combat in Colombia) and the stig-
matization of traditional cultures (a stigma thrown on coca cultivation, a 
staple plantation of the Andean cultures in Bolivia and Peru). 
To this list could also be added:
* ‘Policy displacement’
46 whereby the political environment (rather 
than evidence of effectiveness) skews policy focus and resources 
dramatically towards counterproductive enforcement and eradi-
cation efforts, at the expense of social and economic development. 
Local public health issues, including problematic drug use and 
drug related HIV/AIDS, are marginalised. 
* Development interventions, where they do occur, are distorted by 
drug war objectives, which means that they are often inadequate 
in scale and ineffective in design and implementation. 
* Environmental destruction—for example the deforestation of 
Colombia47 for illicit coca cultivation (exacerbated by displacement 
from eradication) and pollution from unregulated coca processing. 
* Directly fuelling conflict by providing a source of income for 
insurgents, terror groups, militias and corrupt governments that 
supports them as they pursue military objectives.
46 A concept flagged up by the UNODC executive director as one of the ‘unintended 
consequences’ of the drug control system. See: ‘Making drug control 'fit for purpose': Building 
on the UNGASS decade’, UNODC, 2008.
47 Colombia is one of the most bio-diverse nations on earth. 
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Of course, high worth natural resources, whether legal or illegal, can 
also fuel conflict; current examples include oil, diamonds and coltan.48 
But their value remains consistently high, regardless of international 
legal frameworks. By contrast, drug crops such as opium and coca are 
essentially low value. They have only become high value commodities 
as a result of a prohibitionist legal framework, which has encouraged 
development of a criminal controlled trade. By the time they reach 
developed world users, such is the alchemy of prohibition, that they 
have become literally worth more than their weight in gold. 
By contrast, the licit production of opium and coca (see: Appendix 2, 
page 193) is associated with few, if any of the problems highlighted above. 
In this legal context, they essentially function as regular agricultural 
commodities—much like coffee, tea, or other plant-based pharmaceu-
tical precursors. 
Under a legal production regime drug crops would become part of 
the wider development discourse. Whilst such agricultural activities 
present a raft of serious and urgent challenges to both local and inter-
national communities—for example, coping with the whims of global 
capitalist markets and the general lack of a fair trade infrastructure—
dealing with such issues within a legally regulated market framework 
means they are not additionally impeded by the negative consequences 
of prohibition, and the criminal empires it has created. 
The potential role of existing illicit producer countries in any post 
prohibition trade, and the inevitable transitional process, raises a series 
of questions that require more detailed consideration by key agencies, 
NGOs and academics. 
There is potential for long established legal and quasi-legal coca culti-
vation in the Andean regions continuing or expanding under a revised 
48 The ore found in the Congo, that produces Tantalum—a mineral essential to 
manufacture of mobile phones. See: B. Todd, ‘Congo, Coltan, Conflict’, The Heinz Journal, 
Vol 3, issue 1, 2006.
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regulated framework. Rather like coffee, coca production could be 
subject to fair trade principles, and for non-pharmaceutical coca 
products, even some form of protectionism along the lines of the EU’s 
‘Protected Designation of Origin’ (PDO), ‘Protected Geographical Indication’ 
(PGI) or ‘Traditional Speciality Guaranteed’ (TSG) systems.49 Inevitably, 
however, there would be nothing to stop coca cultivation for future legal 
markets emerging elsewhere, unless the UN drug conventions were, by 
agreement, adapted to control such production (as with current opium 
production), or new international trade agreements established to fulfil 
a similar role. 
For the Andean regions, the transition away from illicit coca production 
would undoubtedly have many benefits. However, it would also have 
potentially negative impacts, in terms of reduced GDP and reduced 
economic opportunities for some already marginalised and struggling 
populations. These negative consequences cannot be ignored, and also 
need to be built into any development analysis and planning under-
taken by domestic and international agencies. 
It would also be imperative to manage the influence of any multinational 
corporations within this trade; Colombia already has bad experiences 
with companies such as Coca Cola. In extreme cases, membership 
of trade unions has lead to persecution, abduction and murder. An 
expanded or revised role for established state coca-market regulators/
monopolies, working more closely with UN drug agencies and interna-
tional trade bodies, presents a more attractive option. 
The future for Afghanistan’s opium trade, and to a lesser extent opium 
production elsewhere in Central and East Asia, is more problematic. 
Opium is already produced around the world; existing licit produc-
tion for medical use could relatively easily expand into non-medical 
production (see: Appendix 2, page 193). Poppy cultivation would become 
less attractive for Afghan farmers, as the price support provided by 
49 See the relevant EU detail here: www.ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/.
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global prohibition progressively eroded. Without internationally 
administered fair trade, and specifically guaranteed minimum prices, 
they would be unable to compete with the larger industrialised inter-
national production. 
It may be that as illicit demand contracts something similar to the well-
intentioned but ill-conceived ‘Poppies for Medicine’ scheme50 could play a 
useful role. Existing illicit production could also progressively migrate 
into a legal fair trade scheme for export, overseen in a similar fashion 
to existing medical production (most obviously production in India) by 
the UN drug agencies. 
Any contracting illicit market scenarios would, however, have a very 
different dynamic to current illicit production. They would certainly 
operate on a smaller scale and, as with coca in the Andean countries, 
would have major social and economic implications. Positive impacts 
from reduced criminal profiteering, conflict and instability would 
be weighed against the short to medium term reduction in economic 
opportunity and GDP. 
More conventional development interventions will be required for coca 
and opium producers at the bottom of the illicit production pyramid, 
who have been adversely affected by the progressive contraction of illicit 
trade opportunities, and for whom transition into any post-prohibition 
legal trade was not practically or economically viable. Lessons could 
be learnt from the extensive experience with Alternative Development 
(AD), a concept which has failed in its goal of reducing overall illicit drug 
production, but has—when done well—demonstrated how growers can 
make the transition into non-drug livelihoods. Key points to consider 
here include: 
* AD needs to be well-planned and take account of realities on the 
ground. In the past, it has often been imposed from above as part of 
50 See: www.poppyformedicine.net.
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an eradication/enforcement strategy; local participation in project 
development and ownership of programs is essential.
* Too often AD has been seen as separate to poverty reduction strat-
egies and national development programmes, when in fact these 
are inextricably linked.51 AD needs to be taken out of drug control 
strategies, and integrated into wider development policy.
* AD must be well-financed and include micro-financing for farmers. 
It must focus on viable crops and viable markets. It needs to recog-
nise the impact of security, development and human rights as well 
as education, health, governance, and economic opportunities. 
A real concern exists, however, that once the drug control and eradica-
tion priorities of current policy diminish, so too will the level of concern 
for, and development resources directed towards impoverished drug 
producers.52 They will simply join the broad ranks of marginalised 
people so commonly ignored or failed by international development 
efforts. Some responsibility should fall to the consumer countries 
as any such transition occurs. Perhaps this responsibility could be 
discharged through a post-drug war ‘Marshall Plan’. Under such a plan, 
a proportion of former supply-side enforcement expenditure would 
be reallocated to devastated former drug-producing regional econo-
mies. It would help support alternative livelihoods, and develop good 
governance and state infrastructure. Funding could come from the 
‘peace dividend’ that would arrive with the end of the drug war, possibly 
supported by emerging legitimate drug tax income. 
The development field as a whole—including both governments and 
NGOs—has strikingly failed to engage with the role of prohibition in 
the creation of development problems. Discussion of alternatives to 
prohibition has been almost zero. Where there has been engagement it 
has been largely symptomatic (localised attempts to reduce some illicit 
market and enforcement related harms; conflict resolution, highlighting 
51 J. Buxton, ‘Alternative Development in Counter Narcotics Strategy: An Opportunity Lost?’, 
(publication pending), 2009.
52 A similar concern has been expressed regarding the priority and resources directed into 
drug treatment post-prohibition, as the crime reduction agenda becomes increasingly 
irrelevant.
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more excessive/military enforcement responses, etc.). It has consistently 
failed to address the root causes of the problem. 
The basic tenets and legal structures of prohibition itself have hardly 
been challenged at all. They are invariably seen as being an absolute 
and unchangeable set of legal/political structures, rather than a partic-
ular, reversible policy choice. Some of the blame for this failing must 
fall at the doors of the drug reform movement and its somewhat myopic 
domestic preoccupations, but to a large extent the lack of engagement is 
due simply to fear. Discussing alternatives to prohibition is still seen as 
taboo in many high level policy arenas, especially for the large majority 
of development agencies that are state funded or operating under the 
auspices of the UN. 
Any forward movement on this issue must begin with a meaningful 
effort by key international agencies—NGOs, state governments, and the 
UN—to count the social and economic development costs of the global 
commitment to prohibition, the ‘unintended consequences of drug control’ 
so eloquently outlined by the UNODC.53
Such evaluations will drive and support dialogue on finding new and 
more effective ways forward. Such evolution should galvanise a wider 
development field that has, at last, the opportunity to begin addressing 
this huge and urgent issue, and to create development opportunities 
that are more effective and therefore more constructive than those that 
have gone before. 
4.5.1	 Broaderconsequencesfororganisedcrime
A frequently expressed concern around moves towards legal drug 
market regulation focuses on the simple question ‘what will all 
the criminals do once the opportunities afforded them by prohibition are 
removed?’ Clearly the impacts of moves towards legal regulation of 
53 A. Costa, ‘Making drug control “fit for purpose”: Building on the UNGASS decade’,  
UNODC, 2008.
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drug markets will differ at the various levels of the criminal infra-
structure and the environments in which they operate. Since reforms 
will be phased over a number of years and not happen overnight, 
criminal drug infrastructures will experience a protracted twilight 
period of diminishing profit opportunities. 
Undoubtedly some criminals will seek out new areas of illegal activity 
and it is realistic to expect that there may be increases in some areas, 
such as cyber-crime, extortion or other illicit trades. However, crime 
is to a large extent a function of opportunity, and it is impossible to 
imagine that there is enough untapped criminal opportunity to absorb 
the manpower currently operating an illicit drugs market with a turn-
over somewhere in the region of $320 billion a year globally. Even 
given some diversion into other criminal activity, the big picture will 
undoubtedly show a significant net fall in overall criminal activity in 
the longer term. Getting rid of illegal drug markets is about reducing 
opportunities for crime. 
This concern is a curious one to posit as an argument against reform 
because it seems, when considered closely, to be advocating prohibi-
tion as a way of maintaining destructive illegal drug empires so that 
organised criminals do not have to change jobs. By contrast, from a 
reform perspective, the argument is about removing the largest criminal 
opportunity on earth, not just from existing criminals but, significantly, 
from future generations of criminals. Ending prohibition holds the 
prospect of diverting millions of potential young drug producers, traf-
fickers, and dealers from a life of crime. 
For many involved in the lower tiers of the developed world illicit drug 
economy, like the lower tiers of developing world drug production, a 
contracting illicit trade may have negative consequences, presenting 
significant short to medium term hardship. Aside from the multiple 
social harms created by illicit markets, illicit drug markets do create 
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real economic activity and offer employment for many marginalised 
and socially excluded individuals and populations who have otherwise 
limited economic choices, particularly in urban centres. Impacts of any 
more far reaching drug policy reform process on these groups needs to 
be factored into the social policy discourse as the transition away from 
prohibition occurs. 
“Illicit vice entrepreneurs seem to respond to decriminalizations and shrinkages in illicit 
markets in any of four ways. Some succeed in making the transition to legal entrepreneurship 
in the same line of work. Some seek to remain in the business illegally, whether by supplying 
products and services in competition with the legal market or by employing criminal means 
to take advantage of the legal markets. For instance, following Prohibition, some bootleggers 
continued to market their products by forging liquor tax stamps, by strong-arming bartenders 
into continuing to carry their moonshine and illegally imported liquors, and by muscling their 
way into the distribution of legal alcohol. Some also fought to retain their markets among those 
who had developed a taste for corn whiskey before and during Prohibition. The third response 
of bootleggers and drug dealers is to abandon their pursuits and branch out instead into other 
criminal activities involving both vice opportunities and other sorts of crime. Indeed, one 
potential negative consequence of decriminalization is that many committed criminals would 
adapt to the loss of drug dealing revenues by switching their energies to crimes of theft, thereby 
negating to some extent the reductions in such crimes that would result from drug addicts no 
longer needing to raise substantial amounts of money to pay the inflated prices of illicit drugs. 
The fourth response—one that has been and would be attractive to many past, current, and 
potential drug dealers—is to forego criminal activities altogether. 
“Relatively few criminal pursuits can compare in terms of paying so well, requiring so few skills, 
remaining fairly accessible to newcomers, and presenting attractive capitalist opportunities to 
poorly educated and integrated inner-city youth. During Prohibition, tens if not hundreds of 
thousands of Americans with no particular interest in leading lives of crime were drawn into 
the business of illegally producing and distributing alcohol; following its repeal, many if not 
most of them abandoned their criminal pursuits altogether. There is every reason to believe 
that drug decriminalization would have the same impact on many involved in the drug dealing 
business who would not have been tempted into criminal pursuits but for the peculiar attractions 
of that business. The challenge for researchers, of course, is to estimate the relative proportions 
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of current and potential drug dealers who would respond in any of these four ways. The even 
broader challenge is to determine the sorts of public policies that would maximize the proportion 
that forego criminal activities altogether."
E. Nadelmann, ‘Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition’, 
Daedalus, 1994, 121, pages 87–132 
Furtherreading
Assessing drug harms 
* Nutt	et al.,	‘Development of a rational scale to assess the harms of 
drugs of potential misuse’,	The	Lancet,	Vol.	369,	Issue	9566,	
pages	1047–1053,	2007
* ‘Brain science, addiction and drugs’,	The	Academy	of	Medical	
Sciences	(UK),	chapter	5.3:	‘Measuring the harm associated with the 
use of illegal drugs’,	2008
* Transform	submission	to	the	Parliamentary	Science	and	
Technology	Select	Committee	inquiry:	‘Scientific advice, risk and 
evidence: how the government handles them—case study on the clas-
sification of illegal drugs’,	2006
* M.	Roberts,	D.	Bewley-Taylor,	M.	Trace,	‘Monitoring drug policy 
outcomes: The measurement of drug related harm’,	2006	
Effective research
* M.	Trace,	M.	Roberts,	A.	Klein,	‘Assessing drug policy: Principles 
and practice’,	2004	
Social and economic development
* ‘Drugs and Democracy: Towards a Paradigm Shift’,	Latin	American	
Commission	on	Drugs	and	Democracy,	2009
* Transnational	Institute	Drugs	and	Democracy	programme.	
Visit	www.tni.org.	
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5	 Regulateddrugmarketsinpractice
Any discussion of legal drug market regulation must necessarily 
involve a review of the experiences and lessons learned from different 
approaches to currently legal drugs, and in particular, alcohol and 
tobacco. While many mistakes have been made with alcohol and tobacco 
policy over the past century, more appropriate and effective responses 
have now been developed, if not universally adopted. 
It should be acknowledged that alcohol and tobacco’s unique historical, 
cultural and legal status—and their very distinct effects and patterns of 
use—do, to some extent, demand a degree of pragmatic realism and flex-
ibility. However, even given this, there can be no good argument made 
for not developing alcohol and tobacco management policies based on 
the aims and working principles that drive this book’s thinking. The 
same menu of regulatory tools is available; the same policy outcomes 
are sought. It is therefore both consistent and necessary to combine 
moves toward effective legal regulation of currently illegal drugs with 
calls for improved regulation of currently legal drugs. 
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In both cases, the unique status of psychoactive drugs as commodities 
demanding special attention is acknowledged, and the common goal 
of moving towards optimum regulatory models is shared, even if the 
movement begins from a different place on the policy continuum and 
presents a different set of challenges. Likewise, each seeks to achieve the 
widely shared goals of reducing personal and social harms associated 
with drug production, supply and use, and the broader promotion of 
health and wellbeing. 
There remains, however, one key difference between managing legal 
and illegal drugs. The alcohol and tobacco management improvement 
process has been able to ask, and to some degree answer, questions 
about which forms of regulation are most effective. These are ques-
tions of vital importance; the current legal framework for most other 
drugs denies us the opportunity to explore them in the context of those 
drugs, and thus with the full depth and rigour that they both deserve 
and demand. 
A consistent approach to policy across all drugs will help reverse this 
research gap. It thus holds the prospect of dramatically improving not only 
policy around currently illegal drugs, but also alcohol and tobacco policy. 
5.1		 Alcohol
Alcohol policy provides an invaluable body of evidence to support future 
development of effective legal regulatory models for currently illicit 
drugs. There is an extensive body of research, publications, and schol-
arship in the field, by national governments, NGOs, academics, and UN 
entities including—very prominently—the World Health Organization. 
Some of this research has been alluded to throughout this book; rather 
than revisit this well established analysis, this brief discussion will 
focus more on some of the wider themes that have emerged from it, and 
their implications for other drugs. 
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Alcohol is a psychoactive drug that has toxic effects and potential to 
cause dependence. However, it is important to acknowledge its differ-
ences from other drugs. These differences rest on more than just its 
legal status. 
It is unique amongst drugs in that it is a food/beverage. Alcohol itself, 
being broken down into sugar, has a calorific value. This value is added 
to by the various beverages, and sometimes foods, with which it is mixed 
and consumed. Over and above this, many alcoholic beverages have them-
selves assumed cultural roles and importance only tangentially related to 
their intoxicating effects. For example, they have been used in cooking, 
or as components of religious rituals. It is 
acknowledged that, for example with wine 
connoisseurs, alcoholic beverages are not 
consumed exclusively for intoxication. 
Alcohol has a history as old as human 
civilisation, its use is deeply entrenched in 
a wide range of social contexts and cultural 
rituals, throughout a significant majority 
of the world’s societies. With the possible 
exception of caffeine, alcohol is the most widely used non-medical 
psychoactive drug. The WHO estimates that there are ‘about 2 billion 
people worldwide consuming alcoholic beverages, and 76.3 million with diag-
nosed alcohol use disorders’. The scale of alcohol use and its global cultural 
penetration help explain why its negative public health impact is only 
exceeded by tobacco. 
If there is any upside to this, it is that a wide spectrum of policy 
approaches to controlling alcohol have been experimented with, in 
widely varying social contexts, including unregulated free markets, 
various formulations of licensed sales, state monopolies, and prohi-
bition. These experiments have taken place across the globe and 
For alcohol policy to 
have an effective future 
it is clear that potentially 
very unpopular decisions 
will have to be made that 
will involve increasing 
regulation and heavy 
restrictions on all aspects of 
marketing and promotions
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throughout recent history. From an overview of these experiences, the 
WHO ‘Global Status of Alcohol Policy 2004’ report concludes that: 
A policy mix which makes use of taxation and control of physical access, 
supports drink driving countermeasures, and, which invests broadly 
in treatment of alcohol use disorders and particularly in primary care, 
advertising restrictions and public awareness campaigns, is, based 
on all the research evidence, likely to achieve success in reducing 
the level of alcohol consumption problems (Edwards et al., 1994). 
Thus, in order to be effective, a comprehensive alcohol policy must 
not only incorporate measures to educate the public about the dangers 
of hazardous and harmful use of alcohol, or interventions that focus 
primarily on treating or punishing those who may be putting at risk 
their own or others’ health and safety, but also must put in place regu-
latory and other environmental supports that promote the health of the 
population as a whole.
This is advice that, with some necessary tweaks and variations, clearly 
describes the approach to drug policy and regulation being more widely 
advocated here. Indeed, it is often a revealing experience to read author-
itative texts about alcohol control policy, changing the words ‘alcohol’ to 
‘drugs’, and ‘drinking’ to ‘drug use’.54 
The fundamental conflict between public health policy, and alcohol sale 
and consumption as a commercially driven activity, is a key issue, coming 
up repeatedly in alcohol policy literature. This issue raises a series of 
important concerns for the wider drug policy and law reform agenda. 
It is rather diplomatically elucidated, for example, in the ‘Framework for 
Alcohol Policy in the WHO European Region’ 55 which notes that: 
As well as having psychoactive properties, alcoholic beverages are 
also regarded as commodities. The production and sale of alcoholic 
beverages, together with the ancillary industries, are important 
54 For a paired example see: ‘After the War on Drugs: Tools for the Debate’,  
Transform Drug Policy Foundation, page 16, 2006.
55 See: www.euro.who.int/document/e88335.pdf.
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parts of the economy in many European countries, providing 
employment for many people, export revenue for drinks companies 
and substantial tax revenues for governments. These economic and 
fiscal interests are often an important determinant of policies that 
can be seen as barriers to public health initiatives. Dissemination 
of public health research that can counterbalance these economic 
and fiscal interests is paramount. 
Alcohol producers and suppliers see alcohol from a commer-
cial rather than a public health perspective. They do not bear the 
secondary costs of problematic alcohol use; quite naturally, their 
primary motivation is to generate the highest possible profits. This is 
logically achieved by maximising consumption, both in total popula-
tion and per capita terms. Public health issues become a concern only 
when they threaten to impact on the bottom line, and will invariably 
be secondary to profit maximisation. 
The alcohol industry56 has historically striven to concede as little market 
control to regulators as possible. They have achieved this by deploying 
a now familiar menu of high level lobbying, manufactured outrage and 
populist posturing (the ‘nanny state’ against ‘a man’s right to have a drink 
after work’ etc.), dubious science (creating the false impression there is a 
genuine debate or controversy over issues like the efficacy of price and 
marketing controls), and token gestures. 
In many countries these efforts have been highly effective at distracting 
from, or delaying, any meaningful regulatory legislation. In addition, 
they have often successfully kept what regulation has been passed at 
a voluntary level, meaning that it can largely be ignored or sidelined to 
the point of being almost completely ineffectual. 
The alcohol industry as a whole will never willingly embrace any 
policies that involve increased or stricter regulation, and that lead to 
56 The ‘drinks industry’ or ‘alcohol industry’ refers to the corporate representatives, and 
professional bodies, lobbying and PR agencies funded by alcoholic drink manufacturers/
suppliers to represent their interests.
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a substantial decrease in consumption and profits. Yet this is exactly 
what is required to address particular issues of binge and problem 
drinking, and to support the general evolution of a more moderate and 
responsible drinking culture. It is important to remember that problem-
atic and binge drinking constitute a significant proportion of alcohol 
industry profits; they are, quite simply, hugely profitable consumer 
behaviours. Such concerns have prompted adoption of government 
monopoly control models for sections of alcohol supply in some coun-
tries. Examples include the Systembolaget system in Sweden,57 under 
which the state controls all import and supply, and the provincial 
government control of alcohol off-licences in some Canadian prov-
inces (Ontario and Quebec). These models have some similarities to the 
Regulated Market Model proposed for tobacco (see: page 27). 
There is a related political problem here, too. As the European WHO 
report highlights, state governments themselves generate substantial 
tax revenue from alcohol sales. Furthermore, the alcohol industry is 
a significant employer of potential voters. These factors combine with 
the immense lobbying power of alcohol industry bodies, and the public 
unpopularity of restricting alcohol sales or increasing prices, to create 
massive political obstacles to effective reforms. This is the case even 
when knowledge of what works from a public health perspective (that 
is, encouraging reduced and/or moderate consumption) is clear. In 
effect, many governments have been complicit in the growing public 
health crisis associated with alcohol. 
For alcohol policy to have an effective future it is clear that poten-
tially very unpopular decisions will have to be made that will involve 
increasing regulation and heavy restrictions on all aspects of marketing 
and promotions. How such reforms unfold, combined with historic 
successes and failures in alcohol control, will continue to provide a rich 
resource for future, legally regulated markets to learn from. 
57 In 2007 the EU ruled that the Swedish system violated free trade agreements—raising 
some difficult questions about the role of state drug controls in a broader international 
free trade framework.
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Furtherreading
* ‘Global Status Report: Alcohol Policy’,	World	Health	Organization,	
2004	(public	health	impacts	of	alcohol	around	the	world)	
* ‘The Global Alcohol Status Report’,	World	Health	Organization,	
2004	(different	policy	approaches	around	the	world,	and	their	
effectiveness)
* ‘Working document for developing a draft global strategy to reduce 
harmful use of alcohol’,	World	Health	Organization,	2009
* ‘50 best collection: Alcohol Harm Reduction’,	International	Harm	
Reduction	Association,	2008	
5.2	 Tobacco
Tobacco is the most widely consumed psychoactive drug after caffeine 
and alcohol. It is, however, associated with a disproportionate level of 
health harms, on a scale that eclipses all other drugs combined. These 
huge public health impacts are predominantly associated with smoked 
tobacco; they are related to its high propensity to produce dependency,58 
alongside the fact that it does not intoxicate to a degree that significantly 
impairs functioning. This combination leads to high frequency depen-
dent patterns of use. Many smokers consume nicotine more than 20 
times every day, for prolonged periods—commonly over many years. 
Despite the high risks smoking presents (around half of smokers will 
die prematurely as a result of their use) the low level of intoxication 
created by nicotine has not historically attracted the moral indigna-
tion that fuelled the temperance movement and shaped much punitive 
prohibitionist thinking on other drugs. As such, tobacco has assumed 
a unique role in society; a highly visible pattern of dependent drug 
use associated with a high risk of chronic health harms, yet one that 
58 It has a rapid onset, a short half life, is associated with development of tolerance and 
distinct withdrawal effects and cravings—on top of psychological effects related to 
habituation into various personal and cultural consumption rituals.
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in much of the world, at least until very recently, has become aggres-
sively commercialised and socially acceptable in almost all public 
environments. 
The public health disaster associated with smoked tobacco has, however, 
ultimately led to the emergence of a range of more pragmatic public health 
and regulatory responses in a number of countries. Like alcohol, the full 
gamut of policy responses to tobacco can be observed and learnt from, 
and there is a substantial body of related scholarship to be drawn upon. 
There is now a clear consensus around the types of interventions and 
market regulation that are likely to deliver improved policy outcomes. 
The World Health Organization sponsored a Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, which provided a good summary of these: 
Key policy provisions of the Framework Convention  
on Tobacco Control (FCTC)59
> Increase tobacco taxes
> Protect citizens from exposure to tobacco smoke in workplaces, public transport and 
indoor public places
> Enact comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship
> Regulate the packaging and labelling of tobacco products to prevent the use of 
misleading and deceptive terms such as ‘light’ and ‘mild’
> Regulate the packaging and labelling of tobacco products to ensure that 
appropriate product warnings are communicated to consumers; for example, 
obligate the placement of rotating health warnings on tobacco packaging that 
cover at least 30% (but ideally 50% or more) of the principal display areas and can 
include pictures or pictograms
> Regulate the testing and disclosure of the content and emissions of tobacco products
> Promote public awareness of tobacco control issues by ensuring broad access to 
effective comprehensive educational and public awareness programmes on the health 
59 See the full UN Framework Convention on Tobacco Control here:  
www.who.int/fctc/en/.
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risks of tobacco and exposure to tobacco smoke
> Promote and implement effective programmes aimed at promoting the cessation of 
tobacco use
> Combat smuggling, including the placing of final destination markings on packs
> Implement legislation and programmes to prohibit the sale of tobacco products to minors
> Implement policies to support economically viable alternative sources of income for 
tobacco workers, growers, and individual sellers 
Interestingly, this tobacco control convention has 168 signatories, repre-
senting a powerful international consensus behind a legal framework 
dealing specifically with effective non-medical drug market regulation. 
This level of consensus is notably equivalent to that which exists in 
support of the three UN drug treaties, which define parallel contrasting 
systems for the absolute prohibition of almost all other non-medical 
drug markets (see: Appendix 1, page 165). 
In stark contrast to those prohibited drugs, in the developed world, 
tobacco is becoming less, not more, popular; its use has been falling 
since the 1970s. This is due to a combination of public health educa-
tion, which raises awareness about previously poorly understood 
health risks, and increasingly widespread use of market controls 
like those outlined by the WHO, more recently combined with 
bans on public indoor consumption. The reining in of the rampant 
commercial marketing that fuelled the explosion of tobacco use (in 
particular of cigarettes) in the first half of the last century has been 
particularly important. 
Alarmingly, however, this pattern is far from universal. Tobacco 
consumption is becoming more popular in large swathes of the devel-
oping and newly industrialising world. In these areas, tobacco is being 
aggressively marketed, often as an aspirational Western lifestyle 
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product—somewhat ironic, given its waning popularity in the West. 
The commercial forces that have so effectively distorted policy priori-
ties in the past have not lost any of their potential power. They sound a 
clear cautionary note on the corrupting nature of profit motivations in 
drug markets. 
(See: Tobacco Regulated Market Model, chapter 2, page 27) 
Tobacco Harm Reduction: Smokeless tobacco 
Tobacco harms are substantially related to the inhalation of smoke, rather than the 
consumption of nicotine per se. In common with the regulatory/harm gradient theme 
explored in the previous chapters, there are public health gains to be had from exploring 
and developing the market for, and use of, safer, non-smoked nicotine/tobacco products, 
as alternatives to smoked tobacco. 
The increasing use of various nicotine delivery systems, (such as inhalers, gum and 
patches) as cessation aids is a welcome development, is already widespread, and 
should be actively supported. Such support could include increased access, as well 
as a reduction in price (subsidised where necessary) so that those most dependent on 
nicotine—in particular, those on low income—can afford to access these products. 
However, the use of nicotine delivery systems as cessation aids takes place within a 
medical model that is specifically aimed at achieving abstinence. This is an important 
and proven part of the public health response to tobacco; it does not, however, cater for 
those who want to continue consuming nicotine, or will continue regardless of other 
interventions. Certain non-smoked oral tobacco products (including ‘Snus’ and ‘Bandits’) 
offer potential alternative tobacco preparation/consumption methods that are (it is 
estimated) 90% safer than smoked tobacco.60 
However, use of such products can only occur if an informed choice is available to the 
consumer, and will only gain a foothold amongst current smoked-tobacco consumers if 
they are to some extent promoted as an alternative. In many places they are not widely 
available; they are, for example, effectively banned from sale across most of the EU. 
60 C. Bates et al., ‘European Union policy on smokeless tobacco: a statement in favour of evidence 
based regulation for public health’, Tobacco Control,  2003, Vol. 12, pages 360–367.
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Whilst this ban was—like other drug prohibitions—well intentioned, the result is that 
oral tobacco products that are substantially safer than smoked tobacco are now not 
available as an alternative to cigarettes. 
The oral tobacco product ‘Snus’ is very popular in Sweden, which has an exemption 
from the EU sales ban. This is despite a prohibitionist drug policy position that is, in 
most other respects, the most stringent in Europe. It has been convincingly argued that 
this high level of oral tobacco use correlates with the fact that the country has the lowest 
rate of smokers in the developed world. There has been a large drop in the number of 
smokers in Sweden, in particular within the male population—from 40% in 1976 to 15% in 
2002—partially attributed to a roughly corresponding increased use of Snus.61
Of course, many healthcare professionals and legislators are understandably 
unenthusiastic about actively promoting the use of non-smokeable forms of tobacco 
over nicotine replacement therapies or outright cessation programmes. However, there 
is plenty of evidence from the Swedish model to suggest that Snus and other similar 
products can help users give up smoking, as well as providing a safer tobacco alternative. 
There are obviously difficult ethical and practical questions regarding how such 
products can be brought to the market, and then regulated and promoted responsibly; 
that is, so as to encourage existing smokers to quit or switch from smoked tobacco, while 
not inducing a fresh tobacco consumption habit in new users. However, these challenges 
are not insurmountable. The potentially enormous public health gains are such that the 
relevant agencies should, on pragmatic public health grounds alone, seriously consider 
the options for appropriate legislative reforms. Research and pilot studies should be 
commissioned, as appropriate, to explore potential ways forward. 
Furtherreading
* ‘50 Best Collection: Tobacco Harm Reduction’,	International	Harm	
Reduction	Association,	2008
* R.	Cunningham,	‘Smoke and Mirrors: The Canadian Tobacco War’,	
IDRC,	1996	
61 J. Foulds et al., ‘Effect of smokeless tobacco (Snus) on smoking and public health in Sweden’, 
Tobacco Control, 2003;12, pages 349–359.
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Proposeddiscussionmodelsforcurrentlyillegaldrugs
First of all, it is very important to reiterate that the proposed models 
below are just that: proposals intended to trigger further discussion. 
It should also be acknowledged that the models proposed here reflect 
the authors’ Western background. Other environments, and other 
user populations, will require different, regionally appropriate ways 
of thinking. So, we have built a degree of openness and flexibility 
into these proposals. In particular, we have highlighted potentials for 
greater or lesser levels of regulation, enforcement and/or deployment 
of additional controls. 
5.3	 Cannabis
(See also: 3.1.1 Legal cannabis production, page 35, and Appendix 2, 
page 206). 
A large body of literature, research and real world experience can be 
drawn on to help plot out legal models for cannabis supply and use. 
In fact, for a drug covered by the UN conventions, cannabis already 
uniquely spans the drug control spectrum, with examples of almost all 
regulatory approaches in evidence around the world. These run from 
extreme prohibition to quasi-legal regulated supply and use. 
Of particular relevance is the Netherlands’ experience with its unique 
‘coffee shop’ system, a de facto legal licensing of supply and use that has 
been running since 1976. On one level, the system has problems. A 
primary issue is the so-called ‘back door problem’; that is, the fact that 
while both possession and supply from the coffee-shops is tolerated, 
with the former being effectively legal and the latter licensed, cannabis 
production itself remains illegal. 
This means that coffee shops are forced to source it from an illicit market 
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place. This paradoxical situation is due primarily to the constraints of 
the UN conventions to which the Netherlands is a signatory. 
The fact that the Netherlands’ de facto legal supply is unique amongst its 
immediate geographic region has also caused problems of ‘drug tourism’ 
at its borders, with substantial numbers of buyers entering the country 
solely for procurement. The Netherlands’ pragmatic approach has also 
made them the subject of concerted political attacks and critique from 
reform opponents on the international stage. 
Nonetheless, the licensing models for the coffee shops themselves are 
well developed. They demonstrably function effectively and without 
significant problems. Where specific problems have emerged policy has 
evolved, regulations have been introduced or tightened, and some coffee 
shops have been closed. Of course, this has not been achieved without 
some controversy. However, the overall success of the approach has, 
since its mid-70s introduction, led to growing support from key domestic 
audiences including the police, policy making and public health bodies, 
and the general public. 
International comparisons are fraught with methodological problems; 
nonetheless, it is striking that the Netherlands does not have higher 
levels of use than neighbouring countries, who do not share its tolerant 
approach and licensed outlets, undermining the simplistic notion that 
legal availability is the key factor in determining prevalence of use. 
Certainly, the nightmare scenarios often put forward by opponents of 
legal regulation have failed to materialise. 
More recently, California and other US states have developed medical 
cannabis supply models. These schemes are often largely indistinguish-
able from the regulated supply models proposed here for non-medical use. 
Indeed, somewhat controversially, a proportion of the ‘medical’ supply 
has clearly become a de facto non-medical supply infrastructure.62 
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past of the need to keep medical and non-medical cannabis issues separate.
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Analysis of cannabis health risks have historically become confused 
with, and distorted by the political debate over the drug’s legal status. 
Viewed objectively, however, the risks associated with cannabis use 
are well understood and have been exhaustively chronicled. There 
are particular risks associated with heavy frequent use (especially of 
stronger/more potent varieties), use by non-adults, use by those with 
certain mental health problems, and smoking related lung damage—
especially when smoked with tobacco. 
Acute and chronic toxicity, and propensity for dependence to emerge 
are both low relative to most other commonly used drugs, including 
tobacco and alcohol. Most cannabis use is moderate, occasional and not 
significantly harmful, suggesting that, as elsewhere, the attention of 
regulators and policy makers needs to focus resources on the minority 
of users who do, or are likely to experience real problems. 
Despite the obvious differences, the nature and extent of cannabis use 
means that, more than any other currently illicit drug, it lends itself to 
the lessons learnt from alcohol and tobacco control. As such, the WHO 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (which could almost be 
adapted for cannabis merely by switching the words, see: page 106), and 
the WHO guidance on alcohol regulation, provide a sound basis for 
cannabis regulation models. 
Proposed discussion model for regulation of cannabis 
basic regulatory models
> The basic models would involve various forms of licensed sales, for consumption on 
premises or for take-out—these would be conditional on controls outlined below, and 
would not preclude a potential pharmacy sales model. 
> A regulated market model (see: page 27) might be an appropriate incremental step as 
legal supply infrastructure and outlets were established. A key task of any regulatory 
body would be to manage supply so as to prevent the emergence of branded products 
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and limit all forms of profit driven marketing and promotions.
> Freed from the distorting influence of the non-medical use debate, prescription 
models supporting medical use of cannabis, or its derivatives, could develop based on 
evidence. They would assume a much lower profile than is currently the case.
controls over the product
Dosage and preparation:
> Controls could manage the strength/potency of herbal or resin form cannabis, based on 
relative proportions of active ingredients (that is, ratio of THC [tetrahydrocannabinol] to 
CBD [cannabidiol]). Maximum and minimum % content could be specified. 
> Controls could be put in place to cover potentially toxic contaminants: for example, 
pesticides, fertilisers, or biological agents such as fungus.63
> Different types of cannabis products from different producers could still be identified 
by name and producer, perhaps with an ‘appellation d’origine controllée’ style 
certification. Generic cannabis products could also be available, subject to the controls 
outlined above. 
> Cannabis prepared for oral consumption (e.g. in cakes or brownies) would need to be 
sold in appropriately labelled standardised units, based on product weight and active 
ingredient content/strength per unit. There are particular issues around the difficulty 
in dosing/self-titrating when cannabis is eaten. 
> In much of Europe there is a strong association between the use of tobacco and 
cannabis which are often smoked together. Legal outlets could be in the forefront 
of addressing this health concern, helping bring about the cultural and attitudinal 
changes which would minimise cannabis related tobacco use.
Price controls
> Fixed unit prices or minimum/maximum prices could be specified—with taxation 
included on a per unit weight or % basis. 
> Stronger or more potent preparations could have higher prices/tax rates specified. 
> It is likely that prices would be similar to or marginally lower than current illicit 
63 See for example Netherlands Government guidelines: ‘Guidelines for Cultivating Cannabis 
for Medicinal Purposes: Annex to the Regulation of the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport of 
9 January 2003’, page 60.
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market prices. Prices are relatively low anyway, and the need to de-incentivise illicit 
production and sale is less pressing than with many other drugs. 
Packaging controls
> Tamper proofing - where appropriate.
> Childproof containers (medical pill bottles/canisters).
> Standard labelling—contents (strength/potency), units, health warnings, use by dates 
etc. Licensed purchaser details as appropriate. 
Sales for use on premises would not necessarily have the above requirements.
controls over the vendor/supply outlet
Advertising/promotion
> Cannabis use is embedded in much popular culture. Cannabis products and product 
iconography are generally non-branded and generic, so a blanket prohibition of 
anything that might constitute promotion or advertising of cannabis would therefore 
be impractical. Reasonable controls on exposure to children and young people may 
be easier to put in place, but would remain difficult to globally define and enforce. 
However, best practice and evidence from existing controls already widely applied to 
references to drugs—legal and illegal—in youth media and advertising can be more 
widely applied. 
> Clear lessons can be learnt from experiences with restrictions on promotions and 
marketing of alcohol and tobacco. Areas where cannabis advertising promotion 
controls are more realistic include: 
> Advertising for venues for commercial sales could be limited both in content and 
scope—for example, to specialist publications, or adult only venues. A complete 
ban on advertising for promotion of venues is not realistic. Dutch coffee shops are 
not allowed to advertise but do to some extent—the prohibition in practice acts as a 
moderating influence, rather than a total ban. 
> Restrictions could be placed on appearance and signage of venues/outlets. In the 
Netherlands, coffee shops are not allowed to make external references to cannabis, 
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or use related imagery. Rastafari imagery, a palm leaf image, and the words ‘coffee 
shop’ have become the default signage.
> Restrictions could be placed on advertising for certain types of paraphernalia that 
contain drug references.
Location/density of outlets
> Zoning controls could be exercised by local licensing authority in a similar fashion 
to licensing of outlets for alcohol sales. Controls could also be exercised over size 
and type of outlets. This is the case in the Netherlands where, for example, some 
municipalities do not permit coffee shops (leading to some internal domestic ‘drug 
tourism’), and others have closed coffee shops near to schools. This latter seems 
excessive in a dense urban environment, and is probably more politically motivated—
controls similar to those already used to manage bars/off licenses would be adequate 
in such cases.
Licensing of vendors/suppliers—general
> Broadly similar to licensing of commercial alcohol vendors/ licensees. 
> Additional requirement for relevant health and safety training of vendors—for 
example, to restrict sales to those already intoxicated, offer advice on services, etc.
> Shared responsibility re: public nuisance in immediate environment, litter, local 
enforcement costs. 
> Outlets would, initially at least, be limited to sale/consumption of cannabis only. 
In the Netherlands prohibition of sale of all other drugs, including alcohol, is a 
non-negotiable licence condition. 
> All vendors would be required to promote responsible, safer use, and prominently 
provide drug information and information on relevant drug services. 
> Venues also offering food or live music would come under the same local regulatory 
infrastructure, security and health and safety requirements. 
> Permitted hours of opening would be determined by the local licensing authority.
> The Dutch coffee shops are restricted to holding less than 300g on the premises 
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at anytime. This is largely designed to control illicit ‘back door’ supply; such limits 
would probably not be necessary for licensed premises under a legal regulated 
production scenario. 
Volume sales/rationing controls
> Restrictions on bulk sales could be put in place, establishing a reasonable threshold 
for personal use. A 5g limit operates in the Netherlands. There is nothing to prevent 
multiple purchasing from different outlets; however, the general ease of cannabis 
availability means that such multiple purchasing is a marginal issue. 
controls over the purchaser/user
 Age access controls
> Vendors would be required to enforce age controls though an ID system—precise 
age of access would be locally determined but they would likely be in line with local 
alcohol and tobacco access age limits. In the Netherlands the age limit for coffee 
shops is 18. 
Degree of intoxication of purchaser.
> Vendors would be required to refuse sales to those clearly intoxicated according to a 
clear set of guidelines. Drunkenness would be the most obvious concern. 
licences for purchasers/users
> The Netherlands’ experience suggests that licences to buy are probably unnecessary. 
However, they might usefully be deployed in certain scenarios, either as part of an 
incremental roll out process, or where specific problems arose. For example, in the 
Netherlands a residents only condition on sale is being introduced in some locations 
to deal with cross border trade issues, and there has also been recent discussion about 
making coffee shops members only. 
Limitations in allowed locations for consumption
> Zoning laws familiar from alcohol control could designate public spaces, or areas 
with potential public order issues, as non-smoking areas. These laws would support 
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and build on local ordinances concerning public intoxication or disorderly conduct. 
> Pre-existing restrictions on smoking in indoor public spaces would also apply to 
cannabis smoking.64 As with tobacco, smoking in public venues could only take place 
on open air terraces or similar. Such a prohibition, involving civil or administrative 
sanction rather than a criminal offence, could be used to encourage less harmful 
forms of cannabis consumption. Vaporisers—which do not generate smoke and are 
not associated with the specific smoke related cannabis risks—could be exempted 
from no-smoking ordinances.65 
Furtherreading
* R.	Room	et al.,	‘The Global Cannabis Commission Report’,		
The	Beckley	Foundation,	2007
* ‘Cannabis Policy, Implementation and Outcomes’,		
RAND	Europe,	2003
* M.	Aoyagi,	‘Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dialogue 
on International Drug Policy’,	(includes	detailed	discussion	of	
Dutch	cannabis	policy	and	law),	2006
* ‘Cannabis’,	EMCDDA	drug	profile	
5.4	 Stimulants
This section focuses on the three most widely used types of currently 
illicit stimulants—amphetamines, cocaine and MDMA/ecstasy. 
Potential stimulant regulation models need to respond appropriately to 
the risks presented by this group of drugs. So, it is important to acknowl-
edge that use behaviours encompass a broad spectrum of motivations, 
environments and product preparations. These are associated with a 
64 A curious situation has emerged in the Netherlands where anti-tobacco smoking 
ordinances have collided with coffee shop licensing. This has meant that cannabis 
smoking is legal whilst tobacco smoking is not—leading to the peculiar scene of local 
enforcers checking joints being smoked for prohibited tobacco content.
65 Vancouver, Canada, has one such ‘vaporizer lounge’ in which smoking is not allowed.
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wide range of risks and harms, all presenting very different regulatory 
challenges. However, they can be divided up into three broad categories: 
* Functional—sometimes crossing over into medical use, and 
perhaps more usefully coming under the heading of ‘lifestyle drugs’. 
For example, users might be seeking to stave off tiredness, or aid 
concentration.
* Recreational—users seeking stimulation and enjoyment in a wide 
range of social contexts.
* Problematic—for a small minority of the functional or 
recreational users, stimulant use evolves into problematic/
dependent use. Such issues are most commonly associated 
with higher potency preparations (for example, crack cocaine, 
methamphetamine) and/or more risky patterns of rapid release 
consumption—that is, smoking and injection, as opposed to oral 
use or snorting. 
It should also be noted that much of contemporary culture and 
society is steeped in stimulants. Pharmaceutical stimulants are 
widely prescribed and consumed in vast quantities (including, 
controversially, by children66). In addition, two of the world’s 
favourite psychoactive drugs, nicotine and caffeine, are functional 
stimulants; between them, they saturate much of contemporary 
culture to the point of ubiquity. 
Caffeine, in the number one spot, is most commonly consumed in 
the form of coffee, cola drinks and chocolate. Caffeine based ‘energy 
drinks’ are also becoming increasingly popular. They are aggressively 
marketed specifically on the basis of their stimulant properties, 
much like tobacco and amphetamines used to be. Such drinks are a 
very clear indicator of caffeine consumption’s key driver. It is valued 
primarily for its functional stimulant properties, rather than for 
pleasure or recreation per se. It scores low on any rational drug harm 
66 See: N. Gibbs, ‘The Age of Ritalin’, TIME magazine, June 24, 2001.
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assessment, but is none the less demonstrably not risk-free. Its use 
is, however, largely unregulated. 
Caffeine’s widespread non-harmful—indeed, largely beneficial—con-
sumption is mirrored in the widespread use of low potency cocaine 
preparations; for example, coca leaf chewing and coca tea in the Andean 
regions of South America. It should be noted that the legality of this 
remains contentious in international law (see: page 34). Similar localised 
patterns of stimulant use exist elsewhere, including khat use in Somali 
speaking Africa, and betel nut use in South Asia and the Pacific. These 
are both associated with more clearly documented public health concerns 
than coca or caffeine drinks, but remain legal in their respective locales. 
 There is a significant set of behaviours that involves recreational stim-
ulant use in social contexts. These behaviours are driven either by the 
pleasure of stimulant use itself, or as a quasi-functional adjunct to a 
social behaviour. Such functional motivations include staying awake 
into the night, enhancing confidence and alertness in social interac-
tions, providing the energy to dance for longer, and so on. Inevitably 
this involves higher dosage, although generally less frequent, consump-
tion than more obviously functional/lifestyle use. As such, it presents a 
different set of risks and challenges—not least because the user popula-
tion is largely made up of young people. 
Among these populations there is considerable flexibility in stimulant 
using behaviours. They can be easily substituted depending on taste 
or availability, and are often used in combination. Even though such 
patterns of use present increased risk levels, they are for the most part 
not associated with significant personal or social harms.67 Use is gener-
ally occasional, moderate and contained by social norms that emerge 
amongst using and non-using peer groups in a social context. These 
norms are further tempered by personal controls, based on both experi-
ence and informed understanding of usage risks. 
67 Beyond, of course, the harms associated with the illicit trade itself.
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Key regulatory challenges for recreational stimulant using populations 
will include risk reduction and preventing progression to problematic/
dependent use. Movement towards lower risk products and prepara-
tions (lower dose, slower release, orally administered), more informed 
and lower risk using behaviours (moderation—including abstinence—
avoiding poly-drug use/bingeing, supporting peers, etc.), and stimulant 
use in safer environments should also be encouraged. 
Finally there is the subset of the above users who will progress into 
chaotic, dependent or otherwise problematic stimulant use. Such 
behaviour is often concurrent with problematic use of other non-
stimulant drugs, commonly including opiates and alcohol. For these 
populations, the most effective response is more medically orien-
tated. In particular, it requires regulated supply models to focus 
on harm reduction (essentially as described above), combined with 
appropriate provision of treatment/recovery services, plus relevant 
holistic social support. 
5.4.1		 Cocaine/cocaproducts
Coca/cocaine based drugs vary dramatically in nature, and thus in risk 
level. Different preparations run from negligible-risk orally consumed 
coca leaf and coca tea, through moderate-risk snorted cocaine powder 
(the salt of cocaine; cocaine-hydrochloride), to high-risk smoked crack 
(cocaine base). These are discussed below in reverse order. 
Cocaine related risks and harms are also significantly determined by 
using behaviours. A detailed global study of cocaine use undertaken 
by the World Health Organization and UN Inter-regional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in 199568 noted that: 
It is not possible to describe an ‘average cocaine user’. An enormous 
68 The WHO/UNICRI, ‘The Cocaine Project’ report was suppressed following pressure 
from the US—only later being leaked into the public domain; another example of politics 
interfering with the drug and drug policy research agenda (see: Appendix 2, page 203, for 
more discussion). It is available online here: www.tdpf.org.uk/WHOleaked.pdf.
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variety was found in the types of people who use cocaine, the amount 
of drug used, the frequency of use, the duration and intensity of use, 
the reasons for using and any associated problems they experience. 
(page	1) 
The report describes a continuum of using behaviours:
* experimental use 
* occasional use 
* situation-specific use 
* intensive use 
* compulsive/dysfunctional use 
Experimental and occasional use are by far the most common 
types of use, and compulsive/dysfunctional is far less common.  
(page	28)	
And notes that: 
Health problems from the use of legal substances, particularly 
alcohol and tobacco, are greater than health problems from cocaine 
use. Few experts describe cocaine as invariably harmful to health. 
Cocaine-related problems are widely perceived to be more common 
and more severe for intensive, high-dosage users and very rare and 
much less severe for occasional, low-dosage users.	(page	6) 
Crackcocaine
The question ‘but what about crack?’ is never far away when legal regula-
tion of cocaine is discussed. It is an important and reasonable point to 
pursue. Problematic crack users are at the hard end of chaotic drug use, 
and cause a disproportionate amount of secondary harms to society. 
Given this, how do we manage or attempt to regulate a drug like crack 
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cocaine, which is most associated with uncontrolled use, chaos and 
danger? The answer, as elsewhere, is to begin by moving beyond over-
simplified solutions that have, over the years, demonstrably failed to 
produce effective outcomes. 
Despite the best efforts of criminal justice enforcement, and others 
engaged in conventional prevention, crack dependence is a problem that 
has not been eradicated. Given this, we need to accept the reality that some 
people want to and will use crack, however distasteful such an acceptance 
may be. Then, we need to consider all available evidence. This will help us 
understand what kinds of intervention will be most effective at reducing 
the harm that crack use causes both to users, and to the wider community. 
Such harm reduction should of course include both a longer term reduc-
tion in overall crack use, and in the size of the using population. 
We should be under no illusion that crack presents one of the most diffi-
cult challenges for proponents of a legal regulatory model. However, the 
pragmatic reality remains that if someone is determined enough to use 
crack, they will do so. It therefore seems logical that, rather than sourcing it 
through an illicit marketplace, with all its attendant risks and harms, crack 
users should have legal access to a supply of known strength and purity. 
Such legal access will ensure that users do not have to commit crimes 
against others, or prostitute themselves, as a means of obtaining it. 
Given this, it would seem that future approaches should start with the 
proposition that there is no benefit in further criminalising and demo-
nising crack users. Instead, a concerted public health-led response, 
combined with appropriate social support, would seem to be a more 
productive response to a so far intractable issue. Whilst regulation has 
an important role to play in reducing harm, it is clear that addressing 
the social conditions and low levels of wellbeing that underlie most 
problematic use of crack, and other drugs, is the key to reducing such 
harmful behaviours in the longer term. 
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Public health responses are more difficult and less well established for 
crack than for heroin. While even the most chaotic heroin users will 
respond to regular prescriptions that satisfy their needs, crack users will 
often binge frequently and uncontrollably. While heroin users may accept 
substitute prescriptions such as methadone, no such alternatives for crack 
exist. Research continues into a range of possibilities, including prescrip-
tion of substitute stimulants69 such as amphetamines and Modafinil, or 
use of less potent cocaine preparations.70 This is clearly an area of research 
that requires substantially more attention and investment. 
The need for such research is becoming increasingly urgent as the growing 
concurrent use of crack and heroin makes managing crack related issues 
more and more difficult. Arguably, this development in crack usage is 
another unintended consequence of prohibition. It has been driven by 
the supply infrastructure and underground culture that has grown up 
around the illicit opiate market—a market and a culture that legalisation 
and consequent regulation would actively and directly help dismantle. 
Crack could of course be prohibited, but regulation frameworks should 
also acknowledge that if powder cocaine is available—either legally or 
illicitly on sale, or on prescription—then crack is effectively available 
too. Making crack from powder cocaine is a simple kitchen procedure, 
and one that is impossible to prevent. Even if crack were not directly 
available, determined users previously willing to enter a dirty and 
dangerous illegal market to procure it would clearly not lack the moti-
vation to manufacture it from a legal powder cocaine supply. 
More positively, basic crack harm reduction methods are becoming 
reasonably well established. For example, Vancouver is one of a number 
of locations that distributes crack harm reduction kits, and some tenta-
tive experiments have also begun with supervised consumption venues 
for crack use.71 These interventions point towards a model in which, 
69 A useful summary: Kampman, ‘The search for medications to treat stimulant dependence’, 
Addiction Science and Clinical Practice, 4(2), 2008, pages 28–35.
70 WHO/UNICRI, ‘The Cocaine Project’ report, 1995, page 16.
71 ‘Distributing safer crack use kits in Canada’, Canadian HIV Legal Network, 2008.
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although crack might not be available directly, harm reduction provi-
sion would be made for those who continued to procure and use it, 
regardless of whether they do so through illicit or quasi-licit channels. 
This kind of legally accessible cocaine powder/supervised crack 
consumption venue model creates clear potential for reductions in the 
personal and social harms created by the current illicit crack market. 
These reductions are of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the poten-
tial increase in health harms that might result for some users from a 
lowering of the cost availability barrier that constrains crack use for 
lower income chaotic users. It is also worth noting that, even for the 
most chaotic of those users, crack use is not infinite. It is limited by 
physiological factors, as well as by cost constraints. 
There are also clear lessons to be learned from historic provision of 
heroin and other opiate prescribing and harm reduction services 
such as supervised injecting venues. Lessons from these experiences 
suggest that engaging directly and constructively with problem users’ 
immediate needs, through harm reduction or other service provision, 
has a very clearly defined positive impact. In particular, it increases 
the likelihood that they will not only use drugs more safely and moder-
ately, and do so in a safer peer environment, but that they will also 
come into contact with, and be more likely to utilise the wider service 
provisions on offer. 
The ‘what about crack?’ question is also one that highlights the role 
of prohibition in the emergence of the ‘crack epidemic’. Prohibition 
creates unregulated markets, driven by very clearly defined economic 
processes.72 One effect of these is to encourage the creation and use of 
more potent drugs or concentrated drug preparations, which are more 
profitable per unit weight. This is directly comparable to the way that, 
under alcohol prohibition, the trade in beer and wines gave way to 
sales of more concentrated, profitable and dangerous spirits. This same 
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pattern has been observed over the past century in a variety of different 
illicit drug markets. For example, in opiate marketplaces, opium (either 
smoked or served in drinkable form) has been replaced by injectable 
heroin. More recently, the illegal cannabis market has become increas-
ingly saturated with more potent indoor-grown varieties. 
With coca-based products the transformation has been dramatic. Before 
its prohibition, the most popular forms of cocaine use were low-risk 
coca leaf chewing and coca-based tea and wine drinks. Snorted cocaine 
powder was first introduced onto the streets as a result of the demands of 
prohibition created illicit markets. These same market pressures finally 
led to the development and emergence of high-risk smokable crack. 
It is notable that the market for cocaine (outside of the Andean regions) 
is currently defined by the fact that only the strongest and most risky 
forms of the drug are available. If less potent preparations were avail-
able, demand would be likely to move away from the more risky 
preparations, just as patterns of alcohol use shifted back towards beers 
and wines when US alcohol prohibition was repealed. This is especially 
the case if the regulatory gradients described in chapter 3, page 39, were 
applied with this specific aim. 
In the case of crack cocaine in the UK, the long-established illegal heroin 
market created a ready made distribution network and receptive user 
base for the new product. The heroin and crack markets have meshed 
within a comparatively short period—most crack users are also heroin 
users. If these illegal networks were dismantled through the introduc-
tion of regulated supply, the next new drug ‘epidemic’ would be far less 
likely to take hold. 
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Proposed discussion model for regulation of cocaine powder 
basic regulatory models
> Cocaine-hydrochloride powder would be available to licensed users under a 
retail specialist pharmacist model, or under some limited circumstances, medical 
prescription. 
> Supply would either be entirely state controlled or via a state licensed entity under 
tender (see: Regulated Market Model, page 27).
controls over the product
Dosage and preparation
> The powder would be a pharmaceutical grade product (subject to the same controls 
as medicines).
> On the basis that pure cocaine is almost unknown on the illicit market, a legal product 
could potentially be reduced to an appropriate purity level below 100% through use of 
a safe, non toxic cutting agent. 
> Microtaggants could be included under certain scenarios—(see below).
Price controls
> Fixed unit prices or minimum/maximum prices could be specified—with taxation 
potentially included on a per unit weight or % basis. 
> The precise level of prices would have to be varied based on cautious experimentation 
and close monitoring of key outcomes over time (re levels of use and responses of 
illicit market—see: discussion of drug pricing, page 41).
> Initially they would be set at a point marginally below illicit market prices (Haden73 
has suggested around 70% as a starting point for legal stimulant pricing). 
> Under a licensed user/purchase tracker model prices could potentially increase with 
volume of purchase as a disincentive to excessive use. 
Packaging controls
> Non-branded plain packaging—as per medical drugs.
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> Powder would be in fixed unit sealed sachets which would be provided within a 
secondary sealed container.
> The container would be tamper proof and child proof.
> Standard labelling—contents (strength/potency), units, health and safety, use 
by dates etc. Summary information and prominent warnings on containers and 
sachets would be augmented by a more detailed printed information insert in  
the container. 
> Licensed purchaser details could be on both container and unit sachets as appropriate. 
controls over the vendor/supply outlet
Licensing of vendors/suppliers—general
> See: 2.2.4 Pharmacy model, page 23, for more discussion.
> Permitted hours of opening, density/location of outlets would be determined by local 
licensing authority.
Advertising/promotion
> Total ban on all advertising and promotion—including strict controls on appearance/
signage of outlets.
Volume sales/rationing controls
> There would need to be a realistic acceptance that some degree of sharing would take 
place in social settings, even if sales are volume limited for personal use only. Volume 
of sales per purchaser (per day/week/month) would correspondingly have an upper 
limit established (and/or escalating price/volume structure).
> Potential for individual purchasers to be licensed, requiring an ID linked to a central 
purchase tracking database to enforce rationing controls. 
controls over the purchaser/user
Age access controls
> ID enforced age controls—potentially linked to licensed purchaser system.
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Degree of intoxication of purchaser
> Vendors would be required to refuse sales to those clearly intoxicated—according to a 
clear set of guidelines. 
Licences for purchasers/users
> In the first instance at least (certainly for pilot schemes) a system would be 
established under which only licensed individuals would be allowed access for 
personal use only. This could be linked to an ID based purchase tracker system. 
Licences could be revoked for specified violations (e.g. secondary sales).
> Purchasers could have details of the named buyer encoded on packaging (or through 
use of microtaggants).
Limitations in allowed locations for consumption
> Public consumption would be a fineable offence in most locations. 
> Particular attention should be given to highlighting the risks associated with cocaine 
consumption in conjunction with alcohol. 
Potentialmodelsforregulationoflowerstrengthcocaine
preparations
As already highlighted, coca tea has a usage and public health 
profile in the Andean regions not dissimilar to that of coffee and 
conventional tea in much of the rest of the world. There is no reason 
why it could not be made more widely available on a similar basis, 
for those who desire it.74 Its use in the short to medium term would 
be likely to remain largely within its cultural homeland. On an 
international level, it would probably find most market share in the 
speciality tea market. There is no particular reason to think it would 
replace or seriously encroach on coffee and tea markets where they 
are established. 
74 In reality it is already widely available, yet the international market remains small.
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More likely is that entrepreneurs might seek to develop new coca based 
‘energy drinks’ to compete with the lucrative caffeine based soft drink 
market. The most obvious template for such drinks would be existing 
cola drinks. They might also compete in the substantial, and rapidly 
growing higher caffeine content ‘energy drinks’ market, sharing shelf 
space with products like Red Bull. Whilst coca tea has a natural limit to 
its active content, processed beverages would not. They would therefore 
have to be subject to additional tiers of regulation, so that active content 
could be controlled and limited, appropriate information incorporated 
into labelling and packaging, and other appropriate controls with 
regards to advertising/promotions established. 
Such drinks would presumably (depending on active content levels 
and related risk assessments) be made available under a licensed sales 
model similar to that governing alcohol sales. Alternatively, they might 
only be available over the counter in pharmacies, as Red Bull is in certain 
European countries. Of course, such regulation might not just cover coca 
based drinks; there is a strong case that the packaging, promotion and 
availability of some caffeine based energy drinks should also be more 
strictly regulated.75 
Such coca based beverages have the potential to absorb some of the user 
demand for cocaine powder. Many recreational consumers, if given a 
choice, would prefer a stimulant beverage that has a safer, slower release 
effect than that of a snorted powder. This preference could be further 
encouraged by using pricing and availability controls to make coca based 
energy beverages more attractive than snorted powder alternatives. 
Such a development could both be a beneficial form of risk reduc-
tion, and potentially contribute to a more moderate and responsible 
culture of stimulant consumption—a culture which has, in the past few 
decades, moved in the opposite direction. Regulators would, however, 
need to consider the particular risks of such products being consumed 
75 Such calls have increasingly come from a variety of medical authorities. See: C. Reissig, 
E. Strain, R. Griffiths, ‘Caffeinated energy drinks—a growing problem’, Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, January 1, 2009.
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in combination with other drugs—particularly alcohol. They should be 
aware, for example, how cocaine use has been associated with problem-
atic patterns of drinking. 
Illustrating this potential concern is the rise of caffeine-based energy 
drink/alcohol spirit cocktails in some markets. The popular Red Bull 
and vodka cocktail is perhaps the most visible example of this. Some 
pre-mixed combination beverage products have also emerged which 
cash in on this caffeine/alcohol cocktail trend. Such cocktails are prob-
lematic because the stimulant/depressant effects of their component 
drugs can, to some degree, cancel each other out. This can lead to exces-
sive consumption, and thus increased risk. An additional concern 
around the potential for coca/alcohol cocktails is that co-administration 
of cocaine and alcohol leads to the formation of cocaethylene within the 
body. This is a drug with similar properties to cocaine; it is, however, 
thought to have higher cardiovascular and liver toxicity. 
Regulatory models could respond to these concerns with a combina-
tion of availability restrictions and risk education. These could include 
restrictions on the sale of coca based drinks over a given strength in 
alcohol off-licences and bars, limiting such drinks to over-the-counter 
pharmacy sales only, prohibiting pre-mixed combination drinks or 
cocktails, enforcing specific warnings on packaging, and placing appro-
priate controls on advertising, promotion and branding. 
Otheroralcoca/cocaineproducts
According to the 1995 WHO/UNICRI study, the traditional consump-
tion of the coca leaf, chewed with a small quantity of lime to release the 
active contents: 
…appears to have no negative health effects and has positive, therapeutic, 
sacred and social functions for indigenous Andean populations.
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Many of coca leaf’s functional and beneficial uses in Andean indigenous 
communities are quite regionally and culturally specific. For example, 
it helps combat altitude sickness, and delivers certain locally benefi-
cial nutrients. As such, it seems relatively unlikely that there would be 
a substantial market for traditional Andean style coca leaf chewing in 
the wider world, even if no legal obstacles to its production and export 
existed. Other culturally/regionally specific stimulants such as khat and 
betel nut have similarly not found significant wider markets. 
However, since cocaine is absorbed far more efficiently through the 
palate than through the stomach, there might be potential for the devel-
opment of more consumer friendly coca leaf based products. These 
might be comparable to oral tobacco products, like ‘Bandits’. A quantity 
of coca leaf, plus an alkali additive, could be contained in a perme-
able, tea bag-like pouch, which would sit inside the mouth. Coca based 
products could also take the form of lozenges or chewing gums, to be 
consumed much like current similar nicotine substitution products. 
Such products would require levels of regulation appropriate to the 
levels of risk they present. These are, however, assumed to be relatively 
low; such products would probably require levels of regulation akin to 
comparable nicotine replacement products. 
Were such products to emerge they would generally sit within the func-
tional/beneficial/lifestyle arenas of stimulant using behaviours. They 
would presumably not have a significant impact on recreational or 
problematic patterns of use76 beyond, arguably, helping foster a culture 
of more moderate, sensible use. As with non smoked tobacco products, 
however, regulators and public health officials have often struggled to 
reconcile the active promotion of such new products with their public 
health principles, which emphasise reduced use (see: Tobacco harm 
reduction, page 108). A clear case can be made that oral tobacco products 
are dramatically safer substitutes for smoked tobacco. However, the 
extent of a similar substitution with cocaine products is not established. 
76 The 1995 WHO/UNICRI Cocaine Project report does mention the possibility of using 
coca tea for dependent cocaine users with some positive outcomes (page 16).
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Introducing low strength oral coca products could effectively be creating 
a new market niche and behaviour where none existed. 
On the other hand, such products are likely to emerge in some form 
under a new legal regime, and thus at least warrant consideration. 
Additionally, their emergence may merely serve to expand consumer 
choice between products, such as tobacco/nicotine or coffee, that serve a 
similar function and cultural role. 
5.4.2	 Amphetamines
There are a number of related drugs that come under the amphetamine 
grouping. Amphetamine itself (the name derived from its full chemical 
name: alpha-methylphenethylamine) is the parent compound for a large 
number of derivatives, each with a slightly different molecular forma-
tion, of which there are four main types: 
* Amphetamine; racemic variation; dextroamphetamine 
(Dexedrine)
* Methyl-amphetamine; racemic variation dexmethamphetamine 
(more commonly known as just methamphetamine)
* Ketoamphetmaines; cathine and cathinone (the active ingredients 
in khat)
* Pseudo-amphetamines; methylphenidate (Ritalin) etc. 
MDMA (ecstasy) is another amphetamine related substance, dealt with 
separately below. 
Across the globe, amphetamines are the second most popular illegal drug 
after cannabis.77 They are, like cocaine, associated with a spectrum of 
using behaviours and preparations that span from functional/medical, 
through recreational, to problematic. These behaviours are correspond-
ingly associated with a wide spectrum of risks and regulatory challenges. 
77 ‘World Drugs Report 2008’, UNODC, 2008, page 9.
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As with other drug groupings there is a 
need to balance the short term needs to 
reduce the harm associated with more 
harmful or risky forms of use with 
the longer term goal of progressively 
shifting use towards safer products, 
behaviours and environments. This 
might include provision of more risky 
preparations, such as powders or inject-
able forms, only under much more 
restrictive regimes. 
The usefulness of amphetamines for a range of medical applications—
from over the counter nasal decongestants and cold remedies,78 to 
treatments for attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and narcolep-
sy—means that, unlike cocaine, many amphetamines are in wide legal 
circulation in a number of forms. This means that they are both more 
accessible (including diversion/conversion for non-medical use), and 
their risks, use and misuse are arguably better understood and accom-
modated, both medically and socially. 
Proposed discussion model for regulation of amphetamine 
basic regulatory models
> Dexamphetamine (and potentially some other amphetamines)—would be available 
in pill form under the specialist pharmacist model only—initially under a licensed 
purchaser model. 
> A powder form could potentially also be available under some scenarios—with 
stricter availability controls.
> Weaker preparations, including oral solutions, could be available over the counter or 
under an appropriate licensed sales system—subject to volume sales restrictions.
> A medical prescription model would exist in parallel to any licensed retail supply.
Medically prescribed Dexedrine tablets (dexamphetamine sulphate)
f
l
ic
k
r
/f
g
m
b
78 Which sometimes contain levomethamphetamine and pseudoephedrine.
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controls over the product
Dosage and preparation
> Any pill and powder form drugs would be produced and sold under standard 
pharmaceutical drug controls.
> Pills could be formulated to prevent/discourage crushing for snorting/injecting.
> Dosage would be standardised at an appropriate level, on a per pill or powder sachet 
basis (determined by experience with prescribed amphetamines). 
> Like cocaine, any powder form amphetamines for snorting could be reduced in 
potency below 100%, with the addition of non-toxic cutting agents. 
> The use of slow release dermal patches, already used for methylphenidate (Ritalin), 
could also be explored.
Price controls
> Fixed unit prices or minimum/maximum prices could be specified, with taxation 
included on a per unit weight or % basis. 
> An increasing price/tax gradient could be introduced, from lower dose slower release 
to higher dose faster release preparations. 
> Prices would likely be similar or marginally lower than current illicit market 
prices. Amphetamine prices are, however, generally relatively low anyway and are 
correspondingly less of a factor in using decisions. A reduction in price could thus 
serve to undermine illicit production and supply without necessarily encouraging 
use. As with all drug pricing, developments would have to be based on cautious 
experimentation and close monitoring of key outcomes. 
Packaging controls
> Non-branded plain packaging—as per medical drugs.
> Pills would be in standardised medical drug pill bottles/containers, or blister packs 
within appropriate container. Powder would be in fixed unit sachets or wraps, which 
would be provided within a sealed container. 
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> Containers would be tamper proof and child proof.
> Standard labelling—contents (strength/potency), units, health and safety, use by 
dates, etc. Summary information and prominent warnings on containers (and 
wraps/sachets) could be augmented by a more detailed printed information insert 
in the container. Labelling would prominently specify ‘not for medical use’ to help 
maintain the market distinction between medical and non-medical supply.
> Licensed purchaser details could be on both container and unit sachets/blister packs, 
as appropriate. 
controls over the vendor/supply outlet 
Advertising/promotion
> All advertising and promotion would be prohibited for pill and powder form 
amphetamines, including strict controls on appearance/signage of outlets.
> Some promotion of lower strength/over the counter products (weak oral solutions 
and ‘energy drinks’) could be permitted under strict conditions, as already happens 
with some legal amphetamine products.
Licensing of vendors/suppliers—general
> See pharmacy model for more discussion.
> Permitted hours of opening, density/location of outlets would be determined by local 
licensing authority.
Volume sales/rationing controls
> Volume of sales per purchaser (per day/week/ month) would have an upper limit 
established (and/or an escalating volume/price structure) that would be set at a 
realistic level for personal use (once weekly/four times a month perhaps), but well 
below what would be seen as problematic level/frequency (i.e. daily use). There would 
need to be a realistic acceptance that some degree of sharing would take place in social 
settings—even if sales are limited and on the purchaser/personal use only basis.
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> Problematic/dependency levels of use would be managed through a medical 
prescription model. 
> Rationing controls could be enforced through use of individual purchaser licensing 
linked to ID based purchase tracking.
controls over the purchaser/user
Age access controls
> Vendors would be required to enforce age controls through checking ID—potentially 
linked to a licensed purchaser system.
Degree of intoxication of purchaser
> Vendors would be required to refuse sales to those clearly intoxicated, according to a 
clear set of guidelines. 
Licences for purchasers/users
> In the first instance at least (certainly for pilot schemes) a system would be 
established under which only licensed individuals would be allowed access for 
personal use only. This could be linked to an ID based purchase tracker system. 
Licences could be revoked for specified offences, such as secondary sales.
> Purchases could have details of the named buyer encoded on packaging, or through 
use of microtaggants.
Limitations in allowed locations for consumption
> Public consumption in pill form would not be an issue; public snorting could be a 
fineable offence in most locations. 
> The risks associated with consuming amphetamines in conjunction with alcohol 
should be strongly highlighted. 
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Otheramphetamines:
Methylphenidate (Ritalin) 
Ritalin is widely prescribed to treat a variety of medical conditions. 
Its best known—and most controversial—use is as a treatment for 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, in school and even preschool 
children.79 It has also been widely diverted for non-medical stimulant 
use; the prevalence of medical use by children has led to particular 
misuse issues within that group. Development of slower release one-
a-day preparations and transdermal patches have gone some way to 
addressing this diversion issue. 
However, while remaining a serious concern, the issues around prescrip-
tion diversion amongst children should not affect potential non-medical 
access by consenting adults. Where legal access to dexamphetamine 
existed, demand for other diverted medical amphetamines with similar 
effect profiles, like Ritalin, would naturally diminish. Should any 
demand remain, a regulated supply of non-medical methylphenidate 
could be made available in parallel, or even instead of, dexamphetamine, 
on a similar basis. 
Methamphetamine 
Methamphetamine is a more potent and long acting amphetamine, 
although its distinction from other amphetamines has probably been 
overstated—the key distinctions being its ease of production, and the 
fact that it can be more easily smoked (see: 4.2 Assessing Drug Harms, 
page 70). Over the last two decades, as its medical uses have dimin-
ished, its illicit non-medical production and use have grown rapidly. 
It has become a major public health concern in a number of regions, 
notably south-east Asia, Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation and 
North America. 
79 Dexamphetamine and Adderal (a mix of Ritalin and dexamphetamine) have also been 
widely prescribed for this condition.
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As a result, and combined with substantial 
problems associated with the drugs illicit trade, 
methamphetamine has become very much the ‘new 
drug menace’. In the US, for example, it has, to some 
extent, assumed the status in the drug war narra-
tive formerly occupied by crack cocaine. As a result, 
media panic has generated hyperbolic accounts of 
the threat that it represents. It is important that 
such hyperbole obscures neither a realistic under-
standing of the serious usage-related problems 
facing a significant minority of its users, nor the fact that much of its use 
is largely non-problematic. It should also be acknowledged that metham-
phetamine is easily manufactured from accessible precursor chemicals 
and drugs, which include over the counter medicines (ephedrine and 
pseudoephedrine). This at once makes control next to impossible, and 
creates an attractive and lucrative market for criminal profiteers. In the 
absence of legally accessible options for other amphetamines or stimu-
lants, such profiteers have once again been able to skew illicit markets 
towards the most potent, risky and profitable products.80
In regions where methamphetamine has become a major problem, 
separate but parallel responses are required to address the challenges it 
presents. In the short term there is a need to accept the realities of meth-
amphetamine use as it currently exists, and to adopt public health-led 
approaches that reduce its associated personal health and social risks/
harms. This would mirror the approach defined for crack cocaine 
above, with restricted provision, supervised use venues, and treatment/
recovery/support services made available for problematic users. 
Such harm reduction could be combined with maintenance prescrip-
tion supply, where specific criteria were met. This would be managed 
according to established amphetamine prescription models. There 
may be some potential for prescription of less potent slow-release 
80 In contrast to the US experience, in the UK, where illicit amphetamine sulphate is 
relatively cheap and accessible, methamphetamine use has remained very low. 
In the absence of legally 
accessible options for 
other amphetamines or 
stimulants, profiteers 
have once again been 
able to skew illicit 
markets towards the 
most potent, risky and 
profitable products
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amphetamines to problematic methamphetamine users.81 These could 
be provided as weaker, slower release oral preparations, which would 
discourage higher risk smoking or injecting behaviours. 
In the longer term, amphetamine and broader stimulant regulation 
would look to reverse the pressures created by illicit market economics. 
It would aim to nurture more personally healthy, and less socially 
harmful, relationships with stimulants. Regulatory tools would 
combine with public health education and harm reduction interventions 
to create a gradual, positive impact on stimulant users and stimulant 
using culture, progressively moving towards less risky drugs, prepara-
tions, behaviours and using environments. 
Ephedrine 
Ephedrine is similar both in chemical structure and effects to dexam-
phetamine and methamphetamine, although it is less potent than both. 
The drug occurs naturally in the ephedra plant, long used as a traditional 
Chinese medicine. Ephedrine is legally available in its hydrochloride and 
sulphate forms in many countries, including the US. It is sold both as a 
prescribed medicine and an over the counter pharmaceutical product, and 
is commonly used as a functional stimulant by professionals, students 
and some sportspeople.82 Ephedrine also has other lifestyle/medical uses, 
including as a decongestant, appetite suppressant and bronchiodilator. 
Until comparatively recently, ephedrine has had a relatively low profile 
among non-medical users. This changed when one of its isomers, pseu-
doephedrine, was found to be a primary precursor to methamphetamine. 
At this point, ephedrine became subject to increasingly restrictive controls. 
Interestingly, rather than absolute prohibition, the US responded by intro-
ducing a raft of strict regulations under the Combat Methamphetamine 
Epidemic Act of 2005,83which became law in 2006.
81 Studies using Methylphenidate for this purpose are underway in a number of countries 
including Finland and New Zealand. 
82 Its safety for sports training is highly questionable and its legality in competitive sports 
is the subject of ongoing controversy.
83 For details, see: www.fmi.org/gr/METH_summary_clean_update3_06_logo.pdf.
6
Appendices
4
Making a regulated system happen
5
Regulated drug markets in practice
140
This amended the US Code concerning the sale of ephedrine-containing 
products. The federal statute included the following requirements for 
merchants who sell ephedrine or pseudoephedrine: 
* A retrievable record of all purchases identifying the name and 
address of each party to be kept for two years.
* Required verification of proof of identity of all purchasers.
* Required protection and disclosure methods in the collection of 
personal information.
* Reports to the Attorney General of any suspicious payments or 
disappearances of the regulated products.
* Non-liquid dose form of regulated product may only be sold in 
unit dose blister packs.
* Regulated products are to be kept behind the counter or in a locked 
cabinet, in such a way as to restrict access.
* Daily sales of regulated products not to exceed 3.6 grams, without 
regard to the number of transactions.
* Monthly sales not to exceed 9 grams of pseudoephedrine base 
in regulated products—similar regulations apply to mail-order 
purchases, except the monthly sales limit is only 7.5 grams. 
This response might seem to be at once rather draconian for the medi-
cines and cold remedies that occupy most bathroom cabinets, and 
ineffectual at reducing the availability and use of illicit methamphet-
amine. Indeed, the production of methamphetamine has simply moved 
from small scale user-producers to a larger scale organised crime enter-
prise. However it does, if inadvertently, point towards some useful 
models of regulation for non-medical amphetamines. 
5.4.3	 Ecstasy/MDMA
MDMA—otherwise known as ecstasy—is a synthetic drug which is chem-
ically similar to the amphetamines. However, its stimulant properties are 
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complemented by other, very distinctive psychological effects that set it 
aside from other stimulants. These are described as creating a sense of 
empathy or intimacy in social situations. Ecstasy has accordingly been 
additionally referred to as an ‘empathogen’ or ‘entactogen’. 
Ecstasy/MDMA is by far the most popular of a large number of related 
psychoactive synthetic drugs (sometimes referred to as ‘designer drugs’) 
that have been developed over the last century.84 None of the others 
(including 2CB and MDA) have achieved more than brief or relatively 
low level patterns of use within the illicit drug scene. Many, when they 
are observed, are in fact sold as ecstasy. 
The rapid emergence of ecstasy into youth culture in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s was the spur for a familiar ‘moral panic’, which rumbles on 
sporadically to this day. This panic was accompanied by a growing body 
of research, assessing the risks and harms associated with the drug’s 
use in a range of environments. There was a clear dissonance between 
this research and much of the political and media response to the panic, 
which tended to misrepresent population harms by focusing obses-
sively on individual fatalities. 
The most recent and comprehensive, independent systematic review of 
the observational evidence85 was published in 2009. It was a part of the 
UK’s review of MDMA classification, undertaken by the government 
appointed Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD). The 2009 
ACMD report recommended that MDMA should be reclassified from 
(UK) class A to class B. In support of this, it noted that: 
* Use of MDMA is undoubtedly harmful. High doses may lead to death: 
by direct toxicity, in situations of hyperthermia/dehydration, excessive 
84 The most famous researcher being Alexander Shulgin who, in his book ‘PiHKAL’ 
describes the process by which he developed and tested over 200 related substances, 
including MDMA (initially developed in 1912 by Merck).
85 G. Rogers et al., ‘The harmful health effects of recreational ecstasy: a systematic review of 
observational evidence’, Health Technology Assessment, 2009; Vol. 13(6), pages 1–338.  
The study looked at over 4,000 published studies, 422 of which met the review criteria for 
inclusion.
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water intake, or for other reasons. However, fatalities are relatively low 
given its widespread use, and are substantially lower than those due to 
some other Class A drugs, particularly heroin and cocaine. These risks 
can be minimised by following advice such as drinking appropriate 
amounts of water, although this is no substitute for abstinence. 
* Some people experience acute medical consequences as a result of MDMA 
use, which can lead to hospital admission, sometimes with the require-
ment for intensive care. MDMA poisonings are not currently increasing 
in number and are less frequent than episodes due to cocaine. 
* MDMA appears not to have a high propensity for dependence or with-
drawal reactions, although a number of users seek help through treatment 
services. 
* MDMA appears to have little acute or enduring effect on the mental 
health of the average user; unlike amphetamines and cocaine, it is seldom 
implicated in significant episodes of paranoia. 
* There is presently little evidence of longer-term harms to the brain in 
terms of either its structure or function. However, there is evidence for 
some small decline in a variety of domains, including verbal memory, 
even at low cumulative dose. The magnitude of such deficits appears to 
be small and their clinical relevance is unclear. The evidence shows that 
MDMA has been misused in the UK for 20 years but it should be noted 
that long-term effects of use cannot be ruled out. 
* Overall, the ACMD judges that the physical harms of MDMA more closely 
equated with those of amphetamine, than those of heroin or cocaine. 
* MDMA use seems to have few societal effects in terms of intoxication related 
harms or social disorder. However, the ACMD notes a very small propor-
tion of cases where ‘ecstasy’ use has been implicated in sexual assault. 
1
Introduction
2
Five models for regulating drug supply
3
The practical detail of regulation
 143
* Dis-inhibition and impulsive, violent or risky behaviours are not 
commonly seen under the influence of MDMA, unlike with cocaine, 
amphetamines, heroin and alcohol. 
Key shortcomings in the research base should, of course, be acknowl-
edged; MDMA is a relatively new drug (in widespread use) compared to, 
for example, amphetamine or cocaine, and its illegality is an additional 
research hindrance. However, we do now have a reasonable assessment 
of the drug’s risks, specifically relative to other stimulants. 
Its toxic/acute risks are relatively low, especially if basic risk reduction 
advice is followed; these include hydration, managing overheating 
issues in dance club venues/party environments, and being aware 
of poly-drug use risks. Whilst high risk use is observed, dependent 
patterns of use are extremely rare. Unlike cocaine and amphetamines, 
MDMA has neither functional/lifestyle low dose uses, nor the chronic 
dependence issues associated with high dose frequent usage. 
Given this, we propose as a starting point a specialist pharmacist 
supply model, along the lines described for amphetamine and powder 
cocaine. MDMA’s dance music/party scene use, might also mean that 
membership-based licensed club models could be explored, albeit on an 
experimental basis. This latter would be an appropriate response to an 
accepted reality of MDMA use; it is already easily and cheaply avail-
able in many club and related environments. In fact, the UK experience 
has been that costs per pill have dropped dramatically over the past two 
decades, although use has fallen marginally since its mid-90s peak. At 
a practical level, an on-site licensed outlet would facilitate informed 
choice on content and dosage. This informed choice is sacrificed in illicit 
markets, in which ‘pills’ are of unknown strength, content and purity. 
Licensed on-site vendors would also be able to assume many of the 
responsibilities of the pharmacist role. They would be expected to 
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restrict sales on the basis of intoxication, multiple purchase and volume 
rationing, as well as offering advice on safer use. Such venues could 
initially be membership only. This would offer a degree of control over 
access, with removal of membership as sanction for any ‘house rules’ 
violations. These could include sales to third parties, or supply to indi-
viduals who had already been denied club access. 
In addition, MDMA’s ‘empathogen’/‘entactogen’ properties could justify 
creating an additional channel of access: making the drug available for 
supervised therapeutic use via licensed medical practitioners. The use 
of MDMA in a range of therapeutic environments has been the subject 
of ongoing research into helping with couples therapy, depression, 
anxiety for cancer patients, and post traumatic stress. Without making 
any claims for its efficacy, such potentially beneficial research should 
not be curtailed purely on the basis of unrelated concerns about the 
drug’s recreational use on the party scene. Acknowledging this, offi-
cially licensed research into the therapeutic uses of MDMA has begun 
to expand in the USA and elsewhere.86 
5.4.4	 EmergingMDMAanaloguesandother‘designer drugs’
Over the past two or three decades, the emergence of MDMA, and a slew 
of related compounds, has raised some difficult questions about how 
public health and enforcement agencies deal with the emergence of new 
psychoactive drugs. In some countries, including the UK, entire catego-
ries of similar chemical compounds (including any variants potentially 
developed in the future) are covered by the same legislation. 
It is reasonable to propose that any new drugs not covered by existing 
regulatory frameworks should not be, by default, legally available—as is 
often the case at present. A default prohibition, certainly on any form of 
commercial sales, would seem to be the more cautious and responsible 
course to take (poisons legislation could also come into play to cover 
86 See for example: www.maps.org/mdma/.
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distribution of unknown substances, especially if under misleading 
terms or without informed consent). Such a prohibition would exist 
until any such drug had been subject to appropriate evaluation and 
recommendations by the relevant regulatory agencies. 
Quite how such a prohibition would operate raises a series of potentially 
tricky questions. Distinctions would have to be made, and sanctions 
determined, based on the nature of the drug and the motives for its 
production and supply. Commercial development and sales of unclas-
sified drugs would be the key target of such a restriction. However, it 
seems likely that the incentive for illicit chemists to develop and market 
new drugs on an unregulated basis would diminish if licit alternatives 
were available. Such commercially driven activities would usefully be 
separated from the, admittedly marginal, activities of ‘psychonauts’—
drug chemist/hobbyists. Research into new drugs would ideally take 
place within an academic or government body under some form of 
external supervision and scrutiny.
Furtherreading
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Reduction,	9:5,	pages	339–344,	1998	
* For	background	on	different	stimulant	drugs	see:	the	
EMCDDA	‘drug profiles’	resource:	www.emcdda.europa.eu/
publications/drug-profiles	
* ‘BZP: New Zealand’s experiment with legal regulation of a non-medical 
stimulant’,	Transform	Drug	Policy	Foundation,	forthcoming	
5.5		 Psychedelics
The broad category of hallucinogens—that is, drugs that induce 
hallucinations—can usefully be broken down into three distinct 
subgroups, defined by mode of action and subjective effects. These 
subgroups are dissociatives,87 deliriants,88 and psychedelics. Here, we 
focus on psychedelics. 
‘Psychedelic’ is a relatively new term—essentially meaning ‘mind mani-
festing’—used to describe a group of drugs that cause subjective changes 
in perception and consciousness. The psychedelics in most common 
non-medical usage are LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide), psilocybin/
psylocibe (natural plant form: ‘magic’ mushrooms), mescaline (natural 
plant forms: peyote and San Pedro cacti) and DMT (natural plant form: 
ayahuasca).89 Other drugs, including cannabis and some of the MDMA 
group, can have some psychedelic effects; these are not, however, the 
dominant effects, and thus these drugs are not included in the psyche-
delic grouping. 
Whilst all have their own risk profiles, these psychedelics have a number 
of qualities in common. They are generally viewed as having low toxicity 
87 Dissociatives, including ketamine, PCP and nitrous oxide, tend to induce a sensory 
deprivation/out of body/lucid dreamlike experience by blocking the conscious mind 
from other parts of the mind (ketamine and nitrous oxide are used as anaesthetics 
because of these effects).
88 Deliriants, including the mandrake, henbane and datura plants (and some 
pharmaceuticals at high doses including Benadryl) which have a specific mode of action 
in the brain and create profound hallucinations. They are also more toxic than other 
hallucinogens and often associated with unpleasant physical side effects—and are 
correspondingly not widely used recreationally (and have mostly never been prohibited), 
being of interest mostly to historians and a small group of ‘psychonauts’).
89 Psychedelic drugs in plant form used in a religious or shamanic context are also 
sometimes described as ‘entheogens’.
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and potential for overdose. Fatalities associated with their use are corre-
spondingly rare, and are usually either a result of poly-drug use, or 
accidents occurring under the influence due to lack of inhibitions, reck-
lessness or disorientation.90 These psychedelics are additionally not 
associated with patterns of dependent use (the intense nature of the expe-
rience being self limiting 91) or withdrawal effects, and only rarely with 
frequent use or bingeing. It should, however, be noted that psychedelic use 
can be problematic in other ways. Key identified risks are the potentially 
serious exacerbation of pre-existing mental health problems, or precipi-
tation of mental health problems that had previously gone undetected, 
and the potential for psychologically traumatic negative experiences (a 
‘bad trip’), occasionally including acute psychotic episodes. 
Because of this low toxicity and low potential for dependence, most 
risk assessments of such psychedelics position them as low risk rela-
tive to most stimulant and depressant drugs.92 The risks that do exist, 
which will inform the regulatory supply and use models proposed, are 
focused on those with particular mental health vulnerabilities, and 
issues around inappropriate set (mindset/emotional or psychological 
state when taking the drug) and setting (using environment—including 
physical and peer environment). 
Use of psychedelics encompasses a range of behaviours. These can be 
broadly divided into use specifically for the drugs’ ‘mind manifesting’ 
effects, as part of a planned personal or group exploration, experience, 
or ritual, and use more as an adjunct or enhancer of another recreational 
activity, in a variety of social settings—such as music concerts, parties, 
nightclubs and so on. 
90 Whilst the high profile idea/meme that people under the influence of psychedelics might 
‘think they can fly and jump out of a window’ is largely the result of the LSD panic of the 
1960s, there have inevitably been some serious, occasionally fatal, accidents involving 
psychedelics.
91 Very rapid development of tolerance (including cross-tolerance between psychedelics) is 
another limiting factor. 
92 See: Nutt et al., ‘Development of a rational scale to assess the harm of drugs of potential misuse’, 
The Lancet, 369, 2007, pages 1047–1053.  For historical reasons that can be traced back to 
the emergence of psychedelic drugs as a key part of the 1960s counter culture movement, 
the legal classifications (in the US and UK for example) tend to put psychedelics in the 
‘most harmful’ categories—anomalously alongside heroin and cocaine.
6
Appendices
4
Making a regulated system happen
5
Regulated drug markets in practice
148
Three of the four psychedelics discussed here, psilocybin, mescaline 
and DMT, occur in natural plant forms as well as processed pharmaceu-
ticals. These plant based psychedelics have a long history of ritualised/
sacramental/shamanic use in various cultures. Examples include the 
Native American sacramental use of peyote cactus, indigenous Andean 
use of San Pedro cactus, indigenous Amazonian use of ayahuasca, 
and the widespread use of psilocybin mushrooms, which reflects their 
geographical ubiquity. 
The use of ayahuasca and peyote/San Pedro cacti outside of these loca-
lised indigenous cultures has been small scale and largely limited to a 
ritualised/spiritual context. The preparation of the plants for consump-
tion is quite difficult and laborious, the brewed drinks that need to be 
consumed unpleasant, and in the case of ayahuasca, there are often 
side effects including vomiting and diarrhoea.93 They have therefore, 
unsurprisingly perhaps, not become a feature of the recreational or 
party drug scene (unlike ‘magic’ mushrooms—see below) and are only 
a marginal concern for regulation. Correspondingly, whilst the active 
drugs, mescaline and DMT, are prohibited, the plants themselves are 
generally not. Indeed, San Pedro cacti in particular is widely grown for 
ornamental use. 
The current legal status of psychedelic drugs in plant form is some-
what ambiguous and confusing. This reflects the obvious practical 
problems of attempting to prohibit access to naturally occurring 
plants, or determining precise criteria for the point at which the owner 
of the plant/drug becomes the subject of punitive sanctions. While the 
1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Drugs includes mescaline, DMT 
and psilocine/psilosin in schedule 1, the commentary to the convention 
(the official guide to its implementation and use) makes it clear that: 
The cultivation of plants from which psychotropic substances are 
obtained is not controlled by the Vienna Convention. (...) Neither 
93 Its sacramental use is often associated with a physical as well as spiritual cleansing 
process .
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the crown (fruit, mescal button) of the Peyote cactus nor the roots of 
the plant Mimosa hostilis nor Psilocybe mushrooms themselves are 
included in Schedule 1, but only their respective principles, mescaline, 
DMT and psilocine, psilosin. 
Article 32 of the 1971 convention itself does provide an additional 
exemption: 
A State on whose territory there are plants growing wild which 
contain psychotropic substances from among those in Schedule1 
and which are traditionally used by certain small, clearly deter-
mined groups in magical or religious rites, may, at the time of 
signature, ratification or accession, make reservations concerning 
these plants, in respect of the provisions of article 7, except for the 
provisions relating to international trade. 
A number of such exceptions have been implemented and exist in 
domestic law, providing a functioning legal model for ritual/sacra-
mental use of psychedelics. One notable example of this is the permitted 
use of Peyote cactus/mescaline in the US by Native Americans, and the 
non-requirement for it to be declared on joining the military. 
There are clearly lessons for wider regulatory models to be learnt from 
traditional ritual use. Such use operates within well established social/
cultural controls, ensuring that use is only very occasional, and that set 
and setting are clearly delineated through careful ritualised preparation. 
Under such a model, users are very well informed and organised; it is 
supported by mentoring and peer guidance, with a corresponding respect 
for the potentially profound and intense nature of the drug experience. 
For users seeking the more exploratory psychedelic experience, a 
group/society/club type model could be based on some of the lessons 
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of traditional ritual use. It would offer a wide range of psychedelics 
(potentially including LSD, and pharmaceutical preparations of DMT 
and Mescaline), and would combine elements of the licensed venue and 
vendor models with a licensed user/membership system. 
Proposed discussion model for regulation of psychedelics 
basic regulatory model
> A membership based psychedelic group/club model that would combine elements 
of the specialist pharmacist model (a trained and licensed vendor with specific 
responsibilities), licensed premises for sale and consumption, and licensed users (a 
membership system with a requirement for training, and potentially meeting certain 
health criteria). 
controls over the product
Dosage and preparation:
> For plant based psychedelics, quantifying dosage within acceptable error parameters 
would be based on established knowledge of quantities/effects for either drink 
preparations or—in the case of fresh or dried psilocybin mushrooms—weight, as 
appropriate to the potency of different species. 
> Pharmaceutical preparations would be in standardised units at the lower end of the 
active dosage threshold—higher doses would be established in multiples or additional 
fractions of these units. 
Price controls
> The existing illicit market for psychedelics is relatively small, with prices low enough, 
and use generally infrequent enough, for price to not be an important factor in using 
decisions—so the usefulness of price controls as a regulatory tool would be marginal. 
> Fixed unit prices could be established with sales on a non-profit basis (even if other 
elements of the experience were charged for)—to reduce any profit incentive push 
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towards higher dosage/use, with potential for % or per-unit taxation. Operation of 
such groups on a not for profit basis would be preferable. 
Packaging controls
> Supply of psychedelic drugs for use in licensed premises would not require specific 
packaging controls. 
> Under a scenario where the drugs were taken off premises for any reason standard 
packaging controls would be mandated (see: page 45), including child and tamper 
proof containers, standardised labelling, and licensed user details as appropriate.
controls over the vendor/supply outlet/premises
Licensing of vendors/suppliers 
The licensed vendors/venue licensees of the group/club would assume a number of roles 
and responsibilities including:
> A pharmacist-like role, providing information about effects, health and safety 
information, risk reduction, and services as well as limiting access under certain 
criteria (see user controls below). This would require standardised training as a 
condition of licence. 
> Responsibility for monitoring wellbeing of users, and duty of care should they 
experience difficulties or problems—this might include a requirement  
for mentoring/guiding the experience/acting as a ‘sitter’ (non-use being a 
prerequisite) particularly for first time or novice users. They might also be 
licensed to administer benzodiazepines, which dampen or negate intense 
psychedelic related distress. 
> Safe/secure transit and storage of drug supplies, along with accurate record keeping 
of sales/members.
> Managing membership (inclusion and exclusion) according to clearly mandated 
criteria, and ensuring access was limited to members only. 
> Enforcement of standard health and safety regulations. 
> Restricting drug use within the group environment to specific licensed psychedelics. 
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Issues around venue location, density of outlets, and hours of opening would be 
determined by the local licensing authority but would not be a major issue as group 
or mentored use would be scheduled and venues could vary (including, for example, 
approved rented venues or private homes/gardens).
Volume sales/rationing controls
> If sales are for onsite supervised use, rationing is not an issue, as the drugs are 
dispensed for immediate use direct to the user by the vendor (consumption can be 
supervised). 
> Any off site sales would be rationed at a level appropriate for personal occasional use.
controls over the purchaser/user
Age access controls
> Membership and access would have minimum age criteria (in all likelihood over 18).
Degree of intoxication/mindset of purchaser/user
> Vendors would be required to refuse sales to those clearly intoxicated, according to a 
clear set of guidelines.
> An additional restriction on access could be applied on a discretionary basis/to a set 
of established guidelines if the supplier viewed the prospective user’s mindset to be 
non-conducive to a problem-free psychedelic experience, for whatever reason.
Licences/membership requirements for purchasers/users
> Access to membership of a psychedelic club/group could be conditional on 
participation in training sessions to establish a clear understanding of the potential 
positive and negative effects of different forms of psychedelic use, stressing the 
importance of set and setting, risks and responsibilities, etc. 
> The membership system would aim to restrict/limit access to vulnerable individuals 
(those with certain mental health issues, emotional or psychological problems, 
or using potentially contra-indicated medications), for whom psychedelic use 
presented heightened or unacceptable levels of risk. How such criteria could be 
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objectively evaluated and implemented without being discriminatory or inconsistent 
is problematic; perhaps the best option would be for appropriate questions to be 
built into an informal membership interview (potentially also used to establish that 
training was adequate). Relevant information would, however, have to be volunteered 
(unless a requirement for a doctor’s ‘all clear’ was mandated). 
> Potential for a tiered membership process; potentially beginning with a 
non-problematic supervised/guided/mentored lower dose/shorter acting drug 
experience, leading to ‘graduation’ to extended access, if sought (by dosage/drugs). 
Once a member had established themselves as a responsible, informed and 
non-problematic user over a certain period they could then potentially graduate to 
being able to take out supplies for personal use. 
> Membership/access could be revoked for violating group rules. 
Pharmacysalesmodel
A licensed user/pharmacy-sales model could operate for certain 
psychedelics, potentially alongside a group model described above. 
This could either be for already established group members, or allow 
access based on a similar training/vetting process. 
Lowerthresholdlicensedsalesforpsilocybin
(‘magic’)mushrooms
Psilocybin or ‘magic’ mushrooms are distinct from the other psyche-
delics discussed here in some key respects. They are generally shorter 
acting94 and, unlike peyote, San Pedro cacti and ayahuasca, they are 
consumable in their raw form without any preparation.95 Thus, with 
some basic knowledge about potency, they offer relatively easy user-
dosage control. In many parts of the world, they are available in the 
natural environment, and amongst the psychedelics they are generally 
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to 8–16 hours for mescaline, ayahuasca and LSD. An exception is the smoked 
pharmaceutical DMT which can last about 5–30 minutes. 
95 They can also be made into a tea or prepared as food products. 
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regarded as least risky. The UK government’s drug information website 
‘Frank’ notes that:
The biggest danger with taking any magic mushrooms is making 
sure you’ve picked the right thing. There are hundreds of varieties [of 
mushrooms] and some of them are highly poisonous.96 
This combination of factors means psilocybin mushrooms have a 
more obvious appeal than other psychedelics to the social user. This is 
reflected in their prevalence of use in this group. For example, usage has 
been rising over the past decade in Europe, becoming more popular than 
the previous favoured psychedelic, LSD. Psilocybin mushrooms are 
also used by a smaller population, usually in higher doses, for a range of 
more distinctly personal, exploratory, ritual and spiritual uses. 
In a number of countries the ambiguous legal status of psilocybin mush-
rooms has meant they are or have been effectively legal for sale, subject 
only to voluntary regulation. They were, until a recent ban,97 legally 
available in the Netherlands in so-called ‘smart shops’. For a number of 
years, they were only subject to voluntary regulation; age controls and 
some limited health and safety information appeared on the packaging. 
In the UK, when a legal loophole was identified in 2001–2 that allowed 
fresh psilocybin mushrooms to be sold legally, mushrooms imported 
from the Netherlands soon became widely available in ‘head shops’ 98 and 
other outlets. They were subject to no formal regulation whatsoever, 
and were indeed often promoted and sold irresponsibly.99 Somewhat 
predictably, this situation led to a more comprehensive ban in 2005. 
Use of mushrooms rose during this period and has fallen off since the 
ban. However, the lack of research data means it is unclear how changes 
96 www.talktofrank.com (accessed July 09).
97 The ban was precipitated by the political and media storm that blew up around smart 
shop sales following a series of incidents (all involving tourists) prominently including 
the death of a young French tourist who had allegedly taken magic mushrooms; see:  
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1650873,00. 
98 The UK equivalent of Dutch ‘smart shops’, supplying ‘legal highs’, drug paraphernalia 
(pipes, bongs etc.) and drug culture books, posters and other merchandise.
99 ‘How to deal with psilocybe mushrooms’, Transform Drug Policy Foundation briefing, 2004.
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in mushroom use impacted on use of other psychedelics or other more 
risky drugs.100 Comparisons to other countries that did not have legal 
availability are hampered by poor data quality. In general, however, 
magic mushrooms use seems to have been generally increasing across 
Europe since the late 1990s, whilst LSD use has remained stable or 
fallen—arguably reflecting a rational consumer choice towards the less 
potent, shorter acting product. Lifetime use measures in the Netherlands 
and UK are relatively high, but last year and last month use in these 
countries are nearer European averages. There are other countries that 
have equivalent or higher levels of use, depending on which measures 
are used.101 Interestingly, the 2003 ESPAD schools survey102 found no 
obvious correlation between reported ease of availability and legal 
regimes, with the Netherlands scoring lower than the Czech Republic, 
Ireland, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom for reported ‘easy access’. 
It seems clear that increased availability and unregulated marketing 
had an impact on levels of use, but, as ever, the picture is complicated by 
various parallel social trends. 
Whilst the lack of regulation in both UK and Dutch scenarios was 
clearly inadequate, the availability of the mushrooms was not linked 
to a crisis in public health or social disorder, despite shock headlines 
relating to often misrepresented and isolated incidents. Given this, 
psilocybin mushrooms could be made legally available in a more appro-
priately regulated fashion with lessons learnt from previous mistakes. 
At a minimum, they should be sold from licensed vendors, subject to 
age access, packaging and labelling controls, and with strict adver-
tising and marketing controls. These should be combined with effective 
targeted risk reduction information. Were this to be the case, it seems 
likely that psilocybin mushrooms, arguably the lowest risk psychedelic 
product, would cater for the vast majority of demand for psychedelics. 
100 Fly-agaric mushrooms (containing the deliriant hallucinogenic compound muscimol), 
which are substantially more toxic than psilocybin mushrooms, have not been 
prohibited in the UK and remain on sale in many of the same outlets that previously sold 
psilocybin mushrooms. 
101 See: ‘Hallucinogenic mushrooms; an emerging case study’, EMCDDA, 2006. 
102 The European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drugs:  
www.espad.org/espad-reports.
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They would have additional potential for producing a substitute effect, 
moving recreational users away from more risky party drugs, such as 
stimulants and alcohol. 
Furtherreading
* ‘Hallucinogenic mushrooms; an emerging case study’,	EMCDDA,	
2006
* ‘How to deal with psilocybe mushrooms’,	Transform	Drug	Policy	
Foundation,	2004
* A.	Weil,	‘The Natural Mind: An Investigation of Drugs and the Higher 
Consciousness’,	Mariner	Books,	1998
* P.	Stafford,	‘Psychedelics Encyclopaedia’,	Ronin	Publishing,	1993
* ‘Hallucinogenic mushrooms’:	EMCDDA	drug	profile	
* ‘LSD’:	EMCDDA	drug	profile	
5.6		 Depressants
Depressant drug use, including opiates, benzodiazepines, and barbitu-
rates, is associated with a set of behaviours that are defined by a wide 
spectrum of motivations and functions. These range from more conven-
tional pleasure seeking, through to relief or escape from physical or 
emotional pain, stress or discomfort. As such, depressant use straddles 
recreational and medical/quasi-medical functions, the boundaries 
between the two often becoming blurred. Reaching out to a popula-
tion of users, a substantial fraction of whom are defined by their low 
levels of wellbeing, presents a unique set of policy challenges. They seek 
temporary solace in depressant drugs, often more as a form of func-
tional ‘self-medication’ than hedonism. Contributory factors can include 
emotional, psychological or mental health issues, often in combination 
with socio-economic deprivation. 
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Levels of problematic depressant use are argu-
ably a closer reflection of personal and societal 
wellbeing than use of the other groups of drugs 
(for example, stimulants and psychedelics). 
Of course, an effective legal regulatory system 
should be able to dramatically reduce the harms 
associated with such use. However, the special 
qualities motivating depressant use again high-
light the centrality of the wider social policy 
context in drug policy. In the long term, we can 
only reduce problematic depressant use by addressing the underlying 
causes of low levels of personal and social wellbeing. 
It is important to highlight that alcohol is also a depressant drug, 
even if in low to medium doses it functions as a dis-inhibitor and thus 
appears to have stimulant properties. Problematic alcohol consump-
tion shares characteristics which parallel those of prescription and 
illicitly used depressants. 
Two key characteristics of the depressant drug risk profile have impli-
cations for depressant regulation. Firstly, whilst the chronic toxicity 
of depressants varies widely, they share a high overdose potential. As 
central nervous system depressants, the threshold at which the drugs’ 
desired effects can become dangerous, potentially leading to uncon-
sciousness, coma or death, is often relatively small. A particular risk 
is presented when depressant drugs are used in combination—most 
commonly alcohol in combination with prescription or illicit depressants. 
Secondly, they have a relatively high potential for dependent patterns of 
use to develop. Depressants can all produce potentially powerful physi-
ological withdrawal effects (with barbiturates, for example, sometimes 
even fatal) and cravings, as well as development of tolerance. The psycho-
social component of dependence can also be profound—particularly in 
the context of their use as self-medication, or escapism. 
Reaching out to a 
population of users, 
a substantial fraction 
of whom are defined 
by their low levels of 
well-being, presents 
a unique set of policy 
challenges
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5.6.1	 Opiates
An extensive group of drugs, with similar molecular structures and 
shared characteristics, fall within the opiates grouping. 
Key amongst these are: 
* Naturally occurring opiates in the opium poppy; morphine, 
codeine103 and thebaine—in combination in the poppy resin as 
opium104 or in an opium tincture with alcohol as laudanum.
* Semi-synthetic opiates derived from these, including oxycodone 
(in pharmaceutical form also under the brand name OxyContin105), 
hydrocodone (under the brandname of Dicodid, or more commonly, 
combined with paracetamol, as Vicodin106) and diamorphine, also 
known as heroin—its original pharmaceutical brand name, that 
has effectively become its generic title. 
* Fully-synthetic opiates—including methadone, pethadine, fentanyl 
and tramadol. 
Patterns of opiate use vary greatly between countries and regions. These 
reflect the varied histories of availability of the range of opiates over the 
past two centuries, localised opiate cultures that have formed around this 
availability, and the wider social, economic and cultural contexts alluded 
to above. Trying to devise effective policy responses to the issues around 
opiate use requires the grouping being viewed as a whole; there is clearly 
a high degree of displacement possible between opiates with similar 
effects, or different preparations and methods of using the same opiates. 
To a lesser extent other depressant drugs, and drug use more broadly, 
should be considered in this context. 
103 Codeine is available in various over the counter pain relief products, usually in 
combination with paracetamol e.g. Solpadeine.
104 Opium also contains a number of other active drugs at lower levels. 
105 OxyContin is one of a number of branded and generic oxycodone pharmaceutical 
preparations that also includes preparations with paracetamol (acetaminophen also 
known in branded form as Percocet), aspirin (branded form Percodan), and Ibuprofen 
(branded form Combunox).
106 Vicodin is one of many branded and generic pharmaceutical hydrocodone preparations 
used in pain relief, that also includes Lortab (with aspirin), and Vicoprofen (with 
ibuprofen).
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Policy responses to opiates have to balance the 
short term goal of reducing harms associated 
with opiate use as it exists now—particularly 
the disproportionate harms generated by 
injected use—with the longer term goal of 
broader reduction of problematic opiate use 
and opiate related harms. Short and long term 
efforts should work together to help shift use 
from more to less risky products (both drug 
and preparation), using environments, and 
using behaviours. Taken together, they should 
reduce opiate dependency, and achieve longer 
term reductions in demand by removing 
obstacles to addressing the wider social policy 
concerns that underlie problematic use of 
opiates and other drugs. 
The crossover between extensive formal use of 
medical opiates, and informal quasi-medical 
and recreational use, presents a particular set 
of challenges. As mentioned in chapter 2 (and 
Appendix 2), almost half of global opium production is for legal medical 
pharmaceutical production. Particular care must be taken to avoid a key 
current problem; fear of encouraging illicit or non-medical recreational 
use of opiates has often restricted access for essential medical purposes, 
including palliative care and wider pain relief. 
As alluded to in chapter 2, pragmatic approaches will start with an explo-
ration of the potential for creating a clear harm reduction gradient. This 
will demand the differential application of regulation, along key risk 
vectors. It is proposed this could involve a tiered regulatory system: 
* Some highly potent, short-acting synthetic or semi-synthetic 
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Safer environments: Vancouver's Insite supervised injecting 
venue (above), and an open air drug scene in the back alley 
immediately opposite
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opiates, such as fentanyl (and its various analogues), would remain 
prohibited under all circumstances for non-medical supply and 
use. Whilst many of these drugs have occasionally appeared 
within opiate using populations (usually as diverted medical 
supplies) such use is primarily a reflection of the lack of access to 
alternatives. If greater access to and choice of other opiates were 
available, it is assumed that the demand for more niche medical 
opiates would largely disappear. 
* Where regulated access is permitted, the most severe restrictions 
would be applied to injectable opiates, predominantly diamor-
phine/heroin, which present the greatest risk. These would be 
available on a medical prescription basis, where specific criteria 
were met. Opiate prescribing models have a long history in a 
number of countries and are well established. As discussed in 
chapter 2, various models exist that can include access that is condi-
tional on supervised use in a clinical setting. 
* A range of oral pill or solution form pharmaceutical opiates would 
be available under a licensed pharmacy vendor/licensed user 
model. These would potentially be in combination with licensed 
premises for supply and consumption, or membership based 
clubs/venues. Specific levels of regulation for particular products 
would be determined by risk assessment of individual prepa-
rations. These would be combined with an assessment of local 
demand, patterns of use and risk behaviours. The emphasis would 
be on lower dose, slower release oral preparations. Some more 
potent/risky products would not be available, and would remain 
restricted for medical use only. Some non-injectable pharmaceu-
tical opiates (including methadone) would also be available on 
prescription under certain circumstances. These could be subject 
to tighter restrictions including, for example, a requirement for 
supervised consumption. 
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* Unrefined or moderately refined opium would be subject to rela-
tively less restrictive controls—it would be available for smoking 
or oral consumption (including as poppy tea), under a licensed 
vendor/premises/user model, a licensed user/pharmacy sales 
model, or in some circumstances, on prescription. The aim of 
making opium subject to less restrictive availability controls, 
would be to reverse the trend towards more concentrated opiate 
products that has unfolded over the last century of prohibition. 
Lower risk opium preparations could absorb an increasingly large 
share of the demand for opiates currently met from illicit sales 
and diverted medical supplies of higher risk opiates. Availability 
for consumption in regulated venues would allow for a range of 
controls, peer support, risk reduction and targeting of public 
health information and services. 
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Appendix	1:		
ReformingtheUNdrugcontrolsystem
Theproblem:lackofflexibility
Attempts to move along the spectrum of available drug policy options, 
away from punitive prohibitionist approaches towards decriminali-
sation of adult use and, more specifically, legal regulation of drug 
production and supply for non medical use, inevitably run into the legal 
and institutional obstacles created by the three UN drug conventions 
(1961, 1971, and 1988—detailed below). 
It is notable that whilst the conventions draw very strict lines in terms 
of movement in one direction along the policy continuum, few barriers 
or parameters exist for movement in the opposite direction, towards 
increasing strictness, although the 1988 convention notes that this is 
‘subject always’ to human rights law. The International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB—see below) has rarely publicly spoken out against exces-
sively punitive responses to drug use107 even when these have involved 
serious human rights violations; for example, the use of the death 
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penalty for drug offences (in direct violation of international law108 and 
the UN General Assembly109), and the extrajudicial execution of over 
2000 citizens during the War on Drugs crackdown in Thailand in 2003. 
This is in stark contrast to its frequent and vocal protestations at even 
the most minor shifts in the opposite direction. It is only in the very 
recent history of the UN drug machinery, following a concerted effort 
from various civil society groups and NGOs, that human rights have 
featured in Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) deliberations in any meaningful way.110
Thechallenge:allowingincreasedflexibilitywithout
underminingthewholesystem.
The challenge in reforming the international drug control infrastructure 
is to institute reforms that remove the barriers to individual or groups 
of states exploring models for the legal regulation and supply of some 
currently illicit drugs, without destroying the entire international drug 
control infrastructure, much of which is unquestionably beneficial. The 
system of control and regulation of the pharmaceutical trade is vitally 
important. The consensus and shared purpose that the conventions 
represent—behind the need to address the problems associated with 
drugs—holds great potential to develop and implement more effective 
responses at an international level, guided by the principles and norms 
of the United Nations. 
BackgroundtotheUNconventions
The present system of worldwide drug control is regulated by three 
international conventions. These are the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit 
108 R. Lines, ‘The Death Penalty for Drug Offences’, HR2, IHRA, 2008. 
109 The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the use of 
the death penalty in 2007. See: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10678.doc.  
110 D. Barrett, ‘Recalibrating the Regime’, IHRA, Human Rights Watch, CHALN, 2008.
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Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances.111 As of March 2008, 183 states 
are parties to all three conventions. 
The 1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
The bedrock of the global drug control 
regime is the 1961 Single Convention, 
so called because it largely replaced the 
previous international agreements that had 
been developing piecemeal since the early 
years of the twentieth century. Arguably the first and most significant 
of these was the Hague Opium Convention of 1912, that resulted from 
the Shanghai Opium Commission organised by the US in 1909. The 
thirteen countries involved all sought to curb the opium trade (albeit 
for a range of different cultural, geo-political and economic reasons). 
The Hague convention that emerged in 1912 established the model for 
international drug control that continues to this day, binding parties to 
limit production, supply and use of opium to medical contexts, coor-
dinate international efforts to enforce restrictions on non-medical use 
including closure of ‘opium dens’, and specifically to penalise unauthor-
ised possession. It is interesting to note that drug control demonstrates 
a reversed evolutionary pattern of development to much of contempo-
rary social, criminal or public health policy, in that it actually began 
with a top-down international approach that was then consolidated into 
domestic policy and law at a later stage.112
The 1961 Convention outlines the same prohibitionist principles as its 
forerunner, but for a far broader spectrum of drugs, and also involving 
a substantially greater number of state parties. It shaped global and 
domestic drug policy for the next half century. In a similar fashion to the 
Hague opium convention, the 1961 convention, as a general obligation, 
111 All three treaties available in full from the UNODC website:  www.unodc.org.
112 A. Jamieson, ‘International drug conventions, national compliance and the UN commentaries: 
the shaming mechanism’, in N. Dorn, A. Jamieson, ‘European Drug Laws: the Room for 
Manœuvre’, Drugscope, 2001. 
‘...we believe the time has come 
for the international treaties to be 
reconsidered’ and recommended 
that ‘...the Government initiates a 
discussion within the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs of alternative ways—
including the possibility of legalisation 
and regulation—to tackle the global 
drugs dilemma.’ 
The UK House of Commons Home Affairs 
Select Committee 2001 report  
‘The Government’s Drugs Policy: Is It Working?
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under Article 4(c) requires signatory nations to limit the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and posses-
sion of named drugs exclusively to ‘medical and scientific purposes’. 
Reflecting the prevalent concerns of the era (bearing in mind that the 
main text of the convention was drafted in the 1950s, some of it as far 
back as the 1940s113), the Convention pays particular attention to plant 
based drugs: opium, coca, and cannabis (along with derived drugs 
heroin and cocaine). In fact more than one hundred illicit substances 
are placed in four schedules, nominally based on the perceived harm-
fulness (specifically addictiveness) of the drug as was understood 
at the time.114 Notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
drafting period (1946–48) overlapped the Single Convention drafting to 
some extent, and had been in place for thirteen years by its enactment. 
It does not appear to have influenced the Single Convention’s negotia-
tions, the absence of any reference to the Universal Declaration in the 
Single Convention’s preamble being particularly conspicuous. 
Article 2 of the Single Convention determines that the supply or 
dispensing of any scheduled substance is only possible under legal 
authority, namely under licence. 
* Schedule I contains substances that are subject to all of the control 
measures under the Convention, including heroin, cocaine and 
cannabis.
* Schedule II is comprised of substances used for medical purposes 
that are deemed to require less stringent control in view of a lesser 
risk of abuse, such as codeine.
* Schedule III is effectively for exemptions and, as such, excludes 
a series of pharmaceutical preparations made from substances 
perceived not to lead to abuse or ill effects, such as powders and 
liquids with very low dosages of opium or cocaine. 
113 To put this in perspective, Al Capone died in 1947.
114 How these rankings were determined remains murky and there has been a growing 
body of critique about anomalies in the rankings and the broader utility of a scheduling 
system (see: chapter 4.2, page 70).
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* Schedule IV substances are permitted for amounts that may be 
necessary for medical and scientific research. This includes some 
substances from Schedule I, when they are considered to have 
particularly dangerous properties which are not offset by thera-
peutic value that cannot be afforded by some other drug. 
The Single Convention also established the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) within the UN international drug control 
system. It is the self-described ‘independent and quasi-judicial monitoring 
body for the implementation of the United Nations international drug control 
conventions’.115 The INCB has a watchdog role over the conventions, in 
theory much like similar agencies that exist to monitor compliance 
to other UN treaties116. However, criticisms of the INCB’s activities 
have been growing. It has increasingly been seen as inflexible and 
uncompromising, acting as ‘guardian’ of the purity of the conventions—
challenging activity that does not fit with its rigid interpretations of the 
treaty—and non-responsive to the needs of member states in a world 
dramatically changed from that in which the INCB was established 
(see: Further reading, below). 
The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
The 1971 convention was constructed as a response to concern about 
emerging drugs and related behaviours during the 1960s, specifically 
the higher profile synthetic and/or prescribable drugs,117 including 
amphetamine-like stimulants, barbiturates and other sedative-hyp-
notics/depressants, and hallucinogens (most notoriously, at this point, 
LSD). These are similarly classified into four schedules according to 
perceived harm and therapeutic value, with a corresponding hierarchy 
115 See: INCB, ‘Mandate and Functions’, www.incb.org/incb/mandate.html.
116 The ultimate arbiter between parties regarding disputes over the conventions is the 
International Court of Justice.
117 The UN drug agencies label such synthetic drugs ‘psychotropic substances’—hence the 
name of the 1971 convention, as distinct from the ‘narcotic drugs’, the plant based drugs 
that are the primary concern of the 1961 convention. The use of the term ‘narcotic’ is 
rather confusing given its historical meaning as inducing sleep or numbness. Despite the 
term being rather outdated and redundant, in the US and UN legal context ‘narcotic’ has 
increasingly been used to describe any illegal drug rather than a drug with a given effect.
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of controls to license medical, scientific, 
or other uses. 
An important purpose of both the 1961 
and 1971 Conventions was to codify inter-
nationally appropriate control measures 
to ensure the availability of drugs for 
medical and scientific purposes, while 
preventing leakage into illicit channels. 
It is in this context that the World Health 
Organization (WHO) is responsible for 
the medical and scientific assessment of 
all psychoactive substances, and subse-
quent advice to the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND or Commission) 
about the classification of drugs into one of the schedules of the 1961 
and 1971 treaties (including changes to classifications). 
1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances 
The 1988 Convention was primarily designed to deal with the growth of 
international trafficking in illegal substances in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
earlier international instruments had failed to achieve the aspiration of 
preventing the production, trafficking and supply of scheduled drugs in 
quite spectacular style. The 1988 convention can be seen as a response 
to this failure and the perceived inadequacies of earlier treaties in this 
regard. As such it provides a raft of measures against drug trafficking 
and precursor chemicals. The INCB website notes that it: 
…provides comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including 
provisions against money laundering and the diversion of precursor 
chemicals. It provides for international cooperation through, for 
‘There is indeed a spirit of reform in the air, 
to make the conventions fit for purpose and 
adapt them to a reality on the ground that is 
considerably different from the time they were 
drafted. With the multilateral machinery to 
adapt the conventions already available, all 
we need is: first, a renewed commitment to 
the principles of multilateralism and shared 
responsibility; secondly, a commitment to 
base our reform on empirical evidence and not 
ideology; and thirdly, to put in place concrete 
actions that support the above, going beyond 
mere rhetoric and pronouncement.’
Executive Director of UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Antonio Maria Costa, ‘Making drug control “fit for 
purpose”: Building on the UNGASS decade’ (page 13) 
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example, extradition of drug traffickers, controlled deliveries and 
transfer of proceedings. 
Within the treaty the precursor chemicals are themselves scheduled in 
a similar fashion to the drugs covered by the previous treaties. 
Unlike the 1961 and 1971 conventions, which focused almost exclusively 
on drug production and supply issues, the 1988 Convention made a 
significant departure by also incorporating drug demand within one 
key paragraph (paragraph 2 of Article 3) which directly concerns crimi-
nalisation of drug users. It states unequivocally that: 
...each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic drugs 
or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the 
provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended 
or the 1971 Convention.118 
This is far more specific than the previous conventions’ vague calls for 
criminalisation of possession. As the commentary on the 1988 conven-
tion says explicitly, this paragraph ‘amounts in fact also to a penalisation of 
personal consumption’.119 There are few comparable UN conventions that 
specifically prescribe criminal penalties for individual adult conduct, 
as opposed to the state or government actions on which most conven-
tions are focused.
The only even vaguely comparable convention-based prohibitions 
against individual actions are for torture, crimes against humanity 
including genocide, acts of terrorism, human trafficking and sexual 
118 Notably this paragraph is introduced with the caveat that it is, ‘Subject to its 
constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system’.
119 ‘Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances’, New York, United Nations Publications, E/CN.7/590, December, 
1988. Such commentaries are official (non-binding) UN discursive documents produced 
retrospectively to provide legal guidance on the interpretation and implementation of the 
conventions.
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exploitation of children. These are evidently of a different order of 
magnitude to consenting adult drug use. 
Acrisiswithinthesystem
The crisis within the UN drug control system that is driving the reform 
debate has a number of facets: 
* Long term systemic failure on its own terms: the UN drug 
agencies’ self-proclaimed goal of ‘a drug free world’ is, by its own 
admission, further away than ever. UNODC rhetoric now talks 
more about ‘containment’ than ‘eradication’, but even this position 
is unsustainable in light of deteriorating outcomes on almost all 
meaningful measures. 
* Challenges, tensions and contradictions created by harm 
reduction: whilst the harm reduction movement (as distinct 
from the legalisation/regulation movement) largely seeks 
reforms within the existing legal framework, it none the less 
represents a series of profound contradictions for UN global 
drug control infrastructure. The tenets of harm reduction are 
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna, 2008
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often fundamentally at odds with those that underlie prohibi-
tion and that shaped the treaties during the last century. It is 
also impossible to ignore the fact that much of the harm that the 
movement seeks to reduce directly or indirectly results from 
prohibition and its enforcement (see: 4.2 Assessing and ranking 
drug harms, page 70). These tensions are being played out between 
the UN drug entities (particularly the CND and INCB) and other 
members of the UN family (notably the UNAIDS, the WHO) 
and between increasingly polarised groupings of reform and 
prohibition oriented member states. 
* Challenges posed by decriminalisation: The growing global trend 
towards actual or de facto decriminalisation of personal posses-
sion/use of drugs, whilst nominally permitted within the treaties, 
like harm reduction, poses serious practical and intellectual chal-
lenges to the status quo in the longer term. Such reforms not only 
challenge the spirit of the conventions but are now pushing the 
‘room to manœuvre’ to its limits, and arguably beyond. 
Flexibilityintheconventions?
It is important to appreciate that none of the conventions are ‘self-exe-
cuting’. That is, while the conventions impose obligations on states to 
apply international law, such law is not directly or immediately enforce-
able. This contrasts with, for example, the European Convention on 
Human Rights status in the UK, where it has been incorporated into 
domestic law. The conventions effectively remain contracts between 
states. This contractual nature, bolstered by a large number of signato-
ries, is arguably the real source of their power. 
The INCB, as the body responsible for overseeing the operation of the 
treaties, has no formal power to enforce the implementation of the 
conventions’ various provisions or punish for non compliance. However, 
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considerable public opprobrium can follow its often vocal criticism of 
individual state actions, usually made in its annual report.120
Obviously states are required to interpret and implement UN treaties in 
good faith, respecting the ‘object and purpose’ of conventions to which they 
are party; an attitude that is required for the UN treaty system to have 
any coherence, stability and authority.121 As such, and despite the fact that 
as already noted the autonomy of domestic law is stressed within all the 
conventions,122 state parties are required, or at the very least expected to 
adhere to, the standards and norms of the global drug control systems. 
However, the system and wording of the international conventions 
certainly leaves considerable room for interpretation at the national 
level. They offer signatory nations more ‘room for manœuvre’ in formu-
lating and implementing domestic policy and enforcement strategies 
than is often appreciated in popular political and media discourse. 
This explains why, despite the apparent consensus behind the conven-
tions, there are wide variations in the way they are interpreted and 
implemented. Many of these interpretations would seem to push at the 
boundaries of the letter and spirit of the conventions (see above). 
Some, most notably the INCB, have argued that certain moves—par-
ticularly high profile reforms such as reductions in cannabis penalties 
or de facto decriminalisation of cannabis, and harm reduction inter-
ventions including supervised injecting rooms (and until recently 
even needle exchange123)—are contrary to or go against the ‘spirit of the 
Conventions’, especially the stricter provisions of the 1988 Convention. 
120 By way of contrast the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice have more direct enforcement powers regarding Council of Europe and EU 
treaties and directives respectively. Human Rights treaty bodies—although their main 
form of sanction is political—also have quasi judicial procedures that can suggest 
remedies including compensation.
121 This is also specifically determined by the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, 
article 31 (essentially a treaty that codifies customary law on treaties as the legal basis of 
the convention system).
122 This is in terms of flexibility and interpretation and does not allow national law to be 
cited to excuse non-performance of a treaty (See article 27 of the Vienna Convention).
123 According to former INCB president Philip O. Emafo, needle exchanges should be 
regarded as ‘contrary to the provisions of the conventions’. Interview in ‘Update’, UNODC, 
December 2002.
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None the less the nations in question have a strong legal position when 
contending that they are still operating inside the parameters of the 
international legislation.124
Additional latitude is also provided by the fact that the Single 
Convention does not define ‘medical and scientific purposes’. For practical 
reasons the framers of the 1961 Convention could not be over-pre-
scriptive with such terms, tacitly acknowledging that they would 
inevitably have different meanings in different countries and cultures 
and will doubtless also shift and change in time. Many harm reduction 
initiatives that remain controversial with the INCB in particular, are 
legitimately argued to be medical interventions—prevention of HIV 
being the most obvious and politically potent. 
Thus, when adopting the limited reforms that have so far taken place, 
such as needle exchange and supervised injecting, individual states 
have not incurred sufficient international political repercussions to 
force them to forgo the benefits of those policies. Moreover, defence of 
such reforms in the UN arena has been bolstered by the fact that they 
have been adopted by a number of countries, and have been subject to 
unprecedented scrutiny. In fact, many are now supported by a substan-
tial body of evidence, showing that when done properly, they can deliver 
positive public health and criminal justice outcomes.125 This ‘strength in 
numbers’ defensive position points to potential ways forward for certain 
future reforms, as discussed below. 
Despite this controversial grey area at the fringes of what is permitted 
within the conventions, there can be no doubt that they are very specifi-
cally prohibitionist in nature. In their current form, they offer no room 
for any substantial form of legally regulated production, supply or 
use for non medical use, beyond the small amount of crossover that 
124 For example; methadone treatment is specifically allowed under the conventions as 
noted in the 1988 commentary, and in 2002 the INCB itself commissioned a legal opinion 
on supervised injecting rooms from the UNDCP Legal Affairs Section; titled ‘Flexibility 
of Treaty Provisions as regards Harm Reduction Approaches’, which concluded that 
substitution treatment, needle exchanges and supervised injecting rooms do not breach 
the conventions.
125 For example: Insite, Vancouver’s supervised injecting facility. 
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inevitably occurs with some of the medical access models currently in 
place. In any case, these existing models focus on a minority of problem-
atic users rather than the majority of non problematic users. Flexibility 
that may be potentially available regarding lenience towards drug users, 
according to objective interpretations of the law, is simply not present 
when it comes to options regarding legal regulation of drug production 
and supply for non medical use. Bewley-Taylor (2005) notes that: 
Nations may currently be pushing the boundaries of the international 
system, but the pursuit of any action to formally legalise non-med-
ical and scientific drug use would require either treaty revision or a 
complete or partial withdrawal from the current regime. 
OptionsforreformingtheUNdrugcontrolsystem:
Treaty revision 
The 1997 UN World Drugs Report, produced by the UN Drug Control 
Program126 notes that: 
Laws—and even the International Conventions—are not written 
in stone; they can be changed when the democratic will of nations so 
wishes it.127
There are clearly expressed mechanisms in the drug conventions (as 
with all conventions) for them to be revised. Two possible routes exist in 
this respect: modification and amendment. Bewley-Taylor128 summarises 
these options thus: 
Modification refers to a possible alteration in the regime through the 
re-scheduling of a drug, that is to say moving it from one to another 
126 Later absorbed within the current UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
127 UNODC World Drug Report 1997, chapter 8: ‘The Regulation-Legalization Debate’. The next 
sentence (the final one of the chapter as it happens) is: ‘But the legalizers must find better 
answers to the trickier questions before hearts and minds across the world will follow them’.
128 D. Bewley-Taylor, ‘Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities’, 
International Journal of Drug Policy, 2003, Vol. 14, pages 171–179.
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of the 1961 and 1971 Convention schedules or the 1988 Convention 
tables, or through the deletion of a drug from a schedule/schedules 
or table/tables altogether. Amendment refers to the formal altera-
tion of treaty provisions, namely a convention article, which affects 
all the Parties. 
Bewley-Taylor is one of a number of Convention scholars to have detailed 
the practical difficulties in achieving much substantive reform using 
either of these mechanisms. 
Modification 
Article 3 of the Single Convention allows for the WHO or any Party state 
to initiate the modification process that would reschedule a specified 
drug or delete it from the conventions at any time. For cannabis and coca 
an amendment to the Single Convention would also be required as culti-
vation and production of the plants is specifically prohibited, separately 
from the scheduling infrastructure—thus drastically limiting the reform 
possibilities theoretically available for other scheduled drugs. The nature 
of the Convention provisions renders this somewhat academic, as indi-
vidual states have the power within the system to easily block change. The 
WHO, whilst key to any modification process because of its advisory role, 
can only make non-binding recommendations—the power to implement 
changes remains with the 53 member Commission on Narcotic Drugs that 
operates within and determines policy for the UNODC. 
Within the CND there exists a curious alliance of states (including Sweden, 
Japan, many ex-Soviet States, most Arab nations and the USA) that are 
staunchly opposed to any revisions that would move the treaty away 
from its punitive tenets. For these countries the conventions are based on 
the rigid and absolute position that all (illegal) drug use is morally unac-
ceptable—to the extent that the conventions have assumed a status more 
akin to religious documents.129 In effect, unlike the statement in the 1997 
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129 P. Cohen, ‘The drug prohibition church and the adventure of reformation’, International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 2003, Vol. 14:2, pages 213–215.
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UN world drugs report (above), for these countries the conventions are, to 
all intents and purposes, indeed written in stone. 
The mechanisms for change within all three conventions provide this 
group with ample opportunity to stifle any revisionist action. Within 
this significant power block the US unsurprisingly plays the central 
hegemonic role. The US was the driving force behind the conventions 
in the first instance (their prohibitionist nature mirroring the US’s 
historic cultural tendencies) and has, through its support for them and 
indeed through other forms of political pressure (including its certifi-
cation system) been their significant bulwark. As a diplomat at the UN 
in Vienna observed only a few years ago, ‘wherever a nation seems about 
to break ranks [with Washington’s views on prohibition] the US will be there, 
cajoling or threatening’.130 
The make-up of the Commission means that consensus on revisionist 
moves would never be established. Even in the event of a move to a 
vote, which the political culture in Vienna renders highly unlikely, 
the majority would be unlikely to be established. Even if accepted by 
the CND, any state can request the modification be referred to the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whose decision is final; the 
same hurdles with the prohibitionist states would be faced again. 
Similar structures, with minor administrative variations, exist for the 
1971 and 1988 conventions (1971 requires a two thirds rather than simple 
majority decision from CND).
Amendment 
The obstacles to modification render it an effectively worthless 
option, making the prospects for amendment seem initially more 
promising. However, once again there is ample scope for opposing 
parties to block changes. 
130 Webster, 1998, quoted in D. Bewley-Taylor, ‘Emerging policy contradictions between the 
United Nations drug control system and the core values of the United Nations’, International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 2005, Vol. 16, pages 423–431.
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The possibility to amend is provided in Article 47 of the Single 
Convention, Article 30 of the 1971 Convention and Article 31 of the 1988 
Convention. Parties can notify the Secretary-General of a proposed 
amendment, including the reasoning behind the move. The Secretary-
General then communicates the proposed amendment and the reasons 
for it to the Parties and to the Council. It is then the ECOSOC’s decision 
to either call a conference to consider the amendment, or ask the parties 
if they accept the amendment. In the unlikely event of no party rejecting 
the amendment within 18 months the amendment comes into force. 
In the more likely event of objections being raised to ECOSOC, the 
council then can decide whether or not to convene a conference to 
consider the amendment. Such a conference could usefully raise the 
profile of the revision issue, but there would be no guarantee of mean-
ingful revisions. Prohibition oriented states could even potentially 
exploit the event to move policy in the opposite direction.131 Functional 
cost objections could also be made to such a conference—that is, that it 
would be too expensive. 
Other revision options 
Although not outlined in the relevant articles of the conventions there 
are additional routes by which amendments may be put forward. For 
example, according to the Commentary on the Single Convention, 
ECOSOC may submit proposed amendments to the General Assembly 
for consideration in accordance with Article 62 paragraph 3 of the UN 
Charter. The General Assembly may itself also take the initiative in 
amending the Convention, either by adopting revisions, or by calling a 
Plenipotentiary Conference for this purpose. The same goes for the 1971 
and 1988 Conventions. 
Nonetheless, considering the complex political dynamics of the 
General Assembly, there is no reason to suggest that such alternative 
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131 This occurred during and after behind the scenes activity in the run up to the 1998 United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS). Then initial efforts to 
reassess the effectiveness of the drug control regime were reduced to a reaffirmation of 
the current system and its strategies. 
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amendment procedures would circumvent the obstacles presented by 
the prohibition-oriented block when following the rules laid out in the 
specific articles. 
In order to cut this particular Gordian knot, parties may wish to consider 
withdrawing from the treaties. 
Withdrawal from the treaties 
The administrative blocking possibilities within the convention review 
procedures mean that the prohibitionist block can effectively ensure 
no undesirable revisions are made. The only option then available to an 
individual state wishing to operate outside of the conventions would be 
to withdraw from the relevant treaty. Two main options exist for such 
a withdrawal from the drugs treaties; while in the context of interna-
tional relations and UN culture they would be seen as extreme, they 
would remain within the confines of international law, as they are tech-
nically allowed by articles of the treaties. 
The possibilities of denunciation 
Articles within all the treaties allow any Party to opt out by depositing 
a denunciation with the Secretary-General in writing, and including 
reference to the legal grounds for the move. With regard to the 1961 and 
1971 Conventions, if the Secretary-General receives this instrument on 
or before the first of July, the denunciation comes into effect for that 
Party at the beginning of the following year. Denunciation of the 1988 
Convention comes into effect for the denouncing Party one year after 
the receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General. 
As of March 2008 it would, however, require 143 individual state denun-
ciations to reduce the number of ratifications of the 1961 Convention to 
below 40, thus triggering its termination (in accordance with Article 41). 
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It needs to be acknowledged that this is incredibly unlikely, even if theo-
retically possible or even desirable. The 1988 Convention in fact has no 
termination clause and would thus, in accordance with Article 55 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, somewhat bizarrely remain 
in force even if there was only one remaining signatory. 
It should also be clearly acknowledged that, beyond the possibilities 
of what is technically allowed, the political consequences for any indi-
vidual state that opted out of the prohibitionist regime in this way could 
potentially be severe. Criticism from the prohibitionist block would be a 
serious impediment, particularly from the US, UNODC and the INCB. 
US scholar Peter Andreas notes that: 
Open defection from the drug prohibition regime would... have severe 
consequences: it would place the defecting country in the category of 
a pariah ‘narco-state’, generate material repercussions in the form of 
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‘Looking back over the last century, we can see that the control system and its application 
have had several unintended consequences—they may or may not have been unexpected  
but they were certainly unintended.  
‘The first unintended consequence is a huge criminal black market that thrives in order to 
get prohibited substances from producers to consumers, whether driven by a 'supply push’ 
or a 'demand pull', the financial incentives to enter this market are enormous. There is 
no shortage of criminals competing to claw out a share of a market in which hundred fold 
increases in price from production to retail are not uncommon. 
‘The second unintended consequence is what one night call policy displacement.  
Public health, which is clearly the first principle of drug control… was displaced into  
the background. 
‘The third unintended consequence is geographical displacement. It is often called the 
balloon effect because squeezing (by tighter controls) one place produces a swelling  
(namely an increase) in another place…’
Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Making drug control  
“fit for purpose”: Building on the UNGASS decade’, page 10
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economic sanctions and aid cut-offs, and damage the country’s moral 
standing in the international community.132
Developed countries would obviously be better positioned to resist 
pressure from the US, as would states less dependent on US trade or 
aid. The Netherlands for example has taken criticism for years because 
of its coffee shop cannabis system, but even they have not opted out of 
the treaties, instead choosing to operate at the fringes of what is allow-
able in their letter and spirit. 
Whilst an individual state may choose to opt out in certain circum-
stances it seems highly unlikely, although not unheard of; between 
1945 and 2004 there were 1547 denunciations of withdrawals from UN 
treaties—just under 5% of the total number of ratifications133 (none of 
these addressed the drug treaties). Far more likely is that a group of like-
minded revision oriented states would collectively mount a challenge to 
the system. Bewley-Taylor134 suggests that: 
If a credible group of Parties from Europe, Australasia and the Group 
of Latin American and Caribbean countries at the UN (the so-called 
GRULAC), for example, were to combine to denounce one or all of the 
treaties, the US-UN axis may lose much of its potential influence. The 
‘denouncers’ may find safety in numbers and quite legitimately walk 
away from the treaties. 
Bewley-Taylor also suggests that even the threat of such action could 
be enough to precipitate substantial reform, allowing the system to 
be revised in such a way as to facilitate far more flexibility along the 
spectrum of policy options than the existing barriers created by the 
absolutist prohibitionist structures currently permit. The prohibi-
tionist states could give way to partial reforms, if they were placed in 
132 Quoted in Bewley-Taylor, 2003. 
133 L. Helfer, ‘Exiting treaties’, 2005, Virginia Law Review  91: 1579–1648.
134 D. Bewley-Taylor, ‘Emerging policy contradictions between the United Nations drug control 
system and the core values of the United Nations’,  International Journal of Drug Policy, 2005, 
Vol.16.6, pages 423–431.
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a situation where any refusal to do so threatened the entire drug treaty 
system. Bewley-Taylor notes that: 
Such a scenario is possible since it is generally agreed that denuncia-
tion of any treaty can lead to its demise. This would likely be the case 
with regard to any of the drug control treaties due to the nature of the 
issue and the convention’s reliance on widespread transnational adher-
ence. Using denunciation as a trigger for treaty revision would differ 
from the procedures to modify the conventions discussed above since a 
group of like minded states would not simply be playing the numbers 
game in an effort to gain majority decisions in both the Council or the 
Commission. A sufficiently weighty ‘denouncers’ group may be able to 
not only withstand UN-US pressure, but also apply significant pres-
sure itself. 
The Beckley Foundation’s Global Cannabis commission report iden-
tifies an additional possibility,135 arguably more attractive from a 
political perspective, of denunciation followed by re-accession with 
a reservation. The commission highlights the technical problems 
with this course of action but does note that both the Netherlands 
and Switzerland made reservations against the application of some 
of the provisions on criminalisation (in Article 3) when they ratified 
the 1988 Convention. 
Other possibilities for treaty reform 
The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 1997 World 
Drug Report states: 
. . . [none of the] three international drug Conventions insist on the 
establishment of drug consumption per se as a punishable offence. 
Only the 1988 Convention clearly requires parties to establish as 
criminal offences under law the possession, purchase or cultivation of 
135 Beckley Foundation, ‘Global Cannabis Commission’, 2008, page 155 (note: the discussion 
is limited to cannabis rather than the more substantive debate around all options for all 
currently illegal drugs).
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controlled drugs for the purpose of non-medical, personal consump-
tion, unless to do so would be contrary to the constitutional principles 
and basic concepts of their legal systems. 
As has already been alluded to, if the constitutional courts in a signa-
tory nation determined and ruled prohibition of a single drug, group of, 
or even all drugs, was contrary to their constitutional principles then 
the party would effectively be no longer bound by the limitations of 
the Conventions with respect to those drugs. An active debate already 
exists with regard to the possibilities of challenging drug prohibition 
on the grounds of human rights violations, that might allow some way 
to exploit this constitutional principles ‘loophole’. 
Once again, pursuing this course of action would incur the wrath of the 
prohibitionist block and their strategic/ideological allies in drug control 
thinking, and not be without political consequences. But similarly a 
group of reform oriented nations acting together could find strength in 
numbers to withstand any ensuing pressure. Such a defection would, as 
Bewley-Taylor describes it, ‘severely weaken the treaty system and possibly 
act as a trigger for regime change’. 
Two further technical possibilities exist. One would be if a new treaty 
were drafted and adopted on the same subject, superseding the previous 
treaties and those bound by them. A second would be if, for example, 
something such as the right of indigenous people to sovereignty over 
natural resources were to become recognised as jus cogens (i.e. a peremp-
tory norm of international law), then anything in conflict with it would 
become null and void. Both of these possibilities are constrained by the 
political impediments outlined above. 
Disregarding the treaties 
Parties could simply ignore all or part of the treaties. If multiple states 
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engaged in such a strategy, the treaties would 
eventually ‘wither on the vine’, falling into disuse 
without any specific termination or reform. An 
individual country disregarding the treaties, 
or applying them only partially, could in this 
way institute any policies deemed to be neces-
sary at the national level, including arguably 
the most likely example: the actual legalisation 
of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic 
producers (as the Netherlands and Switzerland have been debating at 
the parliamentary level for some years, and which is now on the polit-
ical agenda in a number of US states). 
Such a move however, like all the other possible reforms discussed 
here, raises serious issues that go beyond the realm of drug 
control—particularly if taken unilaterally. The possibility of nations 
unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten, 
or be perceived to threaten, the stability of the entire treaty system. The 
cost of such a threat and the benefits derived from the wider UN treaty 
system would make states wary of opting out, even on a limited reform 
such as cannabis production. 
As determined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 
article 62, all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental 
change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing. This could 
be argued with regard to the fundamental change in the nature and scope 
of the international drug phenomenon that has taken place since 1961, 
meaning this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could potentially be applied to 
the drug treaties. 
But, yet again, the selective application of such a principle would 
potentially call into question the wider validity of the many and varied 
conventions. The cost benefit analysis for any individual state would 
136 Opening speech at the IHRA conference May 2009, Bangkok, Thailand.
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‘I say drug use cannot be 
criminalised. I’m talking about 
criminalising trafficking but not 
users. From a scientific perspective, 
I cannot understand the repressive 
policy perspective.’
Michele Kazatchkine, Head of the Global 
Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria136
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presumably prevent action. This has not, 
however, prevented the US from acting in 
such a way with regards to its withdrawal 
from the Kyoto treaty (never ratified), its 
repudiation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty (on the grounds that it was 
a ‘relic’ of the cold war no longer relevant 
to the modern world), and the recent 
decision to un-sign itself from the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
All of these actions can be seen as not only undermining the trea-
ties themselves, but additionally threatening the wider treaty system. 
Indeed, the US has begun to slowly move away from some of the 
Bush-era decisions, as the political ramifications of those decisions have 
become apparent. By Bewley-Taylor’s analysis: 
In facilitating this unprecedented move the administration of George 
W. Bush seems to have asserted that the US is also no longer bound 
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Under the 1969 
Convention, a country that has signed a treaty cannot act to defeat 
the purpose of that treaty, even if it does not intend to ratify it. Thus, 
having set this precedent on the basis of national interest, Washington 
will surely find itself in an awkward position vis-à-vis its opposition to 
any defection from the drug control treaties on similar grounds. 
Pragmaticandpracticalwaysforward
Given the near impossibility for substantial or meaningful reform to 
be achieved by unilateral action, using the established administrative 
routes outlined in the various articles of the drug treaties and related UN 
legal structures, the most credible and likely way that the current treaty 
restrictions on exploring legal regulatory models for certain substances 
‘I look to Asian Governments to amend 
outdated laws criminalizing the most 
vulnerable sections of society, and take all the 
measures needed to ensure they live in dignity. 
‘We need to review legislation that risks 
hampering universal access—in cases  
where vulnerable groups are criminalized  
for their lifestyles”
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon137
137 Comments by the UN Secretary-General in relation to the report by the Independent 
Commission on AIDS in Asia (established by UNAIDS) is entitled ‘Redefining AIDS in 
Asia: Crafting an Effective Response’, March 2008. 
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will be loosened is clearly through some form of collective action, by a 
coalition of reform minded states. This coalition would likely consist 
predominantly of an EU bloc (presumably minus Sweden), a South and 
Central American bloc, possibly along with New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, and various others. 
This group of countries is already, through the widespread adoption 
of pragmatic harm reduction and tolerance policies, increasingly 
moving away from both the spirit and letter of certain crucial 
prohibitive aspects of the conventions as they stand. If these trends 
continue, as seems inevitable, a crisis point will be reached where 
the tensions between treaty commitments and actual policy imple-
mentation will mean a more substantial recasting of the conventions 
would be required for the overall system of drug controls to be 
preserved, including the valued and unquestioned benefits of the 
system for controlling licit pharmaceuticals. 
Arguably this crisis point has already 
been reached or is fast approaching, as 
the tensions over the political declaration 
wording at the 2009 CND (specifically the 
inclusion of any mention of ‘harm reduc-
tion’) demonstrated; key elements of the 
consensus behind the international drug 
control system as it stands are already 
beginning to crumble. 
Asteppedapproach
Whilst the current system may be increas-
ingly unstable and fragile as the tensions 
between the different camps grow, there is 
no prospect of it changing overnight. Any 
‘[It was] increasingly difficult to justify the 
continued distinction among substances 
solely according to their legal status and 
social acceptability. Insofar as nicotine-
addiction, alcoholism, and the abuse of 
solvents and inhalants may represent 
greater threats to health than the abuse 
of some substances presently under 
international control, pragmatism would 
lead to the conclusion that pursuing 
disparate strategies to minimize their 
impact is ultimately artificial, irrational 
and uneconomical.’
Executive Director of the United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme at the 
Thirty-seventh Session of the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs, Vienna 13 April 1994. 
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actual reform process will undoubtedly follow a protracted and diffi-
cult debate, and will be fraught with diplomatic wrangling—there is 
a need for realism about these hurdles. However, as the quotes in this 
appendix demonstrate, key figures and institutions in the UN system 
freely acknowledge the inappropriateness of criminalising drug users, 
the systemic failure and futility of supply side drug controls and 
interdiction, the dramatic negative unintended consequences of inter-
national supply side interdiction and enforcement efforts, and that 
the conventions are outdated and not fit for purpose. At the same time 
they now acknowledge the primacy of public health in drug policy, the 
centrality of the harm reduction approach and the fact that there is a 
spirit of reform in the air. In this context the possibilities for mean-
ingful reform and evolution of the UN drug control system begin to 
look more hopeful. 
Key steps towards reform will include: 
* Moves must be made to establish meaningful international data 
collection. In particular, indicators not currently included in 
national questionnaires informing annual UN World Drug Reports 
should be added to those questionnaires. These include questions 
concerning the impact of drug control on human rights, conflict, 
crime, corruption, development and security—as well as the more 
familiar public health measures. Such data will facilitate evalu-
ation of the UN drug control initiatives and global prohibition, 
significantly including their unintended consequences identi-
fied by the UNODC.138 It will support a more effective critique of 
current successes and failings, which will help inform and guide 
more serious discussion of alternative approaches. 
* System coherence issues within the UN family should be 
addressed—in particular regarding how the UN’s international 
drug control infrastructure, and its enforcement, impact on 
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UNODC, 2008.
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human rights, human development and human security: the three 
pillars of the UN. Addressing the most extreme manifestations of 
the drug war would be the natural first step, but there is an urgent 
need for the UN drug agencies to operate within the UN principles 
and norms from which they have been historically isolated. 
* Fully investigating conflicts between human rights law and the 
drug conventions and applying concurrent human rights obliga-
tions to all drug control activities.139
* A progressive shift towards a greater role for other UN agencies 
including the WHO and UNAIDS. This would echo the trend 
in drug policy generally away from a criminal justice focus to a 
more public health focus (including the location of the drug brief 
in domestic government, for example Spain, moving from Home 
Affairs to Health). This would promote a more pragmatic and 
evidence-based discourse. 
139 For more detailed discussion see: D. Barrett, M. Novak, ‘The United Nations and Drug 
Policy, Towards a human rights based approach’ (in: ‘The diversity of international law: Essays 
in honour of Kalliopi K Koufa’), 2009.
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‘In line with various United Nations instruments, legislative and policy reforms necessary 
to meet the objective above should be pursued in areas including: 
> Criminal laws and penalties, with the objective of reducing the criminalization of 
non-violent drug offences and significantly reducing the use of incarceration for 
non-violent drug users.
> Drug control laws and penalties, with the objective of ensuring that these laws and their 
interpretation and enforcement are complementary to HIV/AIDS strategies and do not 
hinder HIV/AIDS prevention or access to HIV/AIDS treatment.
> Sentencing laws and practices, with the objective of developing alternatives to prison 
and non-custodial diversions for people convicted of offences related to drug use so 
as to significantly reduce the number of drug users sent to prison, the overall prison 
population, and levels of prison overcrowding. 
‘HIV/AIDS Prevention, Care, Treatment and Support in Prison Settings; A Framework for an Effective National 
Response’, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, co-published with the World Health Organization and the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
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* A single heavy-weight country ‘taking the plunge’, making its 
position known and putting more substantive treaty system 
reform on the CND agenda, whilst simultaneously exercising 
leadership in building a coalition of reform states. The group 
of twenty six states that emerged during the 2009 High Level 
Segment (objecting to the absence of any reference to harm 
reduction in the CND’s political declaration) could potentially 
form the core of a ‘G-26’ treaty reform caucus. 
* The NGO community (a growing coalition of human rights, 
drugs, public health, and development NGOs backed up with 
a growing number of academic bodies, think tanks and profes-
sional bodies) leading on the development of a new public 
health and human rights discourse in international drug policy 
at UN level. It would move beyond the polarised legalisation/
prohibition debates of the past, instead talking about shared 
principles and aims, exploring options and potential outcomes, 
critiquing the failings of the drugs war and explaining in  
clear practical terms how phased moves towards regulation 
could bring benefits to individual countries and to the wider 
global community. 
* Serious high level discussion about how the coalition of reform 
states would redraw the convention system to preserve its benefi-
cial elements, whilst introducing the flexibility for individual or 
groups of states to explore options for legally regulated production 
and supply of certain currently prohibited drugs. Such a discus-
sion could be facilitated by the NGO community in conjunction 
with leading reform states. 
* Possible first steps towards more substantive reform are likely to 
be linked to plant based drugs—cannabis and coca, particularly 
traditional use. 
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Appendix	2	
Currentlegalproductionframeworksforopium,
coca,cannabisandpharmaceuticals
The regulated production of psychoactive drugs requires less attention 
than supply issues. There are already a large range of models in place 
for regulated production of plant and or pharmaceutical based drugs, 
from which lessons can be learned. In many cases, given that the same 
drugs are being considered, production for non-medical use will merely 
require expansion of existing frameworks. The following consider-
ation of existing legal and regulated production of opium/heroin, coca/
cocaine, and cannabis will help demonstrate how this could happen. 
Legal production of opium 
A significant proportion, almost half,140 of global opium production 
is legally produced for processing into opiate based medicines. Any 
country can cultivate, produce and trade in licit opium, under the 
140 Licit opium production accounted for more than half of global opium production until 
the recent bumper harvests in Afghanistan.
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auspices of the UN Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs of 1961 and 
under the supervision and guidance of the INCB. As of 2001 there were 
eighteen countries that do; of these, four, (China, Korea, India and Japan) 
cultivate opium poppy for the production of raw opium, although only 
India exports it. A further fourteen, including the UK, cultivate it for the 
production of Concentrate of Poppy Straw (CPS), poppy straw, poppy 
seeds, and alkaloids such as morphine and thebaine. Australia, France, 
India, Spain and Turkey are the five main exporters of opiates. 
Most of these countries use the CPS method whereby the whole plant 
is cut down—using a combine harvester—after the poppy heads have 
dried. Once harvested and collected, the pods and stalks are then sent to 
a factory to be chemically ‘washed’. This process produces CPS which has 
a higher percentage of active drug content than the more familiar opium 
gum (also known as opium latex) that is collected by hand, scraped from 
the growing poppy heads. India is the exception to this rule: it is the only 
sanctioned exporter of opium gum. Whilst not without problems, this 
range of scenarios demonstrates that opium production is possible in a 
range of different environments. 
Iran and some Central Asian republics utilise confiscated illicit opium 
for their domestic medical markets. Mansfield notes that: 
Whilst previously, these countries had been satisfied with using seized 
opium for their domestic opiate needs, in recent years they have sought 
to sell seized opiates, or products derived from them internationally. 
This has caused some concerns amongst ‘traditional’ producers, such 
as India and Turkey, as well as the INCB.141
Diversion to illicit market 
The levels of leakage into the illicit market vary greatly from country 
to country. There is very little substantiated data concerning this issue; 
141 D. Mansfield, ‘An Analysis of Licit Opium Poppy Cultivation: India and Turkey’,  
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2001.
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however some estimates have been produced for India and Turkey, the 
focus of concerns as the two producing countries which ‘converted’ 
from illicit/traditional production to legal regulated production for 
medical use. 
india
India comes out relatively badly in these estimates due in part to its production method; 
hand produced opium gum being intrinsically easier to divert into the illicit markets 
than industrial production of CPS, and in part due to the prevalence of corruption, in 
turn fuelled by poverty (India being the least developed of the main opium producing 
countries). Precautions are made to prevent diversions: the Central Bureau of Narcotics 
(CBN) sets a minimum qualifying yield (MQY) which specifies the number of kilos of 
opium produced per hectare, and sets a fixed price per kilo. Satellite imagery is issued 
to estimate the area farmed for licit poppies, and this is compared with exact field 
measurements taken by CBN officials; since 2007 ‘smart cards’ (microchipped identity 
cards) have been issued to cultivators with personal details of the cultivator and the 
licensed area; the CBN is also experimenting with CCTV cameras to monitor the 
collection and weighing of the opium.142
The government of India estimates that 10% of total production is diverted into the illicit 
market, although this is likely to be an underestimate. 
turkey
Unlike India, Turkey is a producer of CPS, which involves large scale industrial plants 
and materials, making diversion generally more difficult and less likely. The US State 
Department claims that there is ‘no appreciable illicit drug cultivation in Turkey other than 
cannabis grown primarily for domestic consumption.’ They go on to state that ‘The Turkish 
Grain Board (TMO) strictly controls licit opium poppy cultivation quite successfully, with no 
apparent diversion into the illicit market’.143 The UNODC says that since ‘1974 until now 
[2003], no seizures of opium derived from Turkish poppies have been reported either in the 
country or abroad.’ 144
142 US Department of State, ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2008’.
143 US Department of State, ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2008’.
144 UNODC Turkey Programme: www.unodc.org/pdf/turkey_programme.pdf.
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Production quotas and meeting demand 
There are strict controls on the volume of poppy grown in each country 
annually. Country quotas are set using official estimates of interna-
tional demand using figures from the past two years’ consumption. 
Whilst India, Turkey, Australia, Spain, and the UK are allowed to 
grow poppy for the production and export of opiates for pain relief, 
other countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Slovakia 
and Macedonia, for example, are sanctioned to produce opium for 
their own use. The Senlis Council has stressed that, ‘...in 2002, 77% of 
the world's morphine was consumed by seven rich countries: [the] US, the UK, 
Italy, Australia, France, Spain and Japan’. However, according to official 
figures, ‘even in these countries only 24% of moderate to severe pain-relief 
need was being met’.145 There is a real issue here regarding the access of 
pain relief by developing world countries that do not have a licence to 
grow poppies. 
International legal framework 
The international licensing control system seeks to permit and regulate 
legitimate production and use, while at the same time prevent diversion 
to the illicit market for non-medical use. National governments deal with 
the licensing and inspection of cultivation, production, manufacture 
and trade (including import and export) in the controlled substances 
whilst being monitored by the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), which is responsible for ensuring a balance between legitimate 
production and legitimate requirements. 
National governments must provide estimates of requirements for 
opiates to the INCB for confirmation on an annual basis and they 
must not exceed these estimates without good reason and the prior 
knowledge and acceptance of the INCB. The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) manages the day-to-day monitoring 
145 Quoted in Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, ‘Licensing Afghanistan's opium: Solution or fallacy?’, 
Asia Times Online, Feb. 1, 2006.
1
Introduction
2
Five models for regulating drug supply
3
The practical detail of regulation
 197
of the situation in each country. The INCB has no actual enforce-
ment powers or punitive sanctions for violations of agreed systems 
beyond diplomatic pressure and a process of ‘naming and shaming’ in 
its annual reports. 
Domestic legal framework arrangements 
Each of the countries that grows opium poppies for export has its own set of 
legal frameworks in order to prevent diversion into the illicit market. Whilst 
some are more effective than others, the only significant observations to 
come out of reviews of such arrangements are that CPS is considerably less 
likely to find its way into the criminal market than raw opium. 
United Kingdom 
Farmers do not need a licence for poppy growing; however, the police 
must be informed of the location. The Home Office confirms this:
Although we do not licence growers, we do issue them with a letter 
confirming that we are aware that growing is taking place at their farm 
and detailing the locations. We advise each grower to produce a copy 
of this letter to their local police station in order that they may be aware 
of what is taking place.
Anyone can grow opium poppies because the process itself is not 
controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, but any processing of the 
plant to extract the opiates is controlled and can only be carried out 
under licence.146 The poppies are grown and then the pharmaceutical 
company Macfarlan Smith, who have a monopoly licence to process 
opium poppy in the UK, harvest and transport the poppy heads to their 
factory for processing. The UK government provides estimates of its 
opiate needs to the INCB for confirmation on an annual basis and must 
alert the INCB if there is any change to these requirements.147
146 ‘Hampshire—the opium poppy capital of the UK’, thisiswiltshire.co.uk, 25th February, 2008.
147 UK government’s response to the UK Office of Fair Trading review of undertakings by 
Macfarlan Smith Limited, Department of Trade and Industry ruling, Sept. 2006, clause 7.
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Tasmania
Licences to grow opium poppies are issued to farmers only after they 
have been contracted (by one of the licensed companies) to grow and 
distribute the crop to a licensed manufacturer.148 Farmers must also 
have obtained a security clearance from Tasmania Police and provided 
a detailed plan of the cultivation site. Australia's four-pronged approach 
to security encompasses industry, government and the rural community, 
and includes: Property assessments by the Poppy Advisory and Control 
Board (PACB) field officers along with grower background checks by 
Tasmania Police at time of licensing; general surveillance and reporting 
by growers, harvest operators and company field officers, of suspi-
cious activity; investigation of thefts, apprehension and prosecution of 
offenders and intelligence by a special Tasmania Police Drug Bureau 
Task Force; and co-ordination of security efforts by the PACB.149
India
Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) grants licences to eligible farmers in 
three states—Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Licences 
are issued annually for a crop year which commences from 1st October 
and ends on 30th September of the following year. CBN issues licences 
to eligible cultivators for licit cultivation in these notified tracts in 
October every year. The cultivators are required to tender their entire 
produce to the government. For this purpose, the central government 
announces a Minimum Qualifying Yield of a certain number of kilos of 
opium per hectare.150
Turkey
The Turkish Grain Board (TMO) allocates licences to farmers once the 
148 Poppy and Advisory Control Board (part of the Tasmanian Ministry of Justice) website—
‘becoming a grower’.
149 Poppy and Advisory Control Board (part of the Tasmanian Ministry of Justice) website—
‘security issues’.
150 India Central Bureau of Narcotics website—www.cbn.nic.in/html/operationscbn.htm.
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government has established how much land should be given over to 
poppy production, and in which provinces and districts it should be 
grown. The average area cultivated per licensee is about 0.4 hectares, 
compared to 0.2 hectares in India and about 100 hectares in Australia. 
In 2001 there were only five provinces in which opium poppies were 
licitly grown compared to 13 in 1933; the limit was reduced in order to 
manage the scale of production. The local district office of the TMO 
monitors the poppy grown in each area to prevent diversion into the 
illicit market.151
Discussion
Expanded production of opium and derived products under the existing 
framework is clearly both feasible and non-problematic. Even with the 
economic pressures from illicit demand as they currently exist, the 
legal production and transit of both raw opium and processed opiate 
pharmaceutical products currently takes place on a large scale without 
significant security or diversion issues. 
It is likely that the expansion of legally regulated opiate use would 
initially take place within existing medical prescription models—in-
deed this process is already underway, albeit slowly. More significant 
shifts from illicit to licit production (be it via more substantial expan-
sion of prescribing models, or some other appropriate form of licensed 
sales, see: page 25) would take place incrementally over a number of 
years allowing for a manageable transition period during which the 
relevant regulatory and enforcement infrastructure could be developed 
or expanded, with any emerging challenges responded to. 
As this phased process continues demand for illicit products will 
correspondingly diminish, and with it the economic incentives for 
diversion or illicit production to occur. This raises potentially signifi-
cant development issues for Afghanistan which currently produces an 
151 D. Mansfield, ‘An Analysis of Licit Opium Poppy Cultivation: India and Turkey’, UK Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 2001, page 13.
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estimated 93% of the world’s illicit opium, 
contributing over half of its GDP.152
Legalcocacultivation/cocaine
production
Both the coca leaf and its active drug 
content cocaine are subject to strict 
controls under the 1961 UN Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, in a similar fashion to opium and 
opium-based pharmaceuticals.153 Legal production of both does take 
place but, compared to the legal production of opium, it is on a much 
smaller scale and there is much less publicly available information—
indeed the whole process is somewhat shrouded in secrecy. 
Various low potency coca products, including traditional use of the coca 
leaf and coca tea, and various other coca preparations including foods 
and traditional medicines, exist in a legal grey area which remains 
the subject of ongoing wrangling between the UN drug agencies and 
Bolivia and Peru. 
Cocaleavesasaflavouringagent
The 1961 Convention specifically allows for de-cocainised coca leaves to 
be used as a flavouring agent.154 The main customer for this flavouring 
is the eponymous Coca-Cola company, who remain notoriously secre-
tive about their ingredients but do concede that ‘de-cocainised flavour 
essence in the coca leaves' is used. In the case of Coca-Cola, coca leaves are 
purchased from South American suppliers by the American conglom-
erate, Stepan Chemicals Company. In the 1990s they were importing and 
processing 175 tonnes of coca leaf a year into the US, the only company 
152 ‘In Afghanistan, the total export value of opium and heroin being trafficked to 
neighbouring countries in 2007 is $US 4 billion, an increase of 29% over 2006. That 
means that opium now accounts for more than half (53%) of the country’s licit GDP.’ 
UNODC, ‘Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2007’, October 2007, page iii.
153 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), Articles 23.2.d and 26. 
154 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), Article 27.2.5.
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with a Federal licence to do so (issued by the US Drug Enforcement 
Agency). Separation of the cocaine and flavouring involves a fairly elab-
orate process in which the leaf is ‘ground up, mixed with sawdust, soaked 
in bicarbonate of soda, percolated with toluene, steam blasted, mixed with 
powdered Kola nuts, and then pasteurized’.155 The de-cocainised product is 
then shipped to the Coca-Cola company. The volume and destination 
of the cocaine produced for medical use (at least one tonne of which 
would be generated from the 175 tonnes of leaf) remaining mysterious, 
but presumably also administered by the DEA. 
A number of smaller product brands also use coca flavouring, many 
(unlike Coca-Cola) specifically building their marketing around the 
coca leaf being an ingredient,156 despite their drinks having no active 
coca-derived content. These include Red Bull Cola (in the UK), Kdrink, 
Kokkawine, and Agwa (a coca leaf liqueur).157 Red Bull Cola state that 
they source their de-cocainised coca flavourings from Bolivia, Peru and 
Colombia, and also confirm that the cocaine that is removed from the 
leaves is passed to relevant pharmaceutical companies for ‘medical use’, 
and that the various stages of processing are monitored by the health 
agencies in the relevant countries and authorised by UN agencies.158
Cocaine-basedpharmaceuticals
There is relatively little information in the public domain about the 
production and use of pharmaceutical cocaine for medical use. No 
figures are available regarding the balance of global production (from 
the de-cocainised leaf based flavourings process), or demand, or whether 
there is any leakage into the illicit market at any point during the coca/
cocaine production process. 
In practice, cocaine now has relatively few mainstream medical 
155 ‘The Legal Importation of Coca Leaf ’, University of Illinois, Class module 9.3, 1999.
156 Unlike Coca-Cola, who would probably do without the ingredient had its inclusion not 
had trade descriptions implications at the turn of the last century. Pepsi and most other 
cola brands notably do not include coca.
157 www.redbullcola.com; www.kdrink.com; www.kokkawine.com; www.agwabuzz.com.
158 Transform correspondence with Red Bull, December 2008.
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applications.159 Its former role in anaesthesia has been progressively 
displaced by newer, more effective synthetically derived alternatives 
including Novocaine, Lidocaine and Xylocaine. It does however remain 
as a licensed medicine in many countries including the US, where 
it is Schedule II (high risk, some medical use, heavily restricted), and 
in the UK where it can also theoretically be prescribed to dependent 
users160 under the same system as more familiar maintenance heroin 
prescribing models. 
Under the 1961 Single Convention, countries that legally produce coca and 
cocaine are expected to have established an agency to control and oversee 
the cultivation of coca and production of cocaine. Peru has established 
such an agency, although whether it functions in the way the conventions 
intended is moot—the Empresa Nacional de la Coca (ENACO)161 oper-
ates as a state authorised monopoly exporting coca leaves to the US but 
also produces and promotes a range of coca products including coca tea 
(mate de coca). Peru also manufactures a small amount of raw cocaine to 
be exported to other countries for the production of medical cocaine.162 
Bolivia similarly also has a national agency to monitor coca production 
and trade—Bolivian National Direction of Coca Leaf Control (DIGECO). 
Cocatea,cocaleafandothercocaproducts
The production, export and distribution of coca tea (mate de coca), and 
coca leaf are viewed by the INCB as illegal under the 1961 Convention, a 
view forcefully re-emphasised in their 2007 Annual Report163 (published 
March 2008). This statement understandably caused outrage in Bolivia 
and Peru where coca leaf chewing is a long established tradition amongst 
159 The use of various coca preparations in South America as a traditional medicine in 
various forms remains widespread.
160 There are, however, few, if any, documented current examples of such prescribing.
161 ENACO website: www.enaco.com.pe.
162 Communication between Transform and the INCB, March 2008.
163 ‘The Board again calls on the Governments of Bolivia and Peru to consider amending their 
national legislation so as to abolish or prohibit activities that are contrary to the 1961 
Convention, such as coca leaf chewing and the manufacture of mate de coca (coca tea) and other 
products containing coca alkaloids for domestic use and export’. INCB Annual Report 2007  
(published March 2008), page 37.
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indigenous groups, and mate de coca is consumed widely across all 
social and economic groups—as freely available as coffee and (conven-
tional) tea. The traditional use of coca leaf has increasingly become a 
political flashpoint in the international arena, as such long established 
cultural and traditional indigenous practices have collided with the 
prerogatives of Western governments determined to stamp out the 
source of illicit cocaine production that exists in parallel with sources 
for traditional use. 
The historic argument made at UN level for the prohibition of 
traditional use is essentially that coca is deemed to be an addictive 
substance; a view traceable back to the World Health Organization 
Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, which reported in 1952 and 
1954, concluding that coca chewing must be considered as some form 
of cocaine addiction.164 However, a more recent WHO/United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) study 
on cocaine use globally found that, ‘use of coca leaves appears to have no 
negative health effects and has positive therapeutic, sacred and social func-
tions for indigenous Andean populations.’ 
This exhaustive four year study completed in 1995 was the most 
comprehensive and in depth study of global coca and cocaine use 
ever undertaken; it collected data from 22 cities in 19 countries on five 
continents, analysing coca and cocaine use and its impacts upon commu-
nities. In March 1995 WHO/UNICRI announced in a press release that 
the publication would shortly be forthcoming and summarised some of 
the key findings. Shortly after this announcement the US representa-
tive at the World Health Assembly queried the data and threatened that 
the US would withdraw its funding to the WHO if they did not disas-
sociate themselves from the report. To date, this report has never been 
officially published although the relevant sections have subsequently 
been leaked and made available online.165 
164 WHO Technical Report Series 57, March 1952, section 62, page 10, and No. 76, March 1954, 
Section 6, page 10. 
165  WHO/UNICRI, ‘The Cocaine Project’ report, 1995, page 16 (for the full document see: 
www.tdpf.org.uk/WHOleaked.pdf).
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The 1961 UN Convention, to which Peru and Bolivia are signatories, 
says traditional use of coca should be eliminated within 25 years. As 
the convention came into force in 1964, that deadline passed in 1989. 
Confusingly, the traditional use of coca was ambiguously addressed 
in the 1988 Convention, which states that, ‘the measures adopted shall 
respect fundamental human rights and shall take due account of traditional 
use…’,166 and additional concerns have been raised that such prohibi-
tions would violate protections of indigenous cultures enshrined in the 
UN’s Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention of 1957. The INCB 
is somewhat isolated in its rigid view of the 1961 Convention; in April 
2008 the European Parliament called for the ‘safe use’ of some coca-
based products (coca tea, etc.) to be explored.167 
Currently four countries (Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Colombia) main-
tain legislation permitting some form of protection of traditional use, to 
different extents. Bolivia and Peru allow the growing of the leaves for 
this use, limiting this to a certain amount of hectares. Argentina allows 
people to carry leaves for traditional chewing, as does Colombia and 
Chile for their indigenous peoples. 
Significant problems exist for the legal and quasi-legal markets in coca-
based products in that they struggle to compete with the illegal coca 
production that supplies the illegal cocaine trade. ENACO said that in 
2006 it paid its farmers 1.4 US dollars per kilo of coca leaf, whilst the 
price on the illicit market is 4 dollars.168 Interestingly, a shadow market 
has emerged that pays farmers even higher prices for the coca leaf than 
cocaine producers; this coca—a gourmet market for the highest quality 
coca—is used not for cocaine but for the production of traditional use, 
and bypasses ENACO altogether. 
The government of Bolivia is currently led by a former coca grower, Evo 
Morales, and is actively encouraging the production of traditional coca-
166 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988), Article 14, clause 2.
167 ‘The role of civil society in drugs policy in the European Union’, Section 39, 2008.
168 Lasso, ‘South America: The business of Legal Coca’, 2006.
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based products such as tea, flour and even toothpaste. In 2006, Morales 
called for the criminalisation of the coca leaf to end at the UN General 
Assembly, repeating his call at the 2009 Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
in a speech that ended with him eating a coca leaf on the podium. In July 
2009 the Bolivian proposal to amend the 1961 Convention and remove coca 
leaf chewing was officially accepted for consideration by ECOSOC.169
Discussion
Legal coca production for use in its raw leaf form, lightly processed 
products, or pharmaceutical cocaine does not present any significant 
problems in and of itself. Low potency coca products (leaf and tea) do 
not require any more controls than equivalent products such as coffee, 
whilst the processing of coca into pharmaceutical cocaine would take 
place at an industrial level for which any security and product regulation 
issues would operate within well established models. The key problems 
in any such system are the ones already seen in coca producing regions: 
the potentially destabilising economic tensions and pressures created 
by any remaining parallel illicit market. 
Regulating legal production of coca leaf in line with the established 
fair trade guidelines—price guarantees along with a range other social 
and environmental protections (for growers of coffee, cocoa, sugar, 
etc.) would go some way to ameliorating these problems. Furthermore, 
in a similar fashion to opium and cannabis, such problems would 
progressively diminish with the shrinking demand for illicit supply, 
as the global market shifted towards legal regulation of production and 
supply. Specific trade and development issues might arise during this 
transition period, including the potential for the UN drug agencies to 
license production of coca to a limited number of countries (for example 
limiting it to Andean nations), or for individual states to begin to culti-
vate coca for their domestic markets (see: 4.5 Broader social, political and 
economic impacts, page 84).
169 Detailed analysis available from the Transnational Institute website  
www.ungassondrugs.org.
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Legalcannabisproduction
When considering how cannabis production should be regulated in the 
future, we have a significant body of past experience to draw on. These 
include legal regulation of cannabis production for a range of purposes 
(primarily for various medical uses and preparations, but also, to a 
lesser extent regulation of industrial hemp production and some sacra-
mental/religious uses) in a number of different countries over a number 
of decades. The challenges and issues raised by these existing models 
provide a clear indication of how licensed models for cannabis produc-
tion for non-medical use can evolve as and when the political and 
legislative environment allows it. 
Cannabis holds a unique place within contemporary drug culture 
and politics, being the most widely used illegal drug globally by an 
enormous margin,170 as well as being a plant based drug171 that can 
be consumed in its raw herbal form without requiring the significant 
levels of processing associated with, for example, heroin or cocaine. 
Regulatory control issues are also complicated by the fact that the plant 
itself is uncommonly simple to cultivate in a wide range of environ-
mental conditions. The combination of these factors with the enormous 
and growing demand for the drug (expanding steadily in the West over 
the past four decades but now showing signs of having flattened off or 
even falling172) means that regulation of cannabis production, supply, 
and use has presented an impossible challenge from the perspective 
of prohibition’s enforcers; illicit production, supply and availability 
having more than kept pace with demand. 
Quite aside from the insurmountable and evidently never ending 
enforcement nightmare this presents (the most recent figures avail-
able are from 2003 when it was estimated that the illicit retail cannabis 
170 The UNODC estimates that about 160 million people use cannabis annually—3.8% of the 
global population aged between 15 and 64. ‘UNODC Annual Report 2008’, page 10.
171 It contains a number of active substances, the two key ones being THC and CBD. 
172 ‘The production and consumption of cannabis levelled off for the first time in the last decade’—
‘UNODC Annual Report 2008’, page 10.
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market was worth about $113 billion173) the almost total lack of market 
regulation means that large scale production is not only in the hands 
of unlicensed growers, untaxed and unmonitored for environmental 
impacts, but the product itself is not subject to any controls, so strength/
potency174 cannot be gauged or controlled and there is no ability for the 
relevant agencies to intervene on problems with quality controls such 
as contamination.175
Legalcannabisproductionformedicaluse
The most useful contemporary model for production of cannabis is for 
its medical uses, in both processed and herbal form. 
Processed medical cannabis-based products 
The UK based company GW Pharmaceuticals produces a product— 
Sativex—which is the world’s first pharmaceutical prescription medical 
product (standardised in composition, formulation and dose) derived 
from the cannabis plant. It differs from some similar synthetic prod-
ucts (see below) in that it is derived directly from the botanical source, 
and contains two active ingredients from the cannabis plant, THC and 
CBD (there are a range of different formulations). The cultivation of 
the cannabis plant used to make this product operates under a special 
licence granted by the UK Home Office (as permitted under section 7 
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971). These licences allow the company to 
research and develop cannabinoid prescription medications such as 
Sativex. According to GW Pharmaceuticals the cannabis plants are 
grown under ‘computer-controlled conditions in secure glasshouses’ which 
allow ‘Strict Standard Operating Procedures’ to be followed ‘to ensure 
non-contamination by chemicals, infestation or fungal growth, consistency of 
173  ‘UNODC World Drug Report 2005’, page 127.
174 Including relative potency of THC and CBD, that can influence the prevalence of some of the 
negative side effects of cannabis intoxication including psychotic symptoms/episodes.
175 There have been a number of examples of cannabis being contaminated with various 
substances.  A 2007 case documented street cannabis being bulked up (by weight) with lead 
particulates leading to a significant number of serious lead poisonings, in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, ‘Lead Poisoning Due to Adulterated Marijuana’, April 10, 2008.
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content, methods of harvest, drying, primary extraction, storage and onward 
consignment’. The farming takes place at a secret location in the South 
of England. 
It is interesting to note that there are currently two other prescription 
drugs based on compounds found in the cannabis plant. The first is 
dronabinol (marketed as Marinol) that contains the main active drug 
component of cannabis: tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), but which is 
produced entirely synthetically. In 1986 in the US, Marinol was moved 
from Schedule 1 (no therapeutic uses—the schedule in which cannabis/
marijuana remains) to Schedule 2, allowing it to be prescribed in oil 
based gel-cap form, albeit under very strict conditions. In 1991 the UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs similarly moved THC and its stereoiso-
mers (chemical variants) from the UN Schedule I (no therapeutic value) 
to Schedule 2 (of limited therapeutic value), freeing Marinol from the 
very tight restrictions imposed by Article 7 of the 1971 UN Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances. In the US during 1999 Marinol was then 
moved again into US Schedule 3.176 Three years later, at its 33rd meeting 
in 2002, the World Health Organization’s Expert Committee on Drug 
Dependence recommended transferring THC to UN Schedule IV of the 
1971 Convention (the least tightly-controlled schedule), citing its medical 
uses and low abuse potential. The expert committee then reconsid-
ered this recommendation in 2006 177 recommending a move only to 
UN Schedule 3. They notably found that ‘Dronabinol is the main active 
principle of cannabis and has similar effects on mood, perception and the 
cardiovascular system’.178
The other cannabinoid based drug is Nabilone, which is synthetically 
produced and mimics the effects of THC, apparently with reduced side 
effects, notably the euphoria associated with THC. 
176 According to a timeline produced by J. Gettman—this move was ‘in response to a petition 
filed by the manufacturer on February 3, 1995’: www.drugscience.org/lib/bib_tl.html.
177  ‘WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence. Thirty fourth report’, page 10 (2.1.1).
178 There have been some high level discussions in some countries about attempting to 
reschedule cannabis from its current UN Schedule 1, notably parliamentary debates 
in the Netherlands in early 2008 around addressing the ambiguous legal status of the 
countries cannabis policy. Such a move has yet to be seriously discussed at the UN level 
in the Commission for Narcotic Drugs. 
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Unprocessed or herbal form medical cannabis products 
The use of herbal cannabis for a range of medical uses is well established 
and has substantial backing from a broad spectrum of the scientific and 
medical community.179 It remains controversial in the medical world 
because, unlike almost all other licensed drugs, it is consumed in its raw 
herbal form (seen as a ‘messy’ cocktail of active substances), because it is 
frequently smoked (although it can be used with a vaporiser or eaten in 
variety of preparations), and because it has not been through the stan-
dardised rigours of other potential prescription drugs. 
There are also ethical issues around potential side effects, not least plea-
surable ones, and concerns about diversion to non-medical use. None 
the less, provision of medical herbal cannabis does exist in various 
forms and provides some useful indications for how potential non-med-
ical production models may operate in the future. 
US legal production 
In the American political arena, medical cannabis production, supply 
and use is arguably more controversial (than, for example, use of 
St. John’s Wort as an anti-depressant, that lacks any parallel non-med-
ical/recreational uses), as the issue has become inexorably entwined 
with the wider political and cultural discourse about non-medical 
cannabis use and legislation. None the less, the widely reported effi-
cacy of herbal cannabis relative to standard prescribed drugs for a large 
number of individuals with chronic illnesses, who do not fit the bill as 
stereotyped drug users, has forced the issue. Thirteen states now allow 
the use of medical cannabis—they are Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
There is an ongoing conflict between state and federal governments. 
179 ‘Supporting Research into the Therapeutic Role of Marijuana: A Position Paper of the American 
College of Physicians’, January 2008.
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Individual states exercising what they view as their right to allow 
medical cannabis production, supply and use, have repeatedly clashed 
with the federal government’s insistence that cannabis has no thera-
peutic value as a Schedule 1 drug under US law. As a result, there have 
been a series of unpleasant enforcement incidents, with federal police 
closing down medical production and dispensaries that were officially 
sanctioned by state governments. Bizarrely, the US federal government 
itself produces and supplies medical cannabis for users, who receive 
monthly consignments of pre-rolled joints. 
At the time of writing there are only four surviving participants in 
the Compassionate Investigational New Drug (IND) programme run 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). These patients have 
been provided with medical cannabis for between 11 and 27 years. The 
cannabis is grown at the University of Mississippi under the auspices 
of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). Material is shipped to 
the Research Triangle Institute in North Carolina where it is chopped 
and rolled on modified tobacco cigarette machines, then stored partially 
dehydrated and frozen. The joints are distributed to each of the users on 
a monthly basis. 
Legal cannabis production in Canada 
A similar scenario has played out in Canada where, in 2001, medical 
use of cannabis was legalised in restricted circumstances through the 
Canadian Department of Health’s Medical Marihuana Access Division.180 
According to their Marihuana Medical Access Regulations, individuals 
can get licences to produce their own supply of cannabis, or a licence 
can be given to another designated individual to grow on their behalf. In 
2000 Canada’s department of health, Health Canada, contracted Prairie 
Plant Systems, on behalf of the federal government, to grow cannabis in 
an underground mine at Flin Flon Manitoba for research purposes, and 
in 2003 to distribute to the expanding number of medical users in the 
180 Health Canada website:  
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/marihuana/supply-approvis/prairie_e.
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government programme.181 Health Canada notes that:182
Under the terms of the original five-year contract PPS signed with 
Health Canada, the company:
* Set up and operated a marihuana growing, processing, fabrica-
tion and storage establishment;
* Conducted laboratory testing and quality control of marihuana 
throughout the product's life cycle;
* Fabricated, packaged, labelled and stored marihuana material; 
* Conformed with the requirements of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act, including stringent security and physical 
measures; 
* Distributed marihuana to patients and researchers. 
Along with the estimated 600 users of the Prairie Plant Systems 
cannabis there are over 11,000 users of ‘compassion clubs’ in Canada.183 
These clubs act as medical cannabis dispensaries, supplying cannabis 
for therapeutic use upon a valid recommendation or confirmation of 
diagnosis from a licensed health care practitioner.184 Whilst the Senate 
Special Committee on Illegal Drugs185 and other government bodies have 
recommended that these organisations be licensed and legally recogn-
ised, currently they are operating without legal sanction. 
These groups are currently self-regulated. They set clearly defined 
standards, including demands that a variety of strains be offered 
181 Health Canada’s Medical Marihuana Access Division website:  
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/marihuana/index-eng.php. 
182 There have been concerns raised about the quality of cannabis produced at Flin Flon;  
see: ‘Open Letter of Concern for the Health and Safety of Canada's Medicinal Cannabis 
Community’, Canadians for  Safe Access.
183 Lucas, ‘Regulating compassion: an overview of Canada's federal medical cannabis policy and 
practice’, Harm Reduction Journal 2008, 5:5, page 9.
184 Capler, Lucas, ‘Guidelines for Community-Based Distribution of Medical Cannabis in Canada’, 
May 2006, page 4.
185 ‘Measures should be taken to support and encourage the development of alternative practices, 
such as the establishment of compassion clubs’—Nolin, Kenny, ‘Cannabis: our position for a 
Canadian public policy.  Report of the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs’, Summary 
Report, September 2002, page 20.
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and that cultivation must be carried out without the use of chem-
ical fertilisers—which potentially lead to contamination with heavy 
metals—pesticides or fungicides. Cultivators must also protect the 
cannabis from yeasts, moulds, mildews and fungi. The clubs under-
take their own independent testing of contaminants and potency. 
Cannabis production in the Netherlands 
Cannabis production in the Netherlands exists in an peculiarly 
ambiguous legal grey area created by the collision of the country’s 
policy of de facto decriminalisation—for personal use and licensed 
sales (through the ‘coffee shop’ system—see: page 26)—and their UN 
drug treaty commitments that enforce a strict prohibition on produc-
tion. Whilst small scale cultivation for personal use is tolerated (as 
elsewhere in Europe), larger scale production or importation for 
supplying the coffee shops is not, and has been the subject of an 
increasing enforcement effort over the last few years. In previous 
decades Dutch criminal enterprises were more closely involved in 
European and international cannabis trafficking but an enforce-
ment push in the late 1990s dismantled much of this activity and 
coincided with the expansion of domestic illicit production, both in 
the Netherlands and elsewhere. 
Domestic production of herbal cannabis now constitutes 75–80% of 
coffee shop sales, and whilst it is unregulated in terms of strength and 
contamination it is considered to be of generally good quality. There is 
no reliable data available, however, a substantial proportion of domestic 
Dutch production is still thought to be for export to neighbouring 
countries. The exported cannabis is rumoured to be of lower quality, 
and thus not acceptable in the coffee shops—it is supplied as vacuum 
sealed product more easily bulked up with non-cannabis materials. 
Most hash/resin form cannabis in the coffee shops is still imported 
from Morocco, through established illicit routes. 
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TraditionalcannabisuseinIndia
Cannabis (also known as ganja 
or bhang in India) has been used 
in India for many centuries. It is 
associated with one of the main 
Hindu gods—Shiva—and is 
also used openly during tradi-
tional annual festivals, most 
commonly the spring festival 
of Holi. Until India became a 
signatory of the 1961 UN drug 
convention, the sale of bhang 
was controlled by the govern-
ment who managed the drugs 
trade through licensed sales and the collection of taxes. Government 
bhang shops were, and in some cases still are, prevalent throughout 
large parts of India. 
Under the 1961 Single Convention they, like many other countries 
who had what was described as ‘traditional use’ of scheduled drugs, 
were obliged to end the use of such substances within 25 years. In 
a similar fashion to the traditional use of the coca leaf in the Andes 
this has, perhaps unsurprisingly, not happened (the 25 year window 
perhaps being a signal that it was never likely to either). There are 
still ‘official’ government bhang shops in some cities such as Varanasi 
and Puri (and others across Rajasthan), and it is still widely used 
during religious festivals, as well as on a more regular basis by a 
small number of holy men or Sadhus. Recreational use of bhang by 
Western tourists is not uncommon. Production of the bhang, which 
is relatively low potency and most commonly eaten or in a beverage, 
is essentially unregulated, operating much like production of herbs 
and spices. 
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A ‘Government Authorised’ traditional cannabis shop in Jaisalmer, India, 2006
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Smallscaledomesticproductionforpersonaluse
As has been discussed above, cannabis is relatively simple for indi-
vidual users to grow and prepare for use in their own gardens, or 
own homes using freely available lighting and grow systems. These 
cannot be legally restricted or controlled as they have a wide range of 
other legitimate uses. Given this reality, small scale domestic produc-
tion has become increasingly popular and widespread, supported by a 
burgeoning industry in growing guides and literature, technology and 
paraphernalia. This development has been facilitated by the difficulty 
in legislating against the distribution of cannabis seeds, which do not 
themselves contain the active drugs.186
Some countries have put in place regulations for domestic produc-
tion for personal medical use. Canada—as discussed above—is a good 
example. Under the Medical Marihuana Access Division regulations it 
allows the issuing of ‘personal use production licenses’, which allow small 
scale production (using a formula to determine a limited number of 
plants/yields) under strict licensing criteria. 
In Spain the policies of decriminalisation of personal possession and use 
of cannabis also cover the right for individuals to grow a limited number 
of plants for their own personal use. 
Discussion
The licensed production of cannabis, on a medium to large scale, for 
medical use in a number of countries, demonstrates clearly how it 
is possible for such production to take place in a way that addresses 
both security concerns and quality control issues. Production for non-
medical use would presumably not need to meet quite such exacting 
standards on either front. For example, going as far as growing in an 
underground mine would seem somewhat excessive. 
186 Seeds are, for example, legal in the UK and Canada, but not in the USA.
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Legitimate concerns about diversion to illegal markets could be 
addressed through appropriate licensing of growers and suppliers, 
combined with effective enforcement where violations of licensing 
conditions were identified. Clearly the economic incentive to divert 
to illegal markets would progressively diminish as legal production 
expanded and undermined the profits currently on offer to illegal 
suppliers. As with opium and coca products discussed above, the 
expansion of legal production would be incremental over a number 
of years, allowing for a manageable transition and the evolution of an 
effective regulatory infrastructure in response to any emerging issues 
and challenges. 
It seems likely that—if a legal, retail supply was available—home 
growing for personal use would become an increasingly minority 
pursuit, rather like home brewing of wine or beer: the preserve of a 
small group of hobbyists and cannabis connoisseurs. In practical terms 
it would be near impossible to license non-commercial small scale 
production, even if some of the product was circulated amongst friends. 
Home tobacco growing in the UK is theoretically subject to customs 
duty but is virtually non-existent. Basic guidelines could be made 
publicly available and limits could be placed on how much production 
was allowed for any individual but experience with such schemes in 
Europe suggests they are hard to enforce and often ignored by police 
and growers alike. A licensing model might become appropriate for 
small to medium sized cannabis clubs or societies of growers who 
share supply/exchange on a non-profit basis, so that age and quality 
controls could be put in place, and some degree of accountability could 
be established.
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